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to enhance vastly China’s sea-based nu-
clear deterrent, was reportedly launched
in 2004. The image is inspired by poster
art produced by the Naval War College
Visual Communications Division for the
College’s “China’s New Nuclear Sub-
marine Fleet” Research Symposium, held
26–27 October 2005—a conference that
produced a study, appearing in this issue,
of “China’s Maturing Navy,” by Rear
Admiral Eric A. McVadon, U.S. Navy
(Retired).
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FROM THE EDITORS
This issue of the Naval War College Review completes the transition to a new
editor—joined as of the previous issue, as readers may have noted, by a newly
minted Editorial Board. A few remarks about this panel and, more generally, the
future editorial direction of the Review are therefore appropriate.
The new Editorial Board is a working group, representative of all of the major
teaching and research departments of the Naval War College. As such, it signals
our intention that the Review be more comprehensively reflective of the intellec-
tual life of this institution than has sometimes been the case in the past. The
board reaches out as well to the broader intellectual community throughout the
United States (and, it should be noted, in the United Kingdom) interested in and
conversant with naval and maritime affairs and strategic studies more generally.
The overall composition of the panel highlights the Review’s long-standing
commitment to scholarly standards of a high order in this field, and the central-
ity to its overall mission of the naval and maritime dimension of international
security. Matters of current (and historical) interest to the sea services of the
United States will have the first claim on our editorial attention. At the same
time, mindful as we must be of the increasingly joint and interagency character
of contemporary warfare, we will continue to pay due attention to military and
security issues of relevance across the services as well as to the framework of na-
tional policy that shapes and is shaped by them.
The lead article of this issue nicely exemplifies this broader focus. In “Trans-
forming the U.S. Global Defense Posture,” Ryan Henry, currently Principal Deputy
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, provides an authoritative overview of the
unprecedented effort undertaken by the U.S. government over the last several
years to review and realign its overseas basing structure and associated alliance
relationships. The implications of these developments have yet to be fully as-
sessed, especially as they affect the Navy and Marine Corps, but they are likely to
be far-reaching. Mr. Henry’s paper also appears in a collection of essays on this
subject, Reposturing the Force: U.S. Overseas Presence in the Twenty-first Century,
which was prepared in parallel by the Naval War College Press for publication as
the twenty-sixth monograph in its Newport Papers series.
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With this issue, the Review introduces what we expect to become a regular
feature, articles under the rubric “Asia Rising,” this time on India and China’s
emerging navy. Our particular focus on the People’s Republic of China will be
supported by innovative analyses currently being carried out within the Center
for Naval Warfare Studies of the rapidly burgeoning Chinese military literature.
Admiral Eric McVadon’s overview of Chinese naval capabilities is based on a pa-
per he delivered at a conference on the Chinese nuclear submarine force held in
Newport in October 2005 under the Center’s auspices.
War gaming has a long and honorable history in the U.S. Navy and is a core
competency of the Center for Naval Warfare Studies. But the historical and analyt-
ical literature on this subject is surprisingly thin. Robert Rubel, currently director
of the Wargaming Department of CNWS, provides in his “The Epistemology of
War Gaming” a valuable insider’s analysis of the conceptual underpinnings of this
arcane subject and, in particular, of the many misconceptions that too often
compromise its value. This article is the first of a regular feature, “Research,
Analysis, and Gaming,” that will explore various aspects of the methodologies of
military-oriented research.
With this issue, the Naval War College Review marks the passing of one of our
institution’s most distinguished recent presidents, Vice Admiral Arthur M.
Cebrowski. Admiral Cebrowski led the Naval War College (and the Navy War-
fare Development Command, which had recently relocated to Newport) from
July 1998 through August 2001; he retired from the Navy in October 2001 after
thirty-seven years of service. Shortly thereafter, he was appointed by the Secre-
tary of Defense as Director, Office of Force Transformation, and served there
until January 2005. Admiral Cebrowski passed away on 12 November 2005 at the
National Naval Medical Center in Bethesda, after a long struggle with cancer,
and was buried in Arlington National Cemetery on 9 January 2006. We are for-
tunate to be able to publish a retrospective essay on Admiral Cebrowski’s life and
his intellectual contributions to the Navy and the Department of Defense by Mr.
James Blaker, who worked closely with him for some fifteen years.
SURFACE NAVY ASSOCIATION LITERARY AWARD
At its eighteenth annual symposium, held 10–13 January 2006, the Surface Navy
Association announced the newest winners of the awards it confers each year for
the best professional articles addressing surface Navy or surface warfare issues.
Two of the awards this time went to Naval War College Review authors—to
whom our sincerest congratulations. The overall winner was Thomas
Wildenberg, for his “Midway: Sheer Luck or Better Doctrine?” in our Winter 2005
issue. Honorable mention went to John R. Benedict, for “The Unraveling and
Revitalization of U.S. Navy Antisubmarine Warfare,” in the Spring 2005 issue.
4 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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NEWPORT PAPER 26
Reposturing the Force: U.S. Overseas Presence in the Twenty-first Century, edited
by Carnes Lord, is available from the editorial office and online. It provides a
snapshot of the ongoing reconfiguration of America’s foreign military “foot-
print” abroad—a process that is likely to prove of the most fundamental impor-
tance for the long-term security of the United States yet that has so far received
little systematic attention. Its essays combine rigor and authoritativeness. Ryan
Henry and Lincoln Bloomfield, Jr., have been central figures in the Global De-
fense Posture Review; their papers were specially commissioned for this volume
(Mr. Henry’s appears also in this issue of the Review). Robert Harkavy places
current developments in a larger historical and strategic framework. Andrew
Erickson and Justin Mikolay provide an in-depth analysis of the role of Guam in
the posture of the U.S. military in the western Pacific. Finally, Robert Work ex-
amines the emerging concept of “sea basing.”
F R O M T H E E D I T O R S 5
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Rear Admiral Jacob L. Shuford was commissioned in
1974 from the Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps
program at the University of South Carolina. His initial
assignment was to USS Blakely (FF 1072). In 1979,
following a tour as Operations and Plans Officer for
Commander, Naval Forces Korea, he was selected as an
Olmsted Scholar and studied two years in France at the
Paris Institute of Political Science. He also holds
master’s degrees in public administration (finance)
from Harvard and in national security studies and
strategy from the Naval War College, where he
graduated with highest distinction.
After completing department head tours in USS Deyo
(DD 989) and in USS Mahan (DDG 42), he com-
manded USS Aries (PHM 5). His first tour in Washing-
ton included assignments to the staff of the Chief of
Naval Operations and to the Office of the Secretary of
the Navy, as speechwriter, special assistant, and per-
sonal aide to the Secretary.
Rear Admiral Shuford returned to sea in 1992 to com-
mand USS Rodney M. Davis (FFG 60). He assumed
command of USS Gettysburg (CG 64) in January 1998,
deploying ten months later to Fifth and Sixth Fleet oper-
ating areas as Air Warfare Commander (AWC) for the
USS Enterprise Strike Group. The ship was awarded the
Battle Efficiency “E” for Cruiser Destroyer Group 12.
Returning to the Pentagon and the Navy Staff, he di-
rected the Surface Combatant Force Level Study. Fol-
lowing this task, he was assigned to the Plans and Policy
Division as chief of staff of the Navy’s Roles and Mis-
sions Organization. He finished his most recent Penta-
gon tour as a division chief in J8—the Force Structure,
Resources and Assessments Directorate of the Joint
Staff—primarily in the theater air and missile defense
mission areas. His most recent Washington assignment
was to the Office of Legislative Affairs as Director of
Senate Liaison.
In October 2001 he assumed duties as Assistant Com-
mander, Navy Personnel Command for Distribution.
Rear Admiral Shuford assumed command of Cruiser
Destroyer Group 3 in August 2003. He became the fifty-
first President of the Naval War College on 12 August
2004.
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PRESIDENT’S FORUM
Our Sailors must be empowered to operate and fight in a vast ar-
ray of environments. . . . They must be equipped with the tools
and skills to meet these challenges and to develop as leaders. We
must . . . encourage and reward continuing education and train-
ing. . . [and] institutionalize executive development.
ADMIRAL MIKE MULLEN, USN, CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
EARLIER THIS YEAR, the Chief of Naval Operations articulated eight
tenets that guide his vision for the twenty-first-century Navy. In the excerpt
above (from his “What I Believe,” in the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings of Janu-
ary 2006), he cites the need for all members of the Navy manpower team (officer,
enlisted, and civilian) to develop the skills and competencies needed to succeed
in the wide array of circumstances they will encounter in the decades ahead. The
Naval War College (NWC) is now actively engaged in helping the Navy’s leader-
ship to define an approach to Navy professional development that, first, empowers
and enables individuals to manage their own career growth, and second, provides
them with the critical guidance and milestone data they need to craft personalized
paths of lifelong learning. This is vital work, since our greatest strength as a mili-
tary service comes from the hard work and genius of the men and women who
transform our Navy into an effective instrument of national power.
Since the service’s founding over two centuries ago, Navy personnel have gained
the maritime skills needed to serve at sea and ashore through a combination of
training, education, and experience. As technology progressed from sail to steam to
nuclear power, this process became more formalized, but the primary components
remained the same: training to develop basic skills, education to enhance critical
thinking abilities, and experience to put the knowledge gained through study into
practical application.
It is highly appropriate that much of the current thinking about Navy lifelong
learning is taking place in Newport, since it was here in 1875 that then-Captain
Stephen B. Luce established the U.S. Navy’s apprentice training program
(aboard USS New Hampshire, anchored off the city of Newport), and that ulti-
mately the headquarters of the apprentice training squadron was established (on
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Coasters Harbor Island, which in 1884 would also become the home of the Naval
War College).
Today, faculty and staff from the Navy’s most senior school for officers, the Naval
War College, and its most senior school for enlisted personnel, the Senior Enlisted
Academy, are working closely together to develop a Professional Military Education
(PME) Continuum that will serve as the armature for developing leaders from sea-
man to admiral. The creation of the PME Continuum will be facilitated by the es-
tablishment of processes and procedures that foster effectiveness, collaboration,
alignment, and efficiency among the Navy’s flagship educational institutions that
will ultimately be tasked with executing the program. Efforts are well under way to
harness the collective intellectual energy of these institutions in a manner that maxi-
mizes their positive impact on the development of our future leaders at all levels.
The Professional Military Education Continuum
Developing sailors begins with the accession process, and considerable time and
money go into ensuring that sailors are as prepared as possible when we “pull the
trigger” and send them to their first assignment. But just as midcourse guidance
is necessary to keep a modern cruise missile on track, we must be prepared to
provide our men and women with the additional learning opportunities they
need to help them adjust to the changing environment as they progress in their
careers. The evolving PME Continuum will be an orderly and prescribed series
of learning opportunities, spread over an entire career, that will provide person-
nel with the skills and competencies necessary to serve effectively in positions of
increasing responsibility and complexity. The challenge of managing this con-
tinuum belongs to the Naval War College.
In a November 2004 general message to the Navy, the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions directed the establishment of the PME Continuum, to be a career-long se-
ries of educational opportunities that are relevant to accomplishing the Navy’s
missions and also supportive of the professional and personal growth of all sail-
ors. He stated, “We must adopt a more comprehensive approach to education
that fully acknowledges the relevance of education to combat effectiveness and
mission success.” The continuum applies to the Total Force, including all officers
and enlisted personnel in both the active and reserve components. Professional
Military Education will: (1) equip all sailors with the right knowledge and skills
at the right time; (2) be a key factor in billet assignment and career progression;
and (3) use the Five Vector Model and the Integrated Learning Environment to
deliver blended learning options.*
8 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
* The Five Vector Model is a pictorial representation of an individual’s career, with key milestones
identified along five different developmental vectors. The Integrated Learning Environment in-
cludes both resident and nonresident education and training opportunities, blended together in an
integrated learning program.
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The Naval War College is now responsible for coordinating the creation and
maintenance of the educational content and for sequencing the delivery of the
various elements of the PME Continuum. The generic term “PME” has been de-
fined to include:
• Navy Professional Military Education (NPME), educational content that
teaches sailors about the various Navy warfare communities and the
individuals and organizations that support them. It provides a broad and
common understanding of the Navy and its full capabilities, thereby
preparing our sailors to perform their mission effectively across the full
spectrum of naval and joint military operations.
• Joint Professional Military Education (JPME), education about the
capabilities and limitations of the various military departments within the
Department of Defense and other governmental agencies that work
together in “joint warfare.” This education will enhance the ability of naval
leaders to provide unique and complementary warfighting from the sea to
joint commanders.
Primary-Level Professional Military Education. In collaboration with a num-
ber of Navy subject-matter experts (from such institutions as the Naval Post-
graduate School, the Naval Academy, the Navy Historical Center, the Naval
Justice School, the Navy Warfare Development Command, and the various war-
fare community schools), we have developed an integrated multimedia course
to provide graduates with:
• A basic understanding of the tenets of naval science
• An introductory-level understanding of service capabilities and the
fundamentals of joint warfare
• A primary-level ability to function as maritime advocates and
spokespersons.
The course, to be delivered over the Internet from the Navy Knowledge On-
line (NKO) portal, will be a self-paced course consisting of approxi-
mately sixty-five hours of instruction, organized into five general themes: The
Culture of the Navy, Governance of the Navy, How the Navy Thinks about War,
How the Navy Plans Its Operations, and Technology and Warfare in the Mari-
time Domain.
Enrollment is planned to start in May 2006. Consistent with the notion of the
continuum as a series of related learning opportunities that build upon one an-
other, it is expected that completion of this course will become a requirement for
promotion to lieutenant commander and a prerequisite for enrollment in an
P R E S I D E N T ’ S F O R U M 9
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Intermediate-Level College (ILC) program. Course completion may also be-
come a prerequisite for attendance at the Senior Enlisted Academy. With the es-
tablishment of the Primary PME course, and for the first time in the Navy’s
history, all individuals (regardless of commissioning source, designator, or ca-
reer subspecialty) moving toward leadership positions will have common and
integrating educational experiences that provide a unifying vision of the capa-
bilities, limitations, and goals of the institution they have sworn to serve.
Intermediate-Level PME. Once the new Primary PME course has commenced,
the College of Naval Command and Staff (CNC&S), which has always been offi-
cially designated by the Joint Staff as an Intermediate-Level College, will become
an intermediate course in fact, falling between the primary and senior-level pro-
grams offered by NWC. Since all sailors will now report to NWC as graduates of
the Primary course, we have been able to restructure the CNC&S curricula to fo-
cus more tightly on the competencies appropriate to the midgrade professional.
It is expected that graduates of both the resident and nonresident versions of
the CNC&S course will be skilled in applying operational art to maritime, joint,
multi-agency, and multinational warfighting; skilled in the joint and Navy plan-
ning processes; capable of critical thought with operational perspectives; pre-
pared for operational-level leadership challenges; and expert in conveying the
maritime perspective. Over the past twelve months, a great deal of work has
gone into revising the intermediate curricula, but I am convinced—and our fleet
commanders have confirmed—that we are on the right track toward helping
our students prepare themselves confidently and effectively to support, drive,
and lead joint, multinational, and interagency processes both in Washington
and in major headquarters staffs and activities around the world.
Senior-Level PME. The third level of the PME Continuum is provided by the
College of Naval Warfare curriculum. This curriculum, which is currently only
available to resident students on our home campus in Newport, provides stu-
dents with executive-level preparation for higher responsibilities as senior captains/
colonels and flag/general officers and members of the Senior Executive Service
(SES). In contrast to the outcomes expected from the intermediate-level gradu-
ates just discussed above, senior-level graduates will be skilled in formulating
and executing strategy and U.S. policy; skilled in joint war fighting, theater strat-
egy, and campaign planning; capable of strategically minded critical thinking;
and capable of excelling in positions of strategic leadership. These desired out-
comes are clearly focused on the skills needed by senior leaders, which most
graduates will either become or closely support those needed at the executive
level.
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Flag-Level Education. In previous issues of the Review, we have discussed our
efforts to establish the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC)
course (see, particularly, Winter 2006). The leadership of our Navy has recently
embraced the JFMCC concept as the way to optimize the employment of naval
and other military capabilities within the joint force. The JFMCC is the joint
force commander’s maritime war fighter, reporting to and advising the com-
mander on the proper employment of maritime forces. Our newly developed
course provides flag and general officers hands-on exposure to the issues in-
volved in directing maritime forces in a joint, multinational, and interagency
context. The JFMCC course also improves the ability of its graduates to analyze
and clearly articulate how maritime forces can help achieve the joint com-
mander’s objectives, so that the commander is fully aware, at all levels and stages
of planning and execution, of the effects—critical to campaign objectives—that
naval capabilities and unique modes of employment from the sea can yield. The
JFMCC course will be offered several times during the remainder of calendar
year 2006.
Next Steps
In the year ahead, the College will be working closely with the Senior Enlisted
Academy and others to develop the components of the PME Continuum appli-
cable to the junior and midlevel enlisted ranks. Actions are well under way to
formulate the myriad of elements that will constitute a complete PME Contin-
uum and to put into place the administrative processes needed to manage the
program. The resources expended in this effort are indeed investments in the fu-
ture, and the return on investment will be seen in the level of improved leader-
ship and decision making that result. This is an ever-changing environment, and
the professional development of our people will always be a work in progress.
The full intellectual capacity of the College’s faculty and staff will remain en-
gaged in providing our students with the tools, skills, and competencies they will
need to succeed in the future.
J. L. SHUFORD
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, Naval War College
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TRANSFORMING THE U.S. GLOBAL DEFENSE POSTURE
Ryan Henry
At the end of 2004, the world was witness to an event that no one could haveforeseen. Even more startling than the shock of the Indian Ocean tsunami
itself was the scale of its impact. But the very suddenness and speed with which
the tsunami struck gave a glimpse of how valuable it is to posture our forces for
uncertainty. Had the tsunami occurred in 1985, at the height of the Cold War, it
is difficult to imagine that the United States could have surged the forces and lo-
gistical support needed to deliver food and water to the areas of the eastern In-
dian Ocean that were the hardest hit. It is even more difficult to imagine that the
United States could have depended on an extensive network of partner nations
to assist us in exercising our global responsibility to act. Only through the trans-
formation of the U.S. military’s capabilities and the growing flexibility of our
overseas posture was the United States able to respond as quickly and effectively
as it did during this crisis.
The security environment at the start of the twenty-first century is perhaps
the most uncertain it has been in our nation’s history. This article focuses on the
strategic realities that are driving the transformation of the American global de-
fense posture to contend with that uncertainty, and the resultant changes the
Department of Defense is working to bring about in our relationships and part-
nership capabilities around the world.
NEW STRATEGIC LANDSCAPE
The impetus for the transformation that put us in a position to respond quickly
and effectively to the Indian Ocean tsunami was the emergence of a new strate-
gic landscape. Since 2002, the U.S. military has been adapting the posture of its
forces to address the key security challenges that our country will face in the
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twenty-first century. Traditional, state-based military challenges—for which
our Cold War posture was optimized—will remain, but as the 11 September
2001 attacks revealed, a broader range of security challenges has emerged. The
events of 9/11 showed the destructive potential of terrorists and the vulnerabil-
ity of the United States and of its allies to unwarned attack. It showed the effec-
tiveness of asymmetric methods in countering U.S. conventional military
superiority and sounded an early warning of the approaching confluence of terror-
ism, state sponsorship of terrorism, and proliferation of weapons of mass de-
struction (WMD) enabled by globalization. It focused our attention on a hostile
ideology that openly advocates the killing of innocents for political gain, and it
proved that globalization has made failed states and ungoverned areas in the
most remote corners of the world grave dangers to our security.
The Secretary of Defense’s 2005 National Defense Strategy provides a concep-
tual framework for understanding this new strategic landscape, which may be
said to span four types of security challenges: traditional, irregular, catastrophic,
and disruptive.
• Traditional: states employing military forces in well-known forms of
military competition and conflict (such as major combat operations
employing conventional air, sea, and land forces)
• Irregular: nonstate and state actors employing “unconventional” methods
to counter stronger state opponents (for instance, terrorism, insurgency,
civil war, and other methods aimed to erode influence and political will)
• Catastrophic: terrorists or rogue states employing WMD or WMD-like
effects against American interests (for example, massive attacks on the
homeland, collapsing global markets, or loss of key allies that would inflict
a state of shock upon political and commercial activity)
• Disruptive: competitors employing breakout technologies or methods that
counter or cancel our military superiority (e.g., advances in bio-, cyber-, or
space war, ultra-miniaturization, directed energy).
As recent experience has shown, these challenges often converge and overlap.
Our adversaries in Iraq and Afghanistan have employed both traditional and ir-
regular approaches, and terrorist organizations like al-Qa‘ida are posing irregu-
lar threats while actively seeking catastrophic capabilities.
THE BROAD VIEW OF “TRANSFORMATION”
President Bush came to office in 2001 with an aggressive agenda for defense
transformation. He charged Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld with trans-
forming the Defense Department for the challenges of the twenty-first century.
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The administration’s sense of the changed strategic landscape led to a new assess-
ment of our needed global defense posture. What is emerging from that as-
sessment is the most profound reordering of U.S. military forces overseas since
World War II and the Korean War. The key to understanding this realignment ef-
fort is transformation.
When he arrived at the Pentagon, Secretary Rumsfeld recognized the need for
change. He understood that the strategic and operational environment today is
defined by uncertainty, that the world is changing in relation to that environment,
and that we need to view that world as it is and adapt to it as necessary. The
threat-based planning system prevalent in the Cold War—through which we
could project a seemingly predefined and predetermined Soviet threat and how to
posture against it—had become obsolete. Overcoming our preconceptions of that
era, Secretary Rumsfeld led the department in taking the first step of transforma-
tion by shifting away from threat-based planning and toward a capabilities-based
approach that addresses the full spectrum of feasible threats. This approach posits
that unlike in the Cold War, we no longer know precisely what threats we will face
in the future, who will pose them, and where, much less when. However, we do be-
lieve there will be future challengers to American interests and to the interests of
our allies and partners, and that we must plan against the kinds of capabilities po-
tential adversaries may employ to exploit our vulnerabilities.
Revisiting the framework of the four security challenges, this approach
means first recognizing that the Defense Department’s (and the nation’s) com-
fort zone has long been in the realm of “traditional challenges.” Through trans-
formation, the department has moved beyond this traditional focus and begun
applying its thinking and capabilities to the other three sets of challenges—
irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive. Our global defense posture realignment
will leave us in much better shape to face the uncertainty that inheres within
these nontraditional challenges.
Our sense of the new strategic landscape—and the opportunities opened up
by emerging technologies—has led to a new way of measuring military effective-
ness. Numbers of troops and weapon platforms are no longer the key metrics.
Rather, military effectiveness is now a matter of capabilities—speed, stealth,
reach, knowledge, precision, and lethality. Thus, our defense planning should
place less emphasis on numbers of forward forces than upon capabilities and de-
sired effects that can be achieved rapidly.
Transformation also calls for increased effectiveness and efficiency. Within
the Defense Department, it has strengthened jointness among military services
through joint presence policy, as well as smarter business practices for man-
aging the day-to-day workings of the institution. At the interagency level, it
has improved transparency and generated new approaches to problem solving.
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Transformation has also strengthened momentum for changing the relationship
between the department and its people, by keeping faith with their expectations
of quality of life in a time of increased operational tempo.
If changing relationships is a hallmark of transformation, the greatest impact
of all has been on American relationships with allies and partners. The adminis-
tration understands that the United States cannot “go it alone” in world affairs.
Among our country’s key strategic assets is the network of alliances and partner-
ships that allows us to enjoy the benefits of international cooperation in virtu-
ally every endeavor we undertake. This network is the most vital asset we have as
a nation in the Global War on Terror. It is instrumental in developing a common
understanding of shared threats and in working jointly to contend with them,
particularly through partnership capacity building.
We call the relationships dimension of transformation security cooperation. It
is important to understand that this term is not synonymous with “engage-
ment”—or with showing the U.S. flag overseas as an end in itself. Rather, secu-
rity cooperation is the means by which the Department of Defense encourages
and enables allies and partners to work with us to achieve common strategic ob-
jectives, thereby building the capability and capacity of the partnership.
In a sense, security cooperation is capabilities-based planning as applied to
relationships with our allies and partners. Whereas during the Cold War we
supported our NATO and Pacific Rim allies against threats to their borders, to-
day we work with allies and partners who share our sense that security chal-
lenges transcend specific borders and threaten societies on a global scale. Just as
capabilities-based planning positions the United States to contend with ad-
versarial capabilities in an uncertain environment, security cooperation enables
the United States to confront a spectrum of threats to its own security and that of
allies and partners—anywhere, at any time. This invokes an important, symbiotic
relationship between security cooperation and our global defense posture. Global
posture serves as the platform for implementing security cooperation activities.
Conversely, security cooperation activities help develop and maintain the access
needed for posturing our forces to contend with future uncertainties.
In sum, transformation is far more dynamic than the common conception of
applying high technology in war. For the Defense Department, it is about:
• A command climate that swept away preconceived notions of strategic
affairs and of the department’s traditional role in those affairs
• The shift from a threat-based to a capabilities-based approach
• The need for increased efficiency and effectiveness
• The shift from engagement to security cooperation.
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Transformational thinking respects the facts, rejects fixed ideas, and promotes
new and necessary relationships and capabilities that position us to contend
with the uncertainty of the new strategic landscape.
THE GENESIS OF THE U.S. GLOBAL DEFENSE POSTURE
Before turning to how this transformation has helped drive the strategy for re-
aligning our global defense posture, a bit of history is in order. In 1985, at the
height of the Cold War, the United States had 358,000 military personnel de-
ployed in Europe, 125,000 in East Asia, and nine thousand in the Persian Gulf. In
Europe, ground, air, and naval forces were stationed in support of NATO from
Iceland in the northwest to Turkey in the southeast. In the Pacific region, forces
were stationed in Korea, the Philippines, and Japan. Our defense posture at that
time was the product of the collective legacy of the wars of the mid-twentieth
century, but our basing and operating patterns were relatively well matched to
the challenges of the Cold War era. Forces in Europe and Asia were primarily de-
signed to fight in place—potent for defensive operations close to garrison, but
difficult to deploy outside of the theater where they were stationed. Essentially,
we maintained forward-deployed forces that served as defensive tripwires.
The end of the Cold War dramatically altered the global landscape. As a re-
sult, during the first half of the 1990s the United States closed or turned over to
host governments about 60 percent of its overseas military installations and re-
turned nearly three hundred thousand military personnel to the United States.
During the 1990s the United States also closed large military facilities in the
Philippines, Spain, and Panama.
By the mid-1990s, although we had dramatically reduced the overall numbers
of forward-stationed military forces, they remained concentrated largely in
Western Europe and Northeast Asia. After the end of the Cold War, however, our
operating patterns had diverged from our basing posture. Western Europe and
Northeast Asia had become springboards for operations in the Balkans, the Per-
sian Gulf, and later, Central Asia. The result was a shift in the rationale for our
forward posture—forces were no longer expected to fight in place. Rather, their
purpose was to project into theaters that were likely to be some distance away
from their garrisons. In other words, while a primary purpose of forward pres-
ence was to provide for the direct territorial defense of treaty allies, this could no
longer be the sole purpose. Threats to the security of our nation and that of our
allies had begun emerging in unexpected and faraway lands.
However, new necessities of geopolitics and operational flexibility overseas
were not the only motivations for transforming our global posture. The other
major impetus was domestic in nature. Stresses on our military forces and their
families also dictated that we review our posture globally. “Accompanied tours”
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(in which families moved with the service members) designed in an era of static
deployments had become more of a hardship for families as service members
deployed more frequently from their forward stations. In increasing numbers,
accompanying dependents faced “double separation”—separated both from
their loved ones in uniform and from their communities and extended families
back in the United States.
In his 2001 review of our defense strategy and capabilities, Secretary
Rumsfeld challenged the Department of Defense to change how it conceptual-
ized and projected American presence overseas so as to contend with uncer-
tainty and surprise. Some remained unconvinced of the need for change, but the
terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 abruptly dispelled any doubt. No one
foresaw this catastrophic event, but our administration had already made the
mental leap—expect uncertainty and surprise—inherently necessary to re-
spond effectively. The attacks coincided in a tragic manner with the defense
transformation already under way.
The confluence of these transformational factors—the president’s sense of
the new strategic landscape, the mandate for change from the 2001 review, and
the shock of 9/11—galvanized the forces of change. In the midst of these co-
alescing events, the secretary of defense initiated the Global Defense Posture
Review, a comprehensive, strategy-based reassessment of the size, location,
types, and capabilities of our forward military forces. We surveyed the new stra-
tegic landscape and developed a global posture strategy that hinged upon
achieving geopolitically sound relationships and a disposition of relevant capa-
bilities forward to contend with uncertainty. This strategy was developed
through a wide range of consultations—with policy makers and military leaders
throughout the department, within the interagency realm, and with defense in-
tellectuals. The secretary then turned to his combatant commanders* to devise
specific proposals for posture changes to implement the strategy. This ensured
that what seemed strategically sound could be made operationally feasible. The
development of these proposals largely revolved around three general areas of
realignment:
• Adjusting our presence in Europe by shifting away from legacy Cold War
structures
• Reforming our posture in the Pacific, with increased emphasis on key
capabilities to assure allies more effectively, dissuade potential competitors,
deter aggressors, and defeat adversaries if called upon to do so
1 8 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
* The combatant commanders, who report through the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the
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• Developing the operational flexibility and diversity in options needed to
contend with uncertainty in the “arc of instability”—the vast region from
North Africa across the Middle East and South Asia to Southeast Asia.
In 2002, the president confirmed the change of direction in defense planning in
the National Security Strategy of the United States: “To contend with uncertainty and
to meet the many security challenges we face, the United States will require bases
and stations within and beyond Western Europe and Northeast Asia, as well as tem-
porary access arrangements for the long-distance deployment of U.S. forces.”
The Defense Department’s strategy was exported to the U.S. government as a
whole, so that the Global Defense Posture Review would not be driven just by
military considerations. The Defense Department collaborated closely with its
interagency partners—particularly the State Department—from the start. The
National Security Council, as the body overseeing posture changes, provided
high-level guidance and input. Thus the global defense posture realignment be-
came the strategy of the U.S. government.
The Defense Department also consulted extensively with allies and partners.
In November 2003 the president formally announced intensified consultations
with allies and partners on the Global Defense Posture Review. Subsequently, se-
nior Defense and State officials held joint consultations in over twenty foreign
capitals, many of which are still going on in various forms.
GLOBAL POSTURE STRATEGY UNVEILED
On 16 August 2004, in a culminating point for Defense Department planners,
the secretary’s new global defense posture strategy, molded by interagency in-
put, was adopted by the president in an announcement of the administration’s
intention to move forward: “Today I announce a new plan for deploying Amer-
ica’s armed forces. . . . The new plan will help us fight and win the wars of the 21st
century. It will strengthen our alliances around the world while we build new
partnerships to better preserve the peace.”
While the global posture strategy does not comprise everything the American
defense establishment is doing overseas, its implementation serves as the foun-
dation for changing U.S. defense policy abroad. It is the department’s vehicle for
translating transformation into relevant and effective defense relationships and
capabilities for the emerging security environment. The global defense posture
strategy is composed of five key themes, which emerged from the review and the
evolving transformational thinking of the department described earlier. These
themes now serve as the measures of effectiveness for global posture changes.
Improve Flexibility to Contend with Uncertainty. Much of our existing over-
seas posture was established during the Cold War, when we thought we knew
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where we would have to fight. Today, however, we often have to deploy to places
that few people, if anyone, would have predicted. Thus, we should plan in ways
that mitigate surprise. Our goal is to have forces positioned forward on a con-
tinual basis, with access and facilities that enable them to reach any potential
crisis spot quickly.
Strengthen Allied Roles and Build New Partnerships. Changes to our global
posture aim to help our allies and friends modernize their own forces, strategies,
and doctrines. We are exploring ways in which we can enhance our collective de-
fense capabilities, ensuring that our future alliances and partnerships are capa-
ble, affordable, sustainable, and relevant. At the same time, we seek to tailor our
military’s overseas “footprint” to suit local conditions, reduce friction with host
nations, and respect local sensitivities. A critical precept in our global posture
planning is that the United States will place forces only where those forces are
wanted and welcomed by the host government and populace.
Create the Capacity to Act Both within and across Regions. In the Cold War years,
we focused on threats to specific regions and tailored our military presence to
those regions. Now we are dealing with security challenges that are global in na-
ture, relationships that must address those challenges accordingly (e.g., Japan’s in-
volvement in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, or NATO’s involvement through the
International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan), and defense capabilities
that must be global in reach. We need to improve our ability to project power from
one region to another and to manage forces on a global basis.
Develop Rapidly Deployable Capabilities. We no longer expect to have to fight
in place. Our forces need to be able to move smoothly into, through, and out of
host nations. This puts a premium on establishing flexible legal and support ar-
rangements with our allies and partners. It also strengthens the demand for ca-
pabilities that provide increasingly global reach, such as the Army’s Stryker
brigade combat teams, the worldwide disposition of key prepositioned materi-
als and equipment, and improvements to global en route infrastructure and
strategic lift.
Focus on Effective Military Capabilities—Not Numbers of Personnel, Units, or
Equipment. Our key purpose is to push relevant capabilities forward—capabil-
ity being defined as the ability to achieve desired effects under certain standards
and conditions. We now can have far greater capabilities forward than in the
past, even with smaller permanently stationed forces. The Cold War practice of
“bean counting” numbers of personnel in administrative regions is no longer
the case. Capabilities matter, not numbers.
2 0 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
T:\Academic\NWC Review\NWC Review Spring 2006\Ventura\NWC Review Spring 2006.vp
Tuesday, April 11, 2006 8:22:33 AM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
26
Naval War College Review, Vol. 59 [2006], No. 2, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol59/iss2/1
A COMPLEX UNDERTAKING
The implementation process for realigning our global defense posture is an
enormously complex undertaking. These changes are not happening in a static
environment. Global posture is a dynamic, rolling process that incorporates the
transformational mind-set described earlier—continuously assessing the
geopolitical environment, incorporating new ideas into the strategy, and mak-
ing adjustments as necessary.
The key to understanding this dynamic undertaking is the recognition that
global posture is not monolithic—not just a matter of the physical military foot-
print of bases and personnel overseas. It includes:
• Our relationships with host nations
• The presence of activities overseas
• The legal arrangements needed to support that presence
• Our capacity to surge forces
• Our prepositioned equipment
• The global sourcing (or “force management”) needed to meet competing
demands.
The interrelationship among these posture elements is akin to an ecosystem.
This “ecosystem” (see figure) is defined by interdependent layers of political,
geographic, and operational access that enable security cooperation and prompt
global military action when needed. Changes on one level can have secondary
and tertiary effects on others. For example, changes in the legal arrangements
(an element of political access) that we have with one host nation can affect our
freedom of action (geographic access) throughout a theater and, consequently,
our ability to push relevant capabilities forward for operations. Achieving and
sustaining good political access through our relationships with host-nation
partners ensures the desired geographic access and, subsequently, the desired
operational access to rotate forces in theater for security cooperation activities
or to surge forces when needed in support of contingency operations. The chal-
lenge for global posture, which is akin to adjusting that ecosystem deliberately, is
in striking the right balance between our relationships and capabilities overseas
on the one hand and the dynamics of the complex and changing security envi-
ronment on the other.
Each of these layers of access deserves a closer look.
Political Access
Building and sustaining political access—that is, the will of host-nation allies
and partners to support U.S. military action when needed—require two posture
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elements: relationships and legal arrangements. Our ability to act around the
world is supported by key security relationships with allies and partners. These
relationships involve interactions at all levels—from heads of state to students
studying together in the schoolhouses that we and our allies provide. Changes in
global posture seek both to strengthen our existing relationships and to help cul-
tivate new relationships founded upon common security interests and common
values. These are critical to enhancing allied and partner military capabilities in
key areas, such as counterterrorism.
The set of bilateral and multilateral legal arrangements pertaining to our mil-
itary personnel and activities worldwide constitutes the formal framework for
our military presence, access, and activities in other countries. It defines the
rights and obligations of the parties, sets the terms for military access and activi-
ties, and provides protections for American personnel. Some of our planned pos-
ture changes require a foundation of new and more flexible legal arrangements.
Our new legal arrangements tend to be more concise than the elaborate arrange-
ments we entered into after World War II, addressing only key things the United
States needs for an expeditionary (rather than permanent) presence. These
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include operational flexibility, training, logistics, financial arrangements, and
status coverage for our forces. Critical to our success in this effort has been close
collaboration by the State and Defense departments to develop a solid inter-
agency team and a good diplomatic structure for consultations and
negotiations.
Geographic Access
Geographic access means having the necessary en route infrastructure to main-
tain our freedom of action globally; in posture planning it requires considerable
versatility in overseas facilities where our forces live, train, and operate. The re-
alignment of our global defense posture combines a network of traditional and
new facilities to enhance our capacity for prompt global action. This network
consists of three types of facilities—main operating bases (MOBs), forward oper-
ating sites (FOSs), and cooperative security locations (CSLs).
Main operating bases, with permanently stationed combat forces, have ro-
bust infrastructures such as family support facilities and strengthened arrange-
ments for force protection. Examples include Ramstein Air Base in Germany,
Kadena Air Base in Okinawa, and Camp Humphreys in Korea. We are retaining
and consolidating many of our MOBs in Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom,
Japan, Korea, and elsewhere. We also rely heavily on forward operating sites, ex-
pandable “warm facilities”maintained with a limited U.S. military support pres-
ence, and, possibly, prepositioned equipment. Greater use of prepositioned
equipment, strategically located and globally managed, will support training
with our allies and partners and facilitate the rapid deployment of forces where
and when they are needed. FOSs largely support rotational rather than perma-
nently stationed forces and are focuses for bilateral and regional training. Exam-
ples include the Sembawang port facility in Singapore and Soto Cano Air Base in
Honduras.
We also will need access to a broader range of facilities with little or no per-
manent American presence. Relying instead on periodic service, contractor, or
host-nation support, cooperative security locations provide contingency access
and serve as focal points for security cooperation activities. A good example is
Dakar, Senegal, where the Air Force has negotiated contingency landing, logis-
tics, and fuel contracting arrangements, and which served as a staging area for
the 2003 peace operation in Liberia. A June 2005 Atlantic Monthly article by
Robert Kaplan discusses presence in the Pacific in a way that captures the idea
behind CSLs:
We will want unobtrusive bases that benefit the host country much more obviously
than they benefit us. Allowing us the use of such a base would ramp up power from a
country rather than humiliating it. . . . Often the key role in managing a CSL is
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played by a private contractor[,] . . . [u]sually a retired American noncom. . . . He
rents his facilities at the base from the host country military, and then charges a fee to
the U.S. Air Force pilots transiting the base. Officially he is in business for himself,
which the host country likes because it can then claim it is not really working with
the American military. . . . [T]he very fact that a relationship with the U.S. armed
forces is indirect rather than direct eases tensions.
Operational Access
Finally, operational access comprises the presence, global management, and
surging of our forces overseas, all enabled by the political and geographic access
we enjoy with host-nation partners. Presence is defined by the permanent and
rotational forces that conduct military activities (training, exercises, and opera-
tions) worldwide, from security cooperation to crisis response. That presence
consists of both small units working together in a wide range of capacities and
major formations conducting elaborate exercises to achieve proficiency in multi-
national operations. Second, our posture supports our new approach to force
management, which seeks both to relieve stresses on our military forces and
their families and to manage our forces on a global, rather than regional, basis.
Combatant commanders no longer “own” forces in their theaters; rather, forces
are managed according to global priorities. Third, managing our military forces
globally also allows us to surge a greater percentage of the force wherever and
whenever necessary.
Tempo of Global Posture Changes
There is another dimension of global posture that underscores its multidimen-
sional nature: the cycle of interdependent processes at work in the Defense De-
partment—a cycle that sets the pace for posture changes, including institutional
transformation within the services, the U.S. government’s deliberations with
host-nation partners, and the Base Closure and Realignment (known as BRAC)
process. Global posture’s flexible, rolling decision-making process must ebb and
flow with these three processes.
Specifically, the process of consultations and negotiations with allies and
partners establishes a tempo for bringing American forces home. Over the next
ten years, from sixty to seventy thousand military personnel (along with approx-
imately a hundred thousand family members and civilian employees) are to re-
turn to the United States from overseas installations. This realignment will also
entail a net reduction of approximately 35 percent in our overseas facilities.
The pace for these changes is set through a deliberative diplomatic process
with current and potential host-nation partners in which we achieve common
understandings of the security environment, develop plans that ensure mutual
benefits and reliable defense commitments, and work to reduce any frictions
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attending upon the U.S. military presence. Multiple variables in negotiations—
such as host-nation stability and sensitivity to American presence, security chal-
lenges in the region, and existing levels of host-nation infrastructure and cost
sharing—are weighed across a diverse range of countries and regions.
U.S. forces that relocate as a result of this diplomatic process will be affected
by the absorptive capacity of service transformation efforts and by BRAC. The
planned posture changes directly support service initiatives—such as the
Army’s modularity and unit rotation concepts, the Navy’s Fleet Response Plan,
and the Air Force’s ongoing force management improvements—designed to fa-
cilitate personnel management, provide predictability in scheduling, and offer
more stability at home. Returning forces meet the services’ need to refit their
units for increased modularity. These transformed units then provide the com-
bat power for prosecuting operations in the Global War on Terror, including
Operations IRAQI FREEDOM and ENDURING FREEDOM. Of course, the absorp-
tive capacity of returning units is also directly impacted by BRAC, which sets the
pace for reconstitution of those forces in the continental United States.
Thus, a symbiotic relationship exists among global posture consultations/
negotiations overseas, service transformation, and BRAC, in which each
informs and dictates the pace of the others. Imagine a clock running on three
wheels, each wheel’s gears interlocked with the others. Slowing one wheel would
slow the entire clockwork, thereby impeding the pace of transformation to sup-
port the war on terror and enable our long-term realignment effort.
REGION-BY-REGION SYNOPSIS
Europe
Peace in Europe is no longer threatened by an enemy with tens of thousands of
armored vehicles poised to invade across the North German plain. We no longer need
heavy maneuver forces as the central element of our defense posture in Europe. A
transformed posture—one that supports NATO’s own transformation goals—
requires forward forces that are rapidly deployable for early entry into conflict
well beyond Europe. Such forces will continue to train alongside other NATO
forces to improve interoperability for twenty-first-century operations.
There are two basic components to posture changes in Europe: increasing ro-
tational presence toward the south and east of Europe, and pushing the most ef-
fective and relevant capabilities forward for expeditionary presence and
spurring allied transformation. Our future posture in Europe will be character-
ized by lighter, more deployable ground capabilities (for example, Stryker and
airborne forces). Such ground forces will have leaner command and support
structures than they have today. They will rely on existing advanced training
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facilities (such as in Grafenwoehr, Germany) and high-capacity mobility infra-
structure (in Ramstein, Germany, for instance). Special Operations forces will
play an increasingly important role in our future European posture. They will be
repositioned in the theater for training and operational efficiencies and for ease
of movement. Our naval and air capabilities in the theater will remain very ro-
bust and will enable rapid movement of forces into, through, and from Europe.
They too have already undergone transformations to leaner and more deploy-
able command structures.
The Asia-Pacific
In the Asia-Pacific region, we seek to strengthen our ability to execute the Na-
tional Defense Strategy and to solidify relationships that can help win the Global
War on Terror. We want to improve our ability to meet our alliance commit-
ments by strengthening our deterrent against threats such as that posed by
North Korea while helping our allies strengthen their own military capabilities.
The forward deployment of additional expeditionary maritime capabilities and
long-range strike assets in Alaska, Hawaii, and Guam will increase both our de-
terrent effect and our capacity for rapid response. In this region—in light of the
vast distances that military forces must traverse in crises—deterrence also
means increasing our ability to project military forces rapidly and at long
ranges, both to the region and within it. Where appropriate, we also will consoli-
date our facilities and headquarters for more streamlined command and control
and increased jointness. This facilitates a more expeditionary posture, as is the
case with the transformation of the U.S. Army’s Japan headquarters into a de-
ployable joint task force–capable headquarters. Finally, we seek to reduce the
number of American military forces in host nations where those forces abut
large urban populations. We will strengthen our relationships by reducing the
frictions—accidents, incidents, and the like—associated with normal military
activities in urban settings.
In a related initiative, over the past two years we have engaged with our Japa-
nese hosts in a series of sustained security consultations. These talks were aimed
at evolving the U.S.-Japan security alliance to reflect today’s rapidly changing
global security environment. The Defense Posture Review Initiative (DPRI) has
focused on alliance transformation at the strategic and operational levels, with
particular attention to the posture of U.S. and Japanese forces in Japan. In the
DPRI, we have negotiated several important force realignment initiatives de-
signed to relieve stresses in our relationship with Japan while strengthening our
deterrence and global flexibility. Among the more significant of these initiatives
are the consolidation of carrier jet aircraft based on mainland Japan, and a sig-
nificant reduction and reorganization of the Marine Corps posture on Okinawa.
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Our current ground, air, and naval access throughout the Asia-Pacific region
serves as a basis for a long-term presence that will be better structured for more
effective regional and global action. For example, the Army’s modular transfor-
mation will streamline headquarters elements and strengthen joint capabilities.
The forward-deployed Air Force Strike ISR (intelligence, surveillance, and re-
connaissance) task force in the Pacific will also enable greater regional and
global reach. We also are establishing a network of forward operating sites and
cooperative security locations to support better the war on terror and to provide
multiple avenues of access for contingency operations. Such facilities will serve
to expand U.S. and host-nation training opportunities, helping our partners
build their own capacities in areas such as counterterrorism.
On the Korean Peninsula, our planned enhancements and realignments are
intended to strengthen our overall military effectiveness for the combined de-
fense of the Republic of Korea. Stationed forces are relocating away from the in-
creasing congestion and sprawl of the greater Seoul area and consolidating into
two major hubs in the central and southern sections of the country. Rotational
and rapidly deployable combat capabilities such as Stryker units and air expedi-
tionary forces will complement these permanently stationed units. We seek to
retain a robust prepositioned equipment capability in Korea to support rapid
reinforcement.
The Middle East
In the Middle East, we seek to maintain a posture of “presence without perma-
nence”—prosecuting the Global War on Terror and assuring our allies and part-
ners, but without unduly heavy military footprints. Cooperation and access
provided by host nations during ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM pro-
vide us with a solid basis for long-term, cooperative relationships in this region.
We seek to maintain or upgrade—and in isolated cases establish—forward op-
erating sites and cooperative security locations for rotational and contingency
purposes, along with strategically placed prepositioned equipment and forward
command-and-control elements. Our posture also aims to strengthen our capa-
bilities on the peripheries of this region, including in the Horn of Africa and in
Central and South Asia. In addition, we continue to identify advanced training
opportunities with our regional partners for capacity building in such areas as
counterterrorism and for broader military interoperability.
Africa and the Western Hemisphere
Our aims in Africa and the Western Hemisphere are to broaden relationships,
build partnership capacity, obtain contingency access, and facilitate practical se-
curity cooperation activities, without creation of new bases or permanent mili-
tary presence.
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Ungoverned and undergoverned areas in vast swaths of sub-Saharan Africa
and South America can serve as breeding grounds not just for domestic insur-
gents but for international terrorists and other transnational threats that in-
creasingly find their “home bases” disappearing in other regions. We therefore
seek an array of CSLs in these regions for contingency access into remote areas.
Often this access will take the form of “gas and go” operations, as has been recent
practice as formalized in the Air Force’s Africa Fuels Initiative. Such CSLs will
not require a permanent combat presence. They will be focal points for com-
bined training with host nations and other allies and partners, and they will have
the capacity to expand and contract on the basis of operational needs.
Though much work remains, the realignment of the U.S. global defense posture
is well under way, particularly through the ongoing strengthening of American
military capabilities in Europe and the Pacific. The 1st Infantry Division has
commenced its redeployment from Germany. A brigade from the 2nd Infantry
Division in the Republic of Korea will redeploy to the United States upon com-
pletion of its rotation in Iraq. In Japan, the DPRI process has resulted in an
agreement on specific force posture realignments that will have far-reaching,
beneficial impacts for the U.S.-Japanese alliance. Also, the services are under-
going expansive transformation and consolidation of their headquarters struc-
tures, the better to support expeditionary operations.
The new U.S. global posture strategy is set to emerge as one of the most
far-reaching of the national defense legacies of this administration. It reflects the
American commitment to a global insurance policy for an emerging security
landscape. Collectively, proposed posture changes provide a framework for our
alliance and defense commitments overseas and for harmonizing our forces’
skill sets with the shifting uncertainties of that new landscape. Global,
geopolitical circumstances will continue to change, our relationships with allies
and partners will evolve, and our capabilities will mature. Well beyond the ten-
ure of this administration, our new global defense posture will provide a foun-
dation upon which the U.S. military and its supporting defense establishment
can build adaptively for decades to come.
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THE PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE
Cornerstone of a New International Norm
Commander Joel A. Doolin, JAGC, U.S. Navy
Chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, along with ballistic missile tech-nology,” are the means by which “small groups could attain a catastrophic
power to strike great nations.”1 Preventing terrorists from obtaining such weap-
ons of mass destruction (WMD) has inspired a dramatic shift in U.S. strategy,
from deterrence to preemption: “We must take the battle to the enemy, disrupt
his plans and confront the worst threats before they emerge.”2 The legal hurdles
in the path of a preemptive strategy, however, were revealed by the So San inci-
dent of December 2002.
THE SO SAN INCIDENT AND THE PROLIFERATION
SECURITY INITIATIVE
In late 2002 U.S. intelligence had collected evidence of money transfers from Ye-
men to North Korea. Satellite footage showed Scud fuel oxidizer being loaded
into shipping containers. Analysts narrowed identification of the merchant ves-
sel carrying the Scuds themselves to one of “three likely ships,” including the
North Korean–flagged So San. That vessel was pinpointed because of two ac-
tions that might seem innocuous in themselves but
were suspicious if taken together. First, it zigzagged;
merchant vessels ordinarily follow a steady course on
the rhumb line, the shortest track between two points
on the globe. Second, the crew of So San lowered and
raised the vessel’s flag; this is unusual, because the na-
tional ensign must be displayed continuously while
under way.3
Commander Doolin is the Staff Judge Advocate for Car-
rier Strike Group 7. A former Surface Warfare Officer, he
has earned an LLD degree (1993) from Catholic Univer-
sity and graduated with distinction from the Naval War
College (2004). His essay “Operational Art for the Prolif-
eration Security Initiative” won the Naval War College
Foundation Prize in 2004.
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Surveillance of the ship in international waters of the Indian Ocean produced
a legal basis for boarding—the fact that “So San” was freshly painted on the
stern, the customary location for a ship’s name, whereas no vessel of that name
was registered under the North Korean flag. That made the vessel “stateless” un-
der international law, permitting U.S. warships to invoke a peacetime right to
approach and visit.4 The master of the vessel declined to give consent for board-
ing and ignored warning shots; special operations forces rappelled aboard by
helicopter to stop and search the vessel. The master claimed his cargo was ce-
ment, but the boarding team discovered fifteen Scud missiles.5 Dialogue be-
tween the United States and Yemen followed, fueling speculation that political
considerations would reverse the interdiction: Yemen was a prospective partner
in the war on terror, and escalation of tension with a nuclear-capable North Ko-
rea was to be avoided. Indeed, So San was allowed to proceed.
The situation is frustrating in operational terms. The U.S.-led maritime-
interdiction coalition had mastered the factors of time, space, and force; prompt
intelligence had correctly identified a Scud carrier; warships had intercepted be-
fore it could deliver its cargo and had apprehended it with sufficient force. Yet
there was no gain—the Scuds were permitted to arrive at their destination, due
to the lack of legal power to seize them. Or was it the political will to argue there
was, or should be, legal justification for seizure that was lacking? In the event,
operational success, international law, and politics could not be synchronized,
and so the interdiction failed.
Legal debate on the incident begins with the premise that proper authority in
two respects must be present if maritime interdiction is to be effective. First, there
must be authority to visit and search a particular vessel. This was satisfied in the So
San case by its status as “stateless.”Second, there must be authority to seize, detain,
or divert cargo found aboard. This did not exist here.6 Conventional missiles are
not contraband subject to seizure. No United Nations resolution imposes a weap-
ons embargo against Yemen. Neither North Korea nor Yemen are signatories to
the Missile Technology Control Regime, which might have authorized seizure.7
Accordingly, there was no unquestionable legal authority to seize the Scuds.
The So San case illustrates the close intertwining of politics and international
law. Less than a month before, the United Nations Security Council had passed
Resolution 1441, giving Iraq a “final opportunity to comply with its disarma-
ment obligations.”8 The decade-old embargo against Iraq was not used as au-
thority to board So San, because its destination was clearly Yemen. Though USS
Cole (DDG 67) had been in Aden, Yemen, when it was attacked two years earlier,
the United States did not now make a self-defense claim. Arguments for seizing
Yemeni ballistic missiles would have divided international political opinion on
weapons of mass destruction precisely when solidarity was desired for a future
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resolution authorizing “all necessary measures” to dismantle Iraqi programs. The
price of solidarity was allowing Yemen to keep the Scuds and declining the oppor-
tunity to use So San as a precedent for interdiction of WMD on the high seas.
Five months later, the United States started to close the gap in international
law through which So San had sailed. On 31 May 2003, President Bush launched
the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) at a G-8 summit in Krakow, Poland.
PSI “builds on efforts by the international community to prevent proliferation”
of biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons, “their delivery systems, and related
materials worldwide.”9
Over time, PSI will make seizure of weapons of mass destruction at sea an in-
ternational norm. This article examines that component of PSI, in particular the
inherent operational and legal issues.10 The operational factors of space, time,
and force create strengths and weaknesses for WMD-interdiction operations;
similarly, legal provisions relevant to WMD interdiction offer both utility and
limitations. Analysis and supporting tables set forth legal options created by
customary international law and treaty for interdiction at sea. The article offers
specific recommendations to enhance operations, based upon what is legally
feasible, with a focus on source countries and drug trafficking. The article then
briefly discusses the advantages and challenges of using NATO architecture and
combined exercises and deployments, as well as improved intelligence sharing
among PSI participants, at the interagency and international levels.
THE FEW, THE RICH: THE PSI CORE MEMBERS
The United States and fifteen other nations are core members of PSI and partici-
pate in regularly scheduled meetings.11 In September 2003, participating nations
issued a “Statement of Interdiction Principles,” which call for the use of diplo-
matic, information, and military instruments of power. “More than sixty coun-
tries have signaled that they support PSI and are ready to participate in
interdiction efforts.”12
PSI appeals to the common interest of states to support counterproliferation:
secure borders uninterrupted by the catastrophic consequences of a WMD at-
tack, with its human suffering and economic chaos. This is a strong mutual in-
terest among the sixteen core members, which also have in common wealth,
previous interest in counterproliferation, and existing security arrangements
with the United States.
As table 1 shows, nine of the sixteen core members are G-8 or G-8/G-20* coun-
tries. All PSI core participants are signatories to the Biological Weapons
D O O L I N 3 1
* The G-20, or Group of Twenty, established on 20 August 2003, focuses on agriculture. The members
are developing countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, China, Cuba, Egypt, Guatemala, India,
Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Paraguay, Philippines, South Africa, Tanzania, Thailand, Ven-
ezuela, and Zimbabwe. See G-20, www.g-20.mre.gov.br/index.asp.
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Convention (BWC), the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Fifteen of the sixteen are also signatories to four
other international agreements against WMD: the Missile Technology Control
Regime (MTCR), the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)*, the Wassenaar Arrange-
ment (WA), and the Zangger Committee (ZC).13 Thirteen of the sixteen PSI core
members are also NATO members. Two others, Australia and Japan, have bilateral
security treaties with the United States. The sixteenth, Singapore, has cordial mili-
tary relations with the United States and is strengthening them.14 These criteria
constitute a potential formula for recruiting future PSI participants.
Table 2 identifies fourteen countries that support all seven WMD agreements
but are not PSI core members. Ten more subscribe to at least four agreements,
3 2 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
* NSG, founded in 1974, is a forty-nation group that controls exports of nuclear weapons and nuclear-
related items. WA, comprising thirty-three nations and founded in 1996, deals with the export of
conventional armaments and dual-use technologies. ZC, with thirty-five nations, concentrates on
aligning the Non-Proliferation Treaty with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) export
standards.
G-8/G-20 NATO NSG ZC MTCR WA REMARKS
Australia G-20 No Yes Yes Yes Yes 1
Canada G-8/G-20 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Denmark Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
France G-8/G-20 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 2
Germany G-8/G-20 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Italy G-8/G-20 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Japan G-8/G-20 No Yes Yes Yes Yes 3
Netherlands Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Norway Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Poland Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Portugal Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Singapore No Yes Yes No Yes 4
Spain Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Turkey G-20 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
United Kingdom G-8/G-20 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
United States G-8/G-20 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
TABLE 1
PSI CORE MEMBERSHIP PROFILE
NPT = Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty BWC = Biological Weapons Convention
NSG = Nuclear Suppliers Group ZC = Zangger Committee
MTCR = Missile Technology Control Regime CWC = Chemical Weapons Convention
WA = Wassenaar Arrangement
Remarks:
1. Australia and the United States have a bilateral security treaty.
2. France is a signatory to the North Atlantic Treaty but not a member of NATO.
3. Japan and the United States have a bilateral security treaty.
4. Singapore is a host for U.S. military forces.
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D O O L I N 3 3
MTCR BWC CWC NPT NSG ZC WA NATO/PfP
Argentina • • • • • • •
Australia • • • • • • •
Austria • • • • • • • PfP
Belarus • • • PfP
Belgium • • • • • • • NATO
Brazil • • • • •
Bulgaria • • • • • NATO
Canada • • • • • • • NATO
China • • • •
Cyprus • • •
Czech Rep • • • • • • • NATO
Denmark • • • • • • • NATO
Finland • • • • • • • PfP
France • • • • • • • NATO
Germany • • • • • • • NATO
Greece • • • • • • • NATO
Hungary • • • • • • • NATO
Iceland • • • • NATO
Ireland • • • • • • • PfP
Italy • • • • • • • NATO
Japan • • • • • • •
Kazakhstan • • • PfP
Latvia • • • • NATO
Luxembourg • • • • • • • NATO
Netherlands • • • • • • • NATO
New Zealand • • • • •
Norway • • • • • • • NATO
Philippines • • •
Poland • • • • • • • NATO
Portugal • • • • • • • NATO
Romania • • • • • • NATO
Russia • • • • • • • PfP
Singapore • • •
Slovakia • • • • • • NATO
Slovenia • • • • • NATO
South Africa • • • • • •
South Korea • • • • • • •
Spain • • • • • • • NATO
Sweden • • • • • • • PfP
Switzerland • • • • • • • PfP
Turkey • • • • • • • NATO
Ukraine • • • • • • • PfP
United Kingdom • • • • • • • NATO
United States • • • • • • • NATO
[3] [167] [180] [187] [40] [35] [33] [26/20]
TABLE 2
MEMBERSHIP OF MAJOR WMD CONVENTIONS
Notes: Figures in brackets are the number of participants in each convention. PSI Core Members are italicized. Fourteen countries are signatories
to all seven WMD agreements but are not yet in the PSI core: Argentina, Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Ire-
land, Luxembourg, Russia, South Korea, Sweden, Switzerland, and Ukraine.
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including NPT, CWC, and BWC.15 Russia is the only G-8 member that is not a
core PSI member, and it is a signatory to all seven WMD agreements. Argentina,
South Africa, and South Korea are G-20 countries that support at least six WMD
agreements and have good or improving security ties with the United States.16
Other G-20 members not in the PSI core are Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mex-
ico, and Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia has the same characteristics as core member
Singapore: military ties with the United States and signatory status for the three
main WMD conventions. PSI nations account for 50 percent of NATO’s members.
Five NATO members and seven Partnership for Peace members (PfP) support all
seven major WMD conventions but are not yet in the PSI core.17
Table 3 depicts the supermajority of United Nations members that support
three major WMD conventions outlawing nuclear, chemical, and biological
weapons. PSI builds upon this enormous political consensus. The next section
argues that all PSI participants, core and noncore members alike, can use their
collective sovereignty to achieve counterproliferation objectives.
HOW SOVEREIGNTY POWERS THE PROLIFERATION SECURITY
INITIATIVE
Every nation that participates in PSI will apply resources of territory, airspace,
waters, and laws to the coalition objective of nonproliferation. PSI interlinks the
sovereign powers of many states by asking participants to follow four interdic-
tion principles (the “PSI Principles”).
• Interdict “chemical, biological or nuclear weapons, their delivery systems
and related materials to and from states and non-state actors of
proliferation concern.”18
• Streamline procedures for the “rapid exchange of relevant information”
concerning WMD proliferation.19
• Strengthen national legal authorities to accomplish the two objectives
above.
• Prevent the transport of WMD within geographic areas and by vessels
subject to their jurisdiction, by taking specific actions consistent with both
their national and international laws.20
Territorial Seas and Contiguous Zones. The PSI Principles further call on par-
ticipants to take the following specific actions: refrain from transporting weap-
ons of mass destruction; require vessels to undergo inspections as a condition of
entry and departure; stop and search vessels that are reasonably suspected of
carrying WMD cargoes at their ports, in internal waters, in territorial seas, and
in contiguous zones; and seize WMD cargoes found.21
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Under international law, a nation’s sovereignty extends seaward twelve nauti-
cal miles from its baseline, forming a belt called the state’s “territorial sea.”22 In
its territorial sea a nation enjoys law enforcement rights identical to those that it
exercises on land within its borders. Ships “enjoy the right of innocent passage
for the continuous and expeditious traversing” of a foreign territorial sea, but
this right is not absolute.23 The coastal nation may “take affirmative actions in its
territorial sea to prevent passage that is not innocent, including, if necessary, the
use of force.”24 The vessel conducting innocent passage is subject not only to the
laws of the coastal nation but to the enforcement of those laws.25 Accordingly,
the coastal nation can approach, visit, and search any vessel in its territorial sea.
The next twelve miles can be declared by the coastal nation as a “contiguous
zone,” where the state is permitted to exercise its customs, fiscal, immigration,
and sanitary laws.26 Weapons of mass destruction are by definition dangerous
materials, transportation of which must be consistent with customs laws. Thus,
D O O L I N 3 5
Yeara Convention Participantsb Coverage
1968 NPT 187/191
Prohibits transfer of nuclear weapons, nuclear explosive devices, and items
that would assist in the manufacture of nuclear weapons (NPT Art. 1)
1972 BWC 167/191
Prohibits microbial or other biological agents, or toxins and weapons, equip-
ment or means of delivery (BWC Art. 1)
1974 NSG 040/191
Controls export of nuclear materials and equipment, including technologies
applicable to peaceful uses, without International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) safeguards
1974 ZC 035/191
Harmonizes NPT with IAEA export requirements for special fissionable ma-
terial and equipment for processing, use, or production of special fissionable
material
1987 MTCR 033/191
Controls export of 300 km–range missiles capable of carrying a WMD pay-
load and their essential technologies (MTCR)
1993 CWC 180/191
Prohibits a total of 19 chemicals and 28 precursors (CWC Schedules):
• Eight highly toxic chemicals and four precursors
• Three lethal chemicals and eleven precursors
• Four toxic commercial chemicals and thirteen precursors
• Three unscheduled discrete organic chemicals (phosphorus, sulfur, and
fluorine)
1996 WA 033/191
Prevents destabilizing accumulations of seven types of conventional weapons,





Criminalizes the proliferation of WMD and delivery systems to nonstate ac-




a. Agreement reached and signatures begun.
b. Signatories and parties to the convention, regardless of ratification status, over the total United Nations (UN) membership (since 24 April 2003 there have
been 191 members).
c. UN Security Council Resolution.
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every nation has the authority to prevent illegal WMD “imports” by enforcing
its customs laws within twenty-four nautical miles of its coast. PSI leverages this
national sovereignty to accomplish nonproliferation objectives.
Consent of the Flag Nation. The PSI Principles invoke national jurisdiction and
authority over vessels flagged by that country, regardless of location. Partici-
pants agree to board and search any vessel flying their flags “beyond the territo-
rial seas of any state,”either based upon a reasonable suspicion the vessel is carrying
WMD “or at the request and good cause shown by another state”;27 to “seriously
consider providing consent” for other states to board and search vessels flying their
flag;28 and to seize WMD cargoes found pursuant to the two tasks above.
Nationality provides the legal basis for “same flag” boardings and for obtain-
ing consent from flag nations to search their vessels in international waters. As
codified by Articles 92 and 110 of the 1982 United Nations Law of the Sea Con-
vention (UNCLOS*), warships and military aircraft have the peacetime right to
approach and visit in international waters vessels of the “same nationality as the
warship” or aircraft.29 PSI participants also bring the sovereign power to autho-
rize inspection by other countries of vessels flying their flags in international
waters. The commercial fleets of six PSI core members are among the world’s fif-
teen largest, accounting for 12 percent of all merchant vessels.30 Significantly,
however, current PSI participants all together own only a fraction of the world’s
merchant vessels.
Bilateral agreements under the PSI rubric between nations can produce rapid
flag-nation consent for searches. Numerous bilateral agreements enable consent
boardings in support of counternarcotics interdiction. Recently, the United States
used this type of agreement as the model for the first bilateral agreements facilitat-
ing consent for WMD interdiction. Bilateral agreements between the United
States and the flag nations of the two largest merchant fleets, Panama and Liberia,
can in a matter of hours authorize boardings of suspect vessels by U.S. personnel
in international waters to search for WMD cargoes. These bilateral agreements
and others with Belize, Croatia, Cyprus, and the Marshall Islands raise the per-
centage of vessels accessible to consent boardings by PSI nations to well over half.31
The Air Picture. The PSI Principles ask participating nations to deny aircraft en-
try into their airspace or require transiting aircraft to land for inspection if there
is a reasonable suspicion that their cargo includes weapons of mass destruction.32
These procedures are consistent with existing international law, under which
national airspace extends seaward twelve nautical miles from the country’s
3 6 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
* So known, as a collective shorthand, for the Third UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, or
UNCLOS III, 1973–82, at which the legal instruments were negotiated, formulated, and issued for
signature.
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baseline.33 On the ground, nonmilitary aircraft of any nationality can be
searched by the host nation.34 States also have the right to refuse entry of foreign
aircraft into their national airspace, unless that airspace is also an international
strait or the state is party to an international agreement to the contrary.35
The Peacetime Right of Approach and Visit. Vessels in international waters are
generally immune from the jurisdiction of other nations. Stopping a vessel at sea
means interfering with its fundamental right of freedom of navigation. War-
ships have the unique power to abridge free navigation by legally approaching
and visiting vessels. During such an “approach and visit” the vessel’s master may
consent to a search, but even a brief delay costs merchants time, inconvenience,
and money. The extent of a warship’s power to “approach and visit,” then, de-
pends on the situation.
In peacetime, the presumption is in favor of free navigation. As codified by
the UNCLOS, warships may impede it only if there are reasonable grounds to
suspect a vessel is engaged in one of six categories of illegal activity: piracy, slave
trade, unauthorized broadcasting, operation without nationality, deception re-
garding nationality (if the vessel is actually of the same nationality as the war-
ship), and illegal narcotics trafficking.36
It is important to emphasize, with regard to operational planning, that the
illegal-activity exceptions cannot be employed against the vast majority of le-
gally registered vessels. Facts and circumstances will arise where an exception
can be invoked, but only against particular vessels, not the entire fleet of that
country. Under current international law, there is no authority to stop vessels on
the high seas solely because of what they are suspected of transporting.
Authority to Seize WMD. The PSI Principles, however, presume that weapons of
mass destruction are subject to seizure. This presumption is based on the reality,
reflected in table 3, that the overwhelming majority of nations have signed trea-
ties outlawing the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons.
The United Nations has 191 member states. The Treaty on the Nonproliferation
of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) has been accepted by over 188 of them, nearly the
entire UN membership.37 The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) has been
signed by 180 nations. The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC)
has been accepted by 176 nations, over 87 percent of the UN membership.
Normally, a treaty binds only nations that agree to it. However, the doctrine
of customary international law holds that a well established and widespread
practice is evidence of the existence of a duty binding on all nations.38 Accord-
ingly, the NPT, CWC, and BWC are arguably enforceable against nonsigners.
The implication for military operations would seem to be that seizure of
WMD items found aboard foreign ships or aircraft may be authorized. The
D O O L I N 3 7
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counterargument is that no interpretation is permitted when the text of a treaty
is clear—and none of the WMD or terrorism conventions authorizes maritime
interdiction.39 Each treaty was the product of negotiation by states, and subse-
quently changed security needs, however compelling, cannot add a right to mar-
itime interdiction that does not exist in its language.
Conventional weapons, explosives, and ballistic missiles are not illegal per se.
It is within the sovereign rights of nations to possess and transfer them, or to
agree not to transfer them. Two initiatives against conventional weapons are the
MTCR and the Wassenaar Arrangement. Both are supported by roughly the
same plurality—thirty of the thirty-three signatories for MTCR and WA are
identical.40 Six other nations support either MTCR or WA but not both.41 The
bottom line is that only 17 percent of the UN membership supports MTCR and
WA, and less than 15 percent support both. Neither can be assumed customary;
therefore, MTCR and WA are enforceable only against signatories, absent addi-
tional and specific authority against a nonsignatory.
HOW PSI CAN MASTER THE FACTORS OF SPACE, FORCE, AND TIME
International law provides a framework for operational design. The law empow-
ers every nation that participates in PSI to conduct maritime interdiction opera-
tions (MIO) in its national waters and against its own vessels. Successful PSI
military operations, however, will require unity of effort. The participation of
many countries and their collective capability in command and control will de-
termine what can be seized, where, and by whom. Intelligence services will be re-
quired to detect the production and shipment of potentially small WMD
packages over enormous distances. Intelligence data can justify an “approach
and visit” under one of the six UNCLOS exceptions for illegal activity; in rare
cases, it may also reveal grounds for self-defense actions. The law, for its part, can
fill in gaps when intelligence is incomplete, so long as the facts give reasonable
grounds to suspect certain illegal activities. The link between intelligence and le-
gal authority for maritime interdiction means that PSI nations need to enhance
their awareness about vessels approaching their national waters.
The Factor of Space
PSI participants have the sovereign power to inspect any vessel or aircraft pres-
ent in their territories, territorial seas and airspace, and to a lesser extent, in their
contiguous zones. Making national space less porous to WMD transport is an
enormous operational challenge. For example, the American coastline stretches
ninety-eight thousand miles and includes “3.5 million square miles of ocean
area” (that is, inside twelve nautical miles) and 185 deepwater ports.42 Interna-
tional trade involves at least a hundred thousand registered merchant vessels of a
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hundred gross tons or more, flying the flags of two hundred countries.43 Focus on
the world’s largest ports compresses the space problem. Sixteen “superports”
handle 99 percent of the world’s trade volume, and 90 percent of this volume
passes through nine choke points.44
By identifying major sources of weapons of mass destruction, intelligence can
help operational planners prioritize counterproliferation efforts. Table 4 is an
overview of WMD programs and terrorist presence in fourteen countries that
have the most of each. Purchase and theft are presumably easier ways for terrorists
to obtain WMD than developing their own. Large-scale production of weapons
of mass destruction requires substantial facilities, as well as time and expense.
Still, and although large programs are generally detectable by national intelli-
gence networks, they cannot be detected with absolute reliability—as Saddam
Hussein’s WMD programs are a pointed reminder.45 Further, modest quantities
of biological or chemical weapons are fairly easy to produce, and the radioactive
D O O L I N 3 9
Countrya Nuclear Bio CW Missiles Terrorb Remarks
North Korea Y Y Y Y *
BWC, CWC, NPT,
WMD negotiations
Iran Y Y Y Y 1*
BWC, CWC, NPT,
WMD negotiations
China Y Y Y Y BWC, CWC, NPT
Russia Y Y Y Y BWC, CWC, NPT, MTCR
Syria Y Y Y * WMD negotiations
Libya Y Y Y * BWC, WMD negotiations
Pakistan Y Y Y 5 BWC, CWC
India Y Y Y BWC, CWC
Israel Y Y 8 CWC




Egypt Y 2 BWC, NPT
Yemen Y 1 BWC, CWC, NPT
Cuba Y * BWC, CWC, NPT
TABLE 4
WMD THREAT MATRIX
Bio = biological weapons CW = chemical weapons
Notes:
a. Omitted is Iraq, in the process of disarmament as a consequence of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM; and Afghanistan, whose sponsorship of terrorism was ended
by ENDURING FREEDOM. Six other nations have at least one terrorist group but no WMD: Algeria, Colombia, Lebanon, Philippines, Turkey, and Uzbekistan.
Britain and France, both nuclear powers, are not listed.
b. Number of known terrorist groups that operate in that country. Asterisk means the country was considered a state sponsor of terrorism in National Strat-
egy for Combating Terrorism (2003).
Sources: Kenneth Katzman, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2001, CRS Report to Congress (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research
Service, 10 September 2001); and James Fitzsimonds, “Weapons of Mass Destruction” (unpublished paper, Naval War College, Newport, R.I., 2000).
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material needed to make a small but lethal “dirty bomb” (radiological dispersal
device or RDD) could be obtained from more than “22,000 machines world-
wide,” located at “hospitals, universities, factories, construction companies and
laboratories.”46 Therefore, table 4 is only the starting point for prioritizing WMD
sources and potential threats.
Increase Participation in PSI. U.S. joint doctrine presumes that maritime inter-
diction operations have both military and political purposes.47 The desired end
state for PSI is elimination of WMD proliferation to the maximum extent possi-
ble. The political objective is to encourage proliferating nations to conform to
PSI; the military objective is interdiction of weapons of mass destruction be-
tween source countries and terrorist organizations. International law, as we have
seen, makes it easier for PSI participants to seize WMD in their own territorial
seas and contiguous zones than on the high seas. PSI operations in national ter-
ritory, water, and airspace enhance the legitimacy of the entire undertaking. The
existence of a superport in a PSI nation accounts for a possible transit point for
WMD shipments; a threat nation’s acceptance of PSI removes a proliferation
source or recipient and adds space where PSI is followed. Compliance expands
cooperation with PSI beyond the situations where international law permits
military interdiction, and it permits assets to be devoted to other threats. Libya’s
renunciation of WMD programs is a recent example.48
Table 5 (which overlays threat data from table 4 with PSI participants,
chokepoints, superports, and merchant ship registration) shows that current
PSI participation produces favorable space-force relationships in NorthCom
and EuCom but poor ones in CentCom and PaCom. Bilateral agreements for
consent boardings, using the Liberia agreement as a model, with three more
countries (the Bahamas, Greece, and Malta) will bring EuCom and NorthCom
ship ratios to 100 percent. EuCom has many PSI partners to track threat nations,
and PSI countries control all three superports in the theater; Russian participa-
tion in PSI would eliminate a WMD source. In CentCom, Egypt stands out, be-
cause that country controls the Suez Canal, one of the choke points. In PaCom,
threat nations outnumber PSI partners, which account for less than a third of
the superports. China is a decisive point in that region; it is a WMD source na-
tion, has a superport, and owns a large merchant fleet. China, however, shares to
some degree the interests of the PSI core nations in economic stability and
nonproliferation.49
Focus on WMD Source Countries. PSI targets a center of gravity for terrorist
groups: their ability to receive weapons of mass destruction. Terrorist groups are
numerous, covert, and mobile. It can be difficult to identify their lines of commu-
nication or predict where they could receive WMD. By contrast, countries have
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fixed seaports, and most countries value their economic and political relation-
ships with the international community. The fact that major WMD sources are
countries, then, is a critical vulnerability for terrorists. Combatant commanders
can, therefore, in their theater security cooperation plans consider WMD source
countries as critical vulnerabilities of terrorists and synchronize military inter-
diction with political, economic, and information instruments.
Stop Drug Money That Buys WMD. Drug trafficking produces “vast sums of
money for international organized crime syndicates and terrorist organizations.”50
Diminishing drug traffic that funds terrorist groups impairs their ability to pur-
chase or develop WMD. International law makes this connection a critical vulner-
ability—PSI nations may legally conduct interdiction operations on the high seas
against suspected drug traffickers. Counterdrug operations can harm terrorist
networks while observing the principles of legitimacy and restraint.
D O O L I N 4 1
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SouthCom (Panama)f None 0:0 Panama Canal 1 of 1 1:1
TABLE 5
THE GEOGRAPHY OF PSI
Notes:
* Threat nations, major WMD sources.
a. Compares PSI and threat nations (as given in left columns).
b. Number of “super ports” in PSI nations versus the total number in the commander’s area of responsibility.
c. Number of largest merchant fleets under PSI flags versus the total number in the commander’s area of responsibility. Those PSI countries are: Singapore,
Norway, U.S., Japan, Italy, and Germany. Nations with the largest vessel registries are also grouped by AOR: EuCom—Greece, Malta, Cyprus;
NorthCom—Bahamas; PaCom—China, Marshall Islands; SouthCom—Panama.
d. Pakistan is investigating and has denounced alleged transfers of atomic program information to Iran.
e. Libya has recently renounced its WMD programs, making the ratio even more favorable in EuCom.
f. Bilateral agreement with the United States.
g Taiwanese cooperation in detaining in Kaohsiung Harbor the North Korean vessel Be Gaehung, which was carrying chemical precursors.
Sources: “General Denies Letting Secrets of A-Bomb out of Pakistan,” New York Times, 27 January 2004, p. A6; “Libya: No More Weapons of Mass Destruc-
tion,” Newport Daily News, 20–21 December 2003, sec. 1, p. 1; “Ship’s Seizure Sends Signal to North Korea,” Christian Science Monitor, 12 August 2003;
U.S. Transportation Dept.,MARAD 2001:Maritime Administration’s Annual Report to Congress (Washington, D.C.: Maritime Administration, 2001), p. 41.
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In the peacetime legal framework, operational commanders have discretion
as to how often to approach and visit vessels. A risk-averse option is to approach
and visit only when there is tangible evidence about a particular vessel, such as
intelligence that narcotics were loaded as cargo. A more assertive concept uses
the 1982 UNCLOS standard of “reasonable grounds.”51 The facts that a vessel is
visibly low in the water and is on a possible drug route would permit the infer-
ence that it may be engaged in drug trafficking.
The Factor of Force
Each PSI participant brings forces to counterproliferation, of varying size and
quality. These forces collectively have a critical weakness and a critical strength
in concentrating to detect and intercept a WMD carrier. The weakness is that
they simply cannot be everywhere at once. Thus, it is necessary to achieve infor-
mation superiority and exercise command and control to focus PSI forces and
surveillance assets where they are required. This task is made easier by the fact
that U.S. sea-based forces are routinely positioned ninety-six hours away from
major shipping routes.52
The critical strength PSI forces enjoy is that when a threat is detected, partici-
pants can muster sufficient force to overpower any potential WMD carrier. The
typical scenario is of a warship or one of its small boats approaching an un-
armed or lightly armed vessel. In most cases the ship receives the master’s con-
sent to board and search. Gunfire is usually not required; should a forcible
boarding be necessary, however, the warship can disable the vessel with its own
weapons or send an embarked “visit board search seize team” (VBSST) to take
control of it. The capabilities of a VBSST, of naval or Coast Guard personnel,
would usually be sufficient to deal with an unarmed or lightly armed crew. If
not, Marines or special operations forces could be requested from the combat-
ant commander. Once aboard, a VBSST can face a difficult task if the crew, even
if unresisting, does not actively aid the search. Ships have hundreds of compart-
ments. Voids and tanks can go undetected if welded shut. On board a large con-
tainer ship, the contents of perhaps thousands of sealed containers, each the size
of a truck trailer, are described by lengthy bills of lading, which must be carefully
examined. These realities require proficient and properly equipped VBSST, es-
pecially since WMD contraband may be very small.53
Use NATO Architecture for Large-Scale Exercises with PSI Nations. Thirteen of
the current PSI participants are also NATO members.54 This heavy proportion
of NATO countries yields operational advantages for the Proliferation Security
Initiative—the NATO command structure, rules of engagement (ROE), and in-
formation assurance agreements can (and should) be used for PSI operations.55
In this way valuable time can be saved, and new PSI members incorporated
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more easily. Operations with non-NATO teammates will require the use of stan-
dardization agreements for information assurance—that is, the protection of
NATO-classified material.56 NATO rules of engagement can be “sanitized” to
safeguard them from compromise. The NATO standardization agreement can
also be the basis for memoranda of understanding with appropriate foreign
agencies, to foster the sharing of intelligence on WMD matters throughout the
PSI membership.
Continue Combined Exercises and Deployments. On PSI’s second anniversary,
its leaders boasted that “over 40 countries have participated in fourteen training
exercises.”57 Command and control is critical if PSI participants are to focus sur-
veillance assets and determine where interdiction is required. Mastery of it will
leverage their advantage in force and facilitate unity of effort. The tasks of com-
mand and control, communicating and disseminating, and using intelligence
for large-scale maritime interdiction operations must be exercised in order to
make forces ready for contingencies. Combined exercises and deployments will
allow PSI participants to practice these skills; determine tactics, techniques, and
procedures for the host of operational and legal issues that would arise from ac-
tual WMD seizures; and validate planning for UN-sanctioned actions against
WMD source countries.58
Multinational warships on PSI taskings could be deployed with U.S. strike
groups. Deployment of a foreign warship on a regular basis with a battle group
would enhance its capabilities for PSI operations. A warship from another na-
tion brings that nation’s sovereign power for “same flag” boardings. Many navies
have law enforcement authority in their nations’ contiguous zones and territo-
rial seas, expanding the potential area of operations. Further, such combined de-
ployments would test the integration of command and control in varied
environments and over extended periods.59
When the United States hosts PSI exercises, inclusion of the Coast Guard would
repair a seam between the American sea services. The Coast Guard has law
enforcement authority and is the lead federal agency for interdiction in U.S. terri-
torial seas and contiguous zones; the Navy has more surveillance assets but no law
enforcement authority. Any American response to a shipment of WMD toward
the homeland would likely involve both services. Exercises are needed, therefore,
to test contingency planning for Navy–Coast Guard interdiction of WMD.
Share Intelligence among PSI Participants. The peacetime justifications for in-
terdiction on the high seas, based on the six kinds of illegal activities enumerated
above, highlight the relationship between intelligence and legal authority. If op-
erational commanders have evidence of a vessel’s illegal activity or the threat of
an imminent attack, legal justification for interdiction may be possible.
D O O L I N 4 3
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Interagency and international resources can improve awareness concerning
WMD movements and the effectiveness of searches. Sharing intelligence among
the armed forces and civilian agencies of PSI countries about WMD shipments
will further promote unity of effort.
Use Interagency Resources. Each combatant commander has an intelligence
team, including interagency professionals, that can tap into the national struc-
ture that monitors WMD activities. “Critical information requirements” to sup-
port PSI operations are different from traditional concentration on an enemy’s
order of battle. Data is needed on merchant vessels, storage capabilities, and
normal operations. Maritime shipping expertise is required to decipher bills of
lading. It may not be possible to add maritime shipping experts to combatant
commanders’ staffs, but liaison with them is essential. American customs in-
spectors and the Coast Guard foreign port liaison officers are other resources for
critical intelligence or training. The Coast Guard has four “maritime safety and
security teams” (MSSTs), of approximately a hundred active-duty and reserve
personnel each, that protect domestic ports in the homeland. One MSST spe-
cialty is WMD detection.60 If maritime agency resources and maritime training
safety and security teams were tapped to train VBSST, improvement in the abil-
ity to detect weapons of mass destruction on board merchant vessels would al-
most certainly result. In such ways, interagency cooperation can bring new
knowledge and state-of-the-art procedures to shipboard searches.
Use International Resources. The State Department is the lead agency for inter-
national law enforcement academies (ILEA), which, with the departments of
Justice and Treasury as partners, have “trained over 8,000 officials from 50 coun-
tries.”61 Alumni of these academies represent a potentially valuable pool of inter-
national talent, on which defense attachés could call for answers about a nation’s
maritime companies and procedures. International law enforcement academy
graduates might assist combatant commanders’ staffs as liaison or interpreters
to increase the effectiveness of shipboard searches.
The Factor of Time
As we have seen, no counterproliferation convention has created the right to in-
terdict the shipment of weapons of mass destruction on the high seas. Under
some circumstances, however, international law permits interdiction of WMD
and conventional weapons in international waters without consent of the flag
nation. With such authority PSI nations would not have to wait until the vessel
entered their contiguous zones and make the interdiction in that narrow area.
There are three possibilities. First, during armed conflicts belligerent war-
ships can “visit” merchant vessels in international waters to search for con-
traband. Second, the Security Council can authorize an arms embargo as a
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“partial interruption of economic relations” against a member state and enforce
it with a “blockade.”62 Finally, and precariously, the inherent right of self-defense
may authorize interdiction. Each of these legal avenues has political require-
ments and risks.
Do Not Invoke the Belligerent Power Universally. The United States does not in
general claim belligerent status in the global war on terrorism to “visit and
search,” but some military operations under that rubric qualify as armed con-
flicts under international law; current examples include operations IRAQI FREE-
DOM and ENDURING FREEDOM. Broader belligerent status would require an
enabling resolution or formal declaration of war by the Congress. Aside from
the political issue of mustering domestic support, the legal issue would be whom
or what to declare war against. Traditional practice assumes that one state de-
clares war on another state, putting all on notice that, inter alia, the declaring
state intends to exercise the wartime power of visit and search. This is impracti-
cal against a stateless threat. To cover all flag nations that might be a host for
al-Qa‘ida cargo the United States would have to declare itself in at least a techni-
cal state of belligerence against at least eleven countries that the 9/11 Commis-
sion lists as potential sanctuaries.63 (The commission itself recommended
instead garnering support for PSI.)64 It would be far better policy to reserve the
belligerent right of visit and search to cases of actual armed conflict.
Use Security Council Resolution 1540 to Request Flag-Nation Consent. Resolu-
tions of the Security Council can authorize maritime interdiction. This author-
ity is reactive, not preventive, in that the state must have committed acts
justifying the resolution. Often it is embodied in two resolutions, one for the
embargo and the second for maritime interdiction operations to enforce the
embargo.65 Again, this power has always been exercised against states, making it
legally and politically difficult to obtain specific authority against a country sim-
ply because it is perceived as a WMD threat, and there is no standing resolution
to authorize interdiction at sea to enforce WMD conventions.
However, UN Security Council Resolution 1540 of 28 April 2004 imposes a
duty on all member states to “refrain from providing any form of support to
non-State actors,” including weapons of mass destruction and delivery systems,
such as missiles.66 Its rationale was to correct a “gap” in international law regard-
ing nonstate actors.67
Resolution 1540 received unanimous support, even from countries that had
opposed American preemptive action against Iraq—China, France, Germany,
and Russia. Also significant was the fact that Spain’s support was unaffected by
the 11 March 2004 terrorist attacks in Madrid. Two of the four PSI Principles are
imbedded in Resolution 1540. In language similar to PSI Principle 1, pledging
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interdiction, UNSCR 1540 calls on states to “detect, deter, prevent and combat”
illicit WMD trafficking within their own borders.68 PSI Principle 3 (strengthen
national legal authorities for counterproliferation) becomes a requirement that
states make and enforce domestic laws prohibiting WMD acquisition and pos-
session “for terrorist purposes.”69
Resolution 1540, though it added no maritime interdiction authority, can be
cited as the legal basis to persuade a flag state to cooperate with counter-
proliferation activities. At sea, that means it should “seriously consider provid-
ing consent” for vessel searches if there is a reasonable suspicion that WMD
cargo is aboard.70
Use Article 51 Selectively as a Trump Card. Article 51 of the United Nations
Charter refers to actual “armed attack” as the threshold for national self-defense.
The article is incorporated by reference into numerous security agreements.71 It
cannot be invoked merely to restrict the growth of an opponent’s capabilities,
because actions in self-defense must be consistent with the international princi-
ples of necessity and proportionality. Article 51 may be thought of as a trump
card that can be played only when a threat becomes an imminent attack.
The status in law of maritime interdiction as a measure of “anticipatory”
self-defense has historical roots. On 29 December 1837, the American steam ves-
sel Caroline was burned in U.S. waters by the British, who suspected the ship was
carrying arms to Canadians engaged in rebellion.72 The case is frequently cited
as the basis for the legal elements of anticipatory self-defense (which the British
did not follow regarding Caroline): “(a) its exercise must be in response to actual
or threatened violence, (b) the actual or threatened violence must create an in-
stant and overwhelming necessity to respond, and (c) the self-defense measures
taken must not be excessive or unreasonable in relation to the threat.”73 Scholars
debate whether this doctrine was codified or eradicated by Article 51, and how
much of it still has force.74
Like the rest of the UN Charter, Article 51 was devised to govern affairs be-
tween states, an arena where deterrence can be a useful tool. Article 51 is insur-
ance when deterrence fails, authorizing force in self-defense in response to
attack until the Security Council acts to remedy the matter. The UN Charter
outlaws preventive attacks between states, such as those committed by Nazi Ger-
many and imperial Japan. The Security Council has authorized military inter-
vention on two occasions in response to territorial invasion by one state upon
another, reversing the invasion of South Korea in 1950 and of Kuwait in 1990.
But lack of unanimity among the permanent five members paralyzes the Secu-
rity Council, as evidenced by its inaction following the report by the United
States of the Soviet Union’s shipment of nuclear missiles to Cuba in 1962.75
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The Cuban missile crisis in 1962 illustrates how the combination of resolve,
diplomacy with regional allies, and seapower can interdict weapons of mass de-
struction. Although the Security Council did not act on the American charge
that the Soviets were transporting WMD, the Organ of Consultation of the
American Republics, convened by the Organization of American States, resolved
to ensure that Cuba did not receive them. This resolution, which did not rely
upon Article 51, was the legal basis cited in President John F. Kennedy’s procla-
mation of a defensive quarantine.76 A brief look at the legal reasoning in that
case demonstrates, however, that interdiction of weapons of mass destruction in
international waters is consistent with state obligations under the UN Charter.
The United States, as we have seen, did not invoke Article 51 or the wartime
doctrine of blockade to justify the “quarantine.”77 Rather, it used as its legal basis
the 1947 Rio Pact, which provided for the collective security of the Western
Hemisphere, using the Article 51 standard.78 The United States was obliged to
interdict the Soviet weapons on its own because its report to the Security Coun-
cil was not acted upon. However, the Rio Pact, to which it appealed, incorporates
the Article 51 standard in its own Article 3. Further, President Kennedy’s Procla-
mation 3504 of 23 October declared that interdiction of offensive weapons and
materials, conventional missiles as well as nuclear materials, would be con-
ducted at a “reasonable distance from Cuba” and along “prescribed routes” to
that country.79 Also, the military force employed was proportional to the threat,
in that it was directed against ships carrying weapons to Cuba. The decision rep-
resented the use of minimum force and caused the briefest possible interruption
of other nations’ right to free navigation. It is clear, then—especially in light of
the alternatives, destroying the vessels or attacking deployed weapons systems—
that the quarantine was consistent with U.S. responsibilities under the UN
Charter.80 The interdiction has stood as a permissible measure for over forty
years and is cited today as a valid precedent.81
Other recent examples are available. Israel and Spain have each conducted at
least one interdiction of a conventional weapons shipment in international wa-
ters, apparently without censure. On 3 January 2002, Israel, in Operation
NOAH’S ARK, captured in the Red Sea Karine-A, a Palestinian Authority freighter.
The vessel’s cargo included twelve-mile-range Katyusha rockets, antitank mis-
siles, and high explosives.82 In July 2003, Spain seized a South Korean vessel navi-
gating the high seas toward Senegal to deliver a shipment of conventional
arms.83 Neither action was condemned by the Security Council.
Preemptive action in self-defense lowers military risk, but it does so by raising
political risks, as demonstrated in the U.S. quarantine of Cuba in 1962. There are
numerous other historical examples where the interdiction of vessels at sea
raised political tensions among states or contributed to the outbreak of war.84
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Universal condemnation of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism cannot
be used as justification for the violation of another state’s sovereignty. Inter-
cepting aircraft in foreign airspace without the host nation’s express consent
risks adverse international reaction, as Israel learned in 1973 when it intercepted
an aircraft in Lebanese airspace that it believed to carry a Palestinian responsible
for a hijacking; the Security Council condemned Israel’s action in Resolution
337. It was for that reason that the United States did not claim jurisdiction over
the Achille Lauro hijackers whom it captured by diverting an Egyptian aircraft in
Sicilian airspace.85 In 1981, UNSCR 487 condemned an Israeli attack on an Iraqi
reactor.86 The record, then, confirms that while some states have interdicted
weapons shipments on the high seas without sanction, these instances were ex-
ceptions and not the general rule. Therefore, states take a political risk if they do
so; the prudent approach is to use Article 51 sparingly—only when it can be jus-
tified with compelling facts.
National self-defense could be used to justify maritime interdiction if the
facts established that the transport of weapons of mass destruction toward the
coastal nation constituted an imminent threat of armed attack. If the United
States learned, for instance, that WMD was being transported illegally toward
its shores aboard a vessel capable of releasing the payload during transit, the
imminence of armed attack could be inferred. The release of biological or
chemical weapons in a territorial sea would risk damage to vessels and islands
within that territorial sea, as well as parts of an exclusive economic zone (dis-
cussed below) and even the mainland. Detonation of a nuclear device could eas-
ily do damage within the twenty-four-mile radius embracing the territorial sea
and contiguous zone. Interdiction on the high seas would therefore be justified as
both necessary to prevent the attack and proportional to the threat. National self-
defense, as formally defined by the United States, could be invoked under such
circumstances.87
ESTABLISHING THE RIGHT TO SEIZE WMD ON THE HIGH SEAS
Stopping a vessel at sea means interfering with a fundamental right, that of free-
dom of navigation. Yet this right is not absolute. A coastal state’s interest in law
enforcement can overcome another country’s right to unmolested freedom of
navigation. Contiguous zones are international waters, but they are subject to
the laws of the coastal state in situations constituting “hot pursuit.”88 The bal-
ance of interests twenty-four miles from sovereign territory has been conclu-
sively presumed to be in favor of the coastal nation. There is no distinction
between a point mere yards past the territorial sea and one twenty-four nautical
miles from the baseline, the outer range of the contiguous zone—both are in in-
ternational waters, and the coastal nation has equal power at either.
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Even beyond the contiguous zone, international law gives a coastal nation in-
fluence over foreign vessels, if it has an exclusive economic zone (EEZ). In its
EEZ, which would extend as far as two hundred nautical miles from its baseline,
the state has jurisdiction over the scientific exploration, economic exploitation,
and environmental management and conservation.89 The legal regime of the
EEZ expresses another balancing of interests, the upshot of which is that the
state may interfere with free navigation far from its coast. The paradox is that in
the EEZ the permissible reasons for interrupting free navigation are of less grav-
ity than in the contiguous zone, though the EEZ is a much larger expanse of sea
and extends farther out. Here it is economic reasons that justify intrusion; those
of law enforcement stop at the twenty-four-mile line.
Yet as we have seen, international law permits some temporary interference
with the right of free navigation well out on the high seas. Warships have a
unique, but limited, right to abridge free navigation by approaching and visiting
vessels anywhere, if the situation justifies the expense and inconvenience for the
owner. In peacetime, the balance heavily favors freedom of navigation. In accor-
dance with Article 110 of the 1982 UNCLOS agreement, warships may impede a
vessel without regard to proximity to the coast only if there is reason to suspect
that it is engaged in one of six categories of illegal activity.90
Each of these six exceptional categories was part of international practice be-
fore codification in the law of the sea. Each expresses a rule for the balancing of
interests between coastal states and a transiting nation’s freedom of navigation.
All six accept the interruption of navigation as a trade-off for enforcement of the
law. Without them, piracy, illegal broadcasting, and trafficking in narcotics or
slavery would have safe havens in the world’s oceans. All nations that respect and
depend upon laws to maintain peace and security benefit from UNCLOS Article
110. One hundred forty-five nations have ratified UNCLOS, while other nations
observe it as a matter of policy.91 There is widespread recognition, then, that the
law enforcement interest of a state can trump the right to freedom of navigation
in some circumstances. Conventions against weapons of mass destruction carry
even wider international support.92
National legislation reaches into international waters. The United Kingdom
prosecutes piracy on the basis of its 1688 antipiracy and illegal-privateering stat-
ute.93 The U.S. Congress has also made law reaching the high seas: “Whoever, on
the high seas, commits the crime of piracy as defined by the law of nations, and is
afterwards brought into or found in the United States, shall be imprisoned for
life.”94 National legislation could be passed to interdict WMD and terrorists in
international waters. The state interest in doing so is easily argued; states already
legislate against criminal operations on the high seas—pirates and drug/slave
traders. Where such criminals could harm individuals and small groups,
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terrorists, especially if armed with weapons of mass destruction, threaten much
larger numbers of people. Interdiction on the high seas would clearly aid the en-
forcement of international conventions prohibiting WMD proliferation; failure
to permit interdiction would render the conventions unenforceable.
But the remedy is amendment, not reinterpretation. The UNCLOS exception
categories emerged for specific historical reasons. Many elements of the law of
the sea began as domestic laws, and some had been taken up in treaties prior to
UNCLOS. Specific treaties created duties or granted rights between states on the
high seas. Some of these, over time, became customs, the original documents
forgotten, only to be recodified in later treaties, including the 1982 convention,
which constituted written recognition of norms, uniform rules for their prac-
tice, and notice to other countries. UNCLOS Article 110, then, cannot be read
collectively as a universal endorsement of “approach and visit,” as a single prin-
ciple justifying interruptions of navigation for reasons not enumerated.95
BUILDING A NEW INTERNATIONAL NORM
So San showed that international law and politics can be decisive in the outcome
of maritime interdiction. PSI participants have legal authority to visit and
search vessels in their territories, territorial seas and airspace, and, to a lesser ex-
tent, their contiguous zones. In international waters, warships can visit and
search merchant vessels flying their countries’ flags.
Existing legal authority makes it easier to seize weapons of mass destruction
than other items that would strengthen terrorist groups, such as ballistic missiles
or conventional weapons. Biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons are almost
universally seen as “contraband” and so are arguably subject to seizure, which,
say, ballistic missiles would not be. Resolutions of the Security Council and con-
siderations of belligerence and self-defense can authorize maritime interdiction
in unusual circumstances. But their legal underpinnings make them reactive in
nature and unsuited to a preventive strategy that requires broad international
support. The 1982 UNCLOS convention offers only a patchwork of authority,
exceptions to the right of free navigation. These exceptions, however, grew out
of domestic law and treaties, codified after years of practice in the suppression of
internationally condemned activities into accepted reasons for warships to ap-
proach and visit vessels on the ocean. The Proliferation Security Initiative may
represent the birth of a new such exception, by which, over time, the combina-
tion of law and seapower may close the oceans as a safe haven for proliferators of
weapons of mass destruction.
PSI activities, exercises, and operations will make maritime searches for
WMD more common, the first steps toward a change in international practice.
PSI will slowly change customary international law as more countries accept the
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boarding of vessels on the high seas to search for weapons of mass destruction.
Security Council Resolution 1540 and bilateral agreements will strengthen this
evolution. It might be possible to negotiate a multinational instrument more
quickly than separate bilateral agreements with the over two hundred nations
that register merchant vessels. The supermajority of nations that already sup-
port WMD conventions could amend UNCLOS Article 110 to include traffick-
ing in weapons of mass destruction as a reason for a warship to approach and
visit another state’s vessel in international waters. Perhaps such an amendment
would finally win U.S. Senate ratification, which has been pending since 1994,
for the 1982 UNCLOS agreement as a whole. But even absent such an overarch-
ing instrument in the short term, the proliferation of bilateral agreements grant-
ing the right to approach and visit vessels on the high seas to search for WMD
will steadily increase the number of countries accepting this practice, gradually
establishing it as an international norm and then as creating a perceived duty, a
matter of customary law. Ultimately the effect would be the same: codification in
an amendment to Article 110 to the 1982 law of the sea agreement, making inter-
national recognition of the customary duty explicit and the rules for its practice
uniform. Reasonable suspicion that a vessel is carrying cargo or terrorists associ-
ated with WMD would then be one of the formally enumerated reasons for
interrupting the freedom of navigation on the high seas.
The journey from custom to codification must be intertwined with politics. If
the warning of the So San case has been heard, the nations participating in the
Proliferation Security Initiative will, in one way or the other, obtain “fast-track
authority” for maritime interdiction to enforce counterproliferation on the high
seas, as they do now in coastal waters. If it has not been heard, the international
community may wait for a seaborne WMD attack by terrorists before putting
pen to paper.
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size of merchant fleets for the other ten PSI
nations.
32. Both prongs are taken from Statement of In-
terdiction Principles, Interdiction Principle 4e.
33. UNCLOS, art. 2; Annotated Supplement,
paras. 1.8, 2.5.1.
34. Convention on International Civil Aviation
(1944) (“The Chicago Convention”); Anno-
tated Supplement, paras. 2.2.2, 2.5.2.1.
35. UNCLOS, art. 2; Chicago Convention, art. 1;
Annotated Supplement, paras. 2.5.1, 2.5.1.1.
36. These exceptions are codified in UNCLOS,
arts. 108 and 110.
37. Of note are the four nonsignatories to NPT:
Cuba, India, Israel, and Pakistan. The eleven
nonsignatories to CWC include Iraq, Kazakh-
stan, and North Korea.
38. For discussion of the doctrine, see Michael
Akehurst, “Custom as a Source of Interna-
tional Law,” Sources of International Law, ed.
Martti Koskenniemi (Burlington, Vt.: Ashgate,
2000), pp. 251–303.
39. P. K. Menon, The Law of Treaties between
States and International Organizations
(Lewiston, N.Y.: Edwin Mellen, 1992), p. 73.
The “textual school” of treaty interpretation
is generally accepted; ibid., chap. 7.
40. The thirty nations are: Argentina, Australia,
Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Repub-
lic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Lux-
embourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea,
Russia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey,
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Ukraine, the United Kingdom, and the
United States.
41. Brazil, Iceland, and South Africa signed
MTCR but not WA. Bulgaria, Romania, and
the Slovak Republic signed WA but not
MTCR.
42. Guy Thomas, “A Maritime Traffic-Tracking
System: Cornerstone of Maritime Homeland
Defense,” Naval War College Review 56, no. 4
(Autumn 2003), p. 139.
43. Lloyd’s Maritime Information Unit lists a
hundred thousand vessels of that minimum
weight in its “confidential directory,” avail-
able at www.seaway.co.uk. The U.S. Coast
Guard maintains a database of its contacts
with vessels in the Port Information State Ex-
change (PISX), which recognizes over two
hundred jurisdictions for which a vessel may
be flagged; see cgmix.uscg.mil/pisx/pisx/
psix2.
44. Naval War College, U.S. Navy Capabilities
Brief, CD-ROM (Newport, R.I.: Joint Military
Operations Dept., 2002). Five of the sixteen
superports are within the United States, and
three are in Europe. Others are located in
China, Hong Kong, India, Japan, Singapore,
South Korea, and Taiwan. The choke points
are the Panama Canal, English Channel,
Strait of Gibraltar, Dardanelles, Suez Canal,
Strait of Hormuz, Straits of Malacca, Taiwan
Strait, and Tsushima Strait.
45. “American intelligence officials failed to de-
tect that Iraq’s unconventional weapons pro-
grams were in a state of disarray.” James
Risen, “CIA Lacked Iraq Arms Data, Ex-
Inspector Says,” New York Times, 26 January
2004, p. 1. Underestimating the maturity of
WMD programs is also a risk. In the summer
of 2003, North Korea “surprised” the world
with more advanced ballistic missile and nu-
clear capabilities than it had been previously
believed to possess.
46. Central Intelligence Agency, Terrorist CBRN:
Materials and Effects, 17 December 2003, p. 5,
available at www.cia.gov/cia/reports/terrorist
_cbrn, discusses possible locations of radioac-
tive materials. The figure of twenty-two thou-
sand is from James Fitzsimonds, “Weapons of
Mass Destruction” (unpublished paper, Naval
War College, Newport, R.I., 2000), p. 16.
47. Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other
than War, Joint Pub 3-07 (Washington, D.C.:
Joint Staff, 16 June 1995), p. III-3.
48. U.S. State Dept., United States Initiatives to
Prevent Proliferation (Washington, D.C.: Bu-
reau of Nonproliferation, 24 May 2005), p. 5,
available at www.state.gov.
49. See table 2 and the discussion above.
50. NSCT, p. 22.
51. “Reasonable grounds” is the legal standard
for a visit and search, per article 110 of
UNCLOS.
52. Naval War College, U.S. Navy Capabilities
Brief, CD-ROM (Newport, R.I.: Joint Military
Operations Dept., 2004).
53. Dirty bombs, or “radiological dispersal de-
vices” (RDD), could be as small as a back-
pack, potentially requiring VBSS teams to
conduct a very thorough search (CIA, Terror-
ist CBRN, p. 5). Chemical weapons usually
“require bulk application,” but some biologi-
cal weapons need only “ten grams” to accom-
plish the same effect. Compare Stephen Rose,
“Soft Weapons and Hard Choices” (unpub-
lished research paper, Naval War College,
Newport, R.I., 1989), p. 6, with Guy Roberts,
“The Counterproliferation Self-Help Para-
digm: A Legal Regime for Enforcing the
Norm Prohibiting the Proliferation of
Weapons of Mass Destruction,” Denver Jour-
nal of International Law and Policy 27 (1999),
pp. 493–94 and note 49.
54. As table 1 shows, the thirteen NATO nations
that are also PSI participants are Canada,
Denmark, France (treaty signatory only),
Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Po-
land, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, the United
Kingdom, and the United States.
55. The 9/11 Commission specifically recognized
the advantages of using these features of
NATO infrastructure: “The PSI can be more
effective if it uses the intelligence and plan-
ning resources of the NATO alliance.” Na-
tional Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon
the United States, 9/11 Commission Report
(New York: W. W. Norton, 2004), p. 381,
available at www.9-11commission.gov/report/
911Report.pdf.
56. This will simplify information assurance, per-
mitting combatant commanders to use the
NATO standardization agreement “as a basis
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for establishing rules and policies for con-
ducting joint intelligence operations” (Doctrine
for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations,
Joint Pub 2-0 [Washington, D.C.: Joint Staff,
9 March 2000], p. vii). “The appropriate U.S.
geographic combatant commander should is-
sue clearly stated guidelines for the release of
classified U.S. information to the MNF
(Multi-National Force)” (Joint Doctrine for
Multinational Operations, Joint Pub 3-16
[Washington, D.C.: Joint Staff, 5 April 2000],
p. IV-3). The instruction also provides that
guidelines will be “based on existing policy
directives and any applicable approved excep-
tions to the national disclosure policy. These
guidelines should be issued to U.S. partici-
pants only and should be specific enough to
allow implementation down to the tactical
level” (Joint Pub 3-16).
57. U.S. State Dept., The Proliferation Security
Initiative (PSI): Second Anniversary (Wash-
ington, D.C.: Bureau of Nonproliferation, 26
May 2005), available at www.state.gov.
58. Actual execution of an MIO embraces several
legal issues: the conduct of the physical
search, diversion of the suspect vessel so that
a proper or safe search may be done, deten-
tion of persons interfering with the search,
and use of force by the VBSS. If the VBSS is
successful in locating WMD or terrorists, ad-
ditional issues arise: What is to be done with
captured WMD materials? Where will per-
sons be detained, and to what authorities will
they be handed over? What sort of prosecu-
tion and due process must be guaranteed for
them? These concerns are beyond the scope
of this article. However, they are all valid and
will arise during operations; exercises in
which policy, doctrine, and procedures can
be developed would be beneficial.
59. As OEF demonstrated, secure communica-
tions for all naval coalition participants are
needed (Phil Wisecup and Tom Williams,
“Enduring Freedom: Making Coalition Naval
Warfare Work,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceed-
ings [September 2002], p. 52). In August
2003, USS Enterprise and its battle group de-
ployed with an Argentine vessel (Dorsey,
“Navy Developing Plans to Deploy, Train
Overseas with Foreign Fleets”).
60. U.S. Coast Guard, Fact Card on Maritime
Safety and Security Teams, 23 January 2004,
www.uscg.mil/hq/g-cp/comrel/factfile/
Factcards/MSST.htm.
61. U.S. State Dept., Fact Sheet: International Law
Enforcement Academies (Washington, D.C.:
Bureau for International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs, 7 May 2004), available
at www.state.gov/g/inl/rls/fs/20280pf.htm.
62. UN Charter, arts. 41 and 42, respectively.
63. 9/11 Commission Report, pp. 365–67.
64. “PSI membership should be open to non-
NATO countries. Russia and China should be
encouraged to participate.” Ibid., p. 381.
65. Historic examples of such pairing are:
UNSCR 661, 665 (1990) sanctions against
Iraq after its invasion of Kuwait; UNSCR 713
(1991), p. 757 (1992) weapons against FRY
after fighting began. It is a matter of debate
whether separate UNSCR authority is re-
quired to implement an embargo with mili-
tary force, or whether MIO authorization
should be implied by the embargo authoriza-
tion. See Richard Zeigler, “Ubi Sumus? Quo
Vadimus? Charting the Course of Maritime
Intercept Operations,” Naval Law Review 43
(1996), pp. 27–31, and Jane G. Dalton, “The
Influence of Law on Seapower in Desert
Shield/Desert Storm,” Naval Law Review 41
(1993), pp. 34–45.




67. Representatives who spoke in favor of
UNSCR 1540 after the unanimous vote were:
Algeria, Brazil, Chile, China, France, Ger-
many, Pakistan, Philippines, Romania, the
Russian Federation, Spain, the United King-
dom, and the United States. Six whose ratio-
nales included closing a “gap” in international
law were: cosponsor France, Pakistan, Chile,
Spain (which used the phrase “legal vac-
uum”), Romania, and the Philippines.
68. UNSCR 1540, para. 3(c).
69. Ibid., quoting paras. 2, 3.
70. Statement of Interdiction Principles, Inter-
diction Principle 4.
71. The North Atlantic Treaty, the Inter-American
Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Pact),
and the Security Treaty between the United
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States and Japan all incorporate Article 51 by
reference.
72. Thomas A. Bailey, Diplomatic History of the
United States, 3rd ed. (New York: Appleton-
Century-Crofts, 1946), pp. 204–207.
73. Ziegler, “Ubi Sumus? Quo Vadimus?” p. 19.
74. The facts of Caroline and its precedential
value on this point are noted by Roberts,
“The Counterproliferation Self-Help Para-
digm,” p. 483 notes 107–108, and discussed
in Yoram Dinstein, War, Aggression and
Self-Defense, 3rd ed. (Cambridge, U.K.: Cam-
bridge Univ. Press, 2001), pp. 218–19.
75. The United States reported the matter to the
Security Council on 22 October 1962: “The
Council met even before the Organ of Con-
sultation under the Rio Treaty adopted its
resolution of October 23rd and before the
proclamation of defensive quarantine was is-
sued or carried into effect.” Leonard Meeker,
“Defensive Quarantine and the Law,” Ameri-
can Journal of International Law 57 (1963),




79. U.S. President, Proclamation 3504, 23 Octo-
ber 1962, 27 Federal Register 10401, reprinted
in American Journal of International Law 57
(1963), p. 512.
80. Specifically Articles 1(1) and 2(4).
81. Annotated Supplement, art 4.3.2; George P.
Politakis, Modern Aspects of the Laws of Naval
Warfare and Maritime Neutrality (New York:
Columbia Univ. Press, 1998), pp. 151–52;
Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defense, p.
169. For a contrary view see Wright Quincy,
“The Cuban Quarantine,” American Journal
of International Law 57 (1963), pp. 546–65.
82. “IDF Seizes PA Weapons Ship,” www.us-israel
.org/jsource/Peace/paship.html.
83. Both incidents were reported by Intellibridge
.com, 18 September 2003.
84. Among these examples are the Essex case in
1805, the Chesapeake Affair of 1807, and the
Trent Affair of 1861. See Bailey, Diplomatic
History of the United States, chaps. 8–9, 21.
85. Gerald McGinley, “The Achille Lauro Case,”
Legal Responses to International Terrorism:
U.S. Procedural Aspects, ed. M. Cherif
Bassiouni (Dordrecht, Neth.: Nijhoff, 1988),
pp. 323–25, 351–53.
86. For discussion, see Timothy L. H. McCormack,
Self-Defense in International Law: The Israeli
Raid on the Iraqi Nuclear Reactor (New York:
St. Martin’s, 1996).
87. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruc-
tion 3121.01B of 13 June 2005 provides the
standing guidance on self-defense, including
national self-defense, which may be justified
in response to a hostile act or intent toward
the United States. Enclosure A defines “na-
tional self-defense” in paragraphs 5a, 5b, 5f–
5h, and appendix A.
88. UNCLOS, art. 111, codifies the doctrine of
hot pursuit by the coastal nation.
89. This specifically includes artificial islands, in-
stallations and structures with economic pur-
poses, scientific research, and environmental
protection within the EEZ. See UNCLOS,
arts. 56, 58, and 60, also Annotated Supple-
ment, art 2.4.2.
90. The categories are: piracy, slave trade, unau-
thorized broadcasting, without nationality,
deception regarding nationality (when true
nationality is the same as the warship’s), and
illegal narcotics trafficking.
91. See “Chronological List of UNCLOS
Ratifiers,” 16 January 2004, www.un.org/
Depts/los. The United States has not ratified
but follows UNCLOS as a matter of policy.
92. Compare tables 2 and 3 and their accompa-
nying discussion with UNCLOS support by
145 countries.
93. Donald A. Petrie, The Prize Game: Lawful
Looting on the High Seas in the Days of
Fighting Sail (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute
Press, 1999), pp. 68–82.
94. 18 USC 1651. Congress has made the Coast
Guard the lead maritime agency in the en-
forcement of customs laws and created spe-
cific statutory authority for interdiction to
accomplish that mission both “on the high
seas and waters subject to the jurisdiction of
the United States” (14 USC 20). This separa-
tion by the United States of maritime law en-
forcement from the naval service is unique.
Many states, such as Australia, have made law
enforcement a naval mission. Others, like
Chile, have a law-enforcement specialization
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within the naval service. International law
considers high-seas interdiction for law en-
forcement a task of warships; U.S. Coast
Guard are “warships” under international
law. See UNCLOS, art. 29.
95. Four UNCLOS exception categories are
rooted in the historical struggles against pi-
racy, the slave and opium trades, and illegal
broadcasting in ways that illustrate this pro-
cess. See Suzanne Miers, Britain and the End-
ing of the Slave Trade (New York: Africana,
1975), pp. 3–20, 315–19; “1958 Convention
on the High Seas,” art. 22, reprinted in
Burdick Brittin and Liselotte Watson, Inter-
national Law for Seagoing Officers, 3rd ed.
(Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1973);
and Annotated Supplement, note 38.
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INDIA IN THE INDIAN OCEAN
Donald L. Berlin
One of the key milestones in world history has been the rise to prominenceof new and influential states in world affairs. The recent trajectories of
China and India suggest strongly that these states will play a more powerful role
in the world in the coming decades.1 One recent analysis, for example, judges
that “the likely emergence of China and India . . . as new global players—similar
to the advent of a united Germany in the 19th century and a powerful United
States in the early 20th century—will transform the geopolitical landscape, with
impacts potentially as dramatic as those in the two previous centuries.”2
India’s rise, of course, has been heralded before—perhaps prematurely. How-
ever, its ascent now seems assured in light of changes in India’s economic and
political mind-set, especially the advent of better economic policies and a diplo-
macy emphasizing realism. More fundamentally, In-
dia’s continued economic rise also is favored by the
scale and intensity of globalization in the contempo-
rary world.
India also is no longer geopolitically contained in
South Asia, as it was in the Cold War, when its alignment
with the Soviet Union caused the United States and
China, with the help of Pakistan, to contain India.
Finally, the sea change in Indian-U.S. relations, espe-
cially since 9/11, has made it easier for India to enter into
close political and security cooperation with America’s
friends and allies in the Asia-Pacific.3
Dr. Berlin is a professor at the College of Security
Studies, Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, in Hono-
lulu. Dr. Berlin served with the Defense Intelligence
Agency from 1976 to 1998 and has been a faculty mem-
ber of the Joint Military Intelligence College in Wash-
ington, D.C. He was commissioned a second lieutenant
in the U.S. Air Force in 1968, serving in a variety of
assignments, including duty in air intelligence in the
Vietnam War and as a reserve intelligence officer at
National Defense University. He holds a PhD in inter-
national studies from the University of South Carolina
(1982) and an MA in national security and strategic
studies from the Naval War College (1998).
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Much of the literature on India has focused on its recent economic vitality, es-
pecially its highly successful knowledge-based industrial sector. The nature and
implications of India’s strategic goals and behavior have received somewhat less
attention.4 Those implications, however, will be felt globally—at the United Na-
tions, in places as distant as Europe and Latin America, and within international
economic institutions. It also will be manifest on the continent of Asia, from Af-
ghanistan through Central Asia to Japan. Finally, and most of all, the rise of India
will have consequences in the broad belt of nations from South Africa to Austra-
lia that constitute the Indian Ocean littoral and region.
For India, this maritime and southward focus is not entirely new.5 However, it
has been increasing due to New Delhi’s embrace of globalization and of the
global marketplace, the advent of a new Indian self-confidence emphasizing se-
curity activism over continental self-defense, and the waning of the Pakistan
problem as India’s relative power has increased. Other, older, factors influencing
this trend are similar to those that once conditioned British thinking about the
defense of India: the natural protection afforded the subcontinent by the Hima-
layan mountain chain, and the problem confronting most would-be invaders of
long lines of communications—the latter a factor that certainly impeded Japan’s
advance toward India in World War II.6
The December 2004 tsunami that devastated many of the coasts of the Indian
Ocean (IO) turned the world’s attention to a geographic zone that New Delhi in-
creasingly sees as critically important and strategically challenging.7 The publi-
cation of India’s new Maritime Doctrine is quite explicit on the central status of the
Indian Ocean in Indian strategic thought and on India’s determination to consti-
tute the most important influence in the region as a whole. The appearance of
this official paper complements a variety of actions by India that underscore
New Delhi’s ambitions and intent in the region.8
WHY THE OCEAN IS INDIAN
Why does New Delhi care about the Indian Ocean region? India is, after all, a
large nation, a subcontinent in itself. Why is it driven to exercise itself in a larger
arena, one larger in fact than the South Asian subregion?
The reality is that while India is a “continental” power, it occupies a central posi-
tion in the IO region, a fact that will exercise an increasingly profound influence
on—indeed almost determine—India’s security environment. Writing in the
1940s, K. M. Pannikar argued that “while to other countries the Indian Ocean is
only one of the important oceanic areas, to India it is a vital sea. Her lifelines are
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concentrated in that area, her freedom is dependent on the freedom of that wa-
ter surface. No industrial development, no commercial growth, no stable politi-
cal structure is possible for her unless her shores are protected.”9 This was also
emphasized in the most recent Annual Report of India’s Defence Ministry, which
noted that “India is strategically located vis-à-vis both continental Asia as well as
the Indian Ocean Region.”10
From New Delhi’s perspective, key security considerations include the acces-
sibility of the Indian Ocean to the fleets of the world’s most powerful states; the
large Islamic populations on the shores of the ocean and in its hinterland; the oil
wealth of the Persian Gulf; the proliferation of conventional military power and
nuclear weapons among the region’s states; the importance of key straits for India’s
maritime security; and the historical tendency of continental Asian peoples or
powers (the Indo-Aryans, the Mongols, Russia) to spill periodically out of Inner
Asia in the direction of the Indian Ocean.11 The position of India in this environ-
ment has sometimes been compared to that of Italy in the Mediterranean, only
on an immense scale. To this list may be added the general consideration that, in
the words of India’s navy chief, Indians “live in uncertain times and in a rough
neighborhood. A scan of the littoral shows that, with the exception of a few
countries, all others are afflicted with one or more of the ailments of poverty,
backwardness, fundamentalism, terrorism or internal insurgency. A number of
territorial and maritime disputes linger on. . . . Most of the conflicts since the end
of the Cold War have also taken place in or around the [Indian Ocean region].”12
Confronted by this environment, India—like other states that are geographi-
cally large and also ambitious—believes that its security will be best guaranteed
by enlarging its security perimeter and, specifically, achieving a position of in-
fluence in the larger region that encompasses the Indian Ocean. As one promi-
nent American scholar recently noted, “Especially powerful states are strongly
inclined to seek regional hegemony.”13
Unsurprisingly, New Delhi regards the Indian Ocean as its backyard and
deems it both natural and desirable that India function as, eventually, the leader
and the predominant influence in this region—the world’s only region and
ocean named after a single state. This is what the United States set out to do in
North America and the Western Hemisphere at an early stage in America’s “rise
to power”: “American foreign policy throughout the nineteenth century had one
overarching goal: achieving hegemony in the Western Hemisphere.”14 Similarly,
in the expansive view of many Indians, India’s security perimeter should extend
from the Strait of Malacca to the Strait of Hormuz and from the coast of Africa
to the western shores of Australia. For some Indians, the emphasis is on the
northern Indian Ocean, but for others the realm includes even the “Indian
Ocean” coast of Antarctica.15
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In this same vein, one—probably not atypical—Indian scholar judges that “a
rising India will aspire to become the regional hegemon of South Asia and the
Indian Ocean Region, and an extraregional power in the Middle East, Central
Asia and Southeast Asia. Ceteris paribus, a rising India will try to establish re-
gional hegemony just like all the other rising powers have since Napoleonic
times, with the long term goal of achieving great power status on an Asian and
perhaps even global scale.”16
India’s strategic elite, moreover, in some ways regards the nation as the heir of
the British Raj, the power and influence of which in the nineteenth century often
extended to the distant shores of the Indian Ocean, the “British Lake.” Writing
about the hill station and summer capital of Simla in that period, historian
James Morris has observed:
The world recognized that India was a great Power in itself. It was an Empire of its
own, active and passive. Most of the bigger nations had their representatives at Simla,
B E R L I N 6 1
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and the little hill station on the ridge cast its summer shadow wide. Its writ ran to the
Red Sea one way, the frontiers of Siam on the other. Aden, Perim, Socotra, Burma,
Somaliland were all governed from India. Indian currency was the legal tender of
Zanzibar and British East Africa; Indian mints coined the dollars of Singapore and
Hong Kong.
It was from Simla, in the summer time, that the British supervised the eastern half of
their Empire. Upon the power and wealth of India depended the security of the east-
ern trade, of Australia and New Zealand, of the great commercial enterprises of the
Far East. The strength of India, so many strategists thought, alone prevented Russia
from spilling through the Himalayan passes into Southeast Asia, and the preoccupa-
tions of generals in Simla were important to the whole world.17
Historian Ashley Jackson is even more explicit in highlighting the Indian di-
mension in all of this. He writes that
India under the Raj was a subimperial force autonomous of London whose weight
was felt from the Swahili coast to the Persian Gulf and eastward to the Straits of
Malacca. There was, in fact, an “Empire of the Raj” until at least the First World War,
in which Indian foreign policy interests were powerfully expressed and represented
in the Gulf and on the Arabian and Swahili coasts, often in conflict with other British
imperial interests.18
Perhaps unsurprisingly, this imperial “Indian” posture in the Indian Ocean re-
flects the strategic vision of many influential Indians today.19
A second motive for India, and one obviously related to the foregoing, stems
from anxiety about the role, or potential role, of external powers in the Indian
Ocean. The late prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru summed up India’s concerns
in this regard: “History has shown that whatever power controls the Indian
Ocean has, in the first instance, India’s sea borne trade at her mercy and, in the
second, India’s very independence itself.” This remains India’s view. The Indian
Maritime Doctrine asserts: “All major powers of this century will seek a toehold
in the Indian Ocean Region. Thus, Japan, the EU, and China, and a reinvigorated
Russia can be expected to show presence in these waters either independently or
through politico-security arrangements.” There is, moreover, “an increasing
tendency of extra regional powers of military intervention in [IO] littoral coun-
tries to contain what they see as a conflict situation.”
India’s concern about external powers in the Indian Ocean mainly relates to
China and the United States. The Sino-Indian relationship has improved since
India’s war with China in 1962 and the Indian prime minister’s 1998 letter to the
U.S. president justifying India’s nuclear tests in terms of the Chinese “threat.”20
Most recently, the Chinese premier paid a state visit to India in April 2005, dur-
ing which the two sides agreed to, among various other steps, the establishment
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of a “Strategic and Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Prosperity.” Chinese
and Indian naval units also exercised together for the first time in November 2005.
However, and notwithstanding the probably episodic progress registered of
late, China and India likely will remain long-term rivals, vying for the same strate-
gic space in Asia. Beijing, according to former Indian external affairs minister
Jaswant Singh, is the “principal variable in the calculus of Indian foreign and de-
fense policy.”21 In the words of one Indian scholar, China’s “rise will increasingly
challenge Asian and global security. Just as India bore the brunt of the rise of inter-
national terrorism because of its geographical location, it will be frontally affected
by the growing power of a next door . . . empire practicing classical balance-
of-power politics.”22
Another observer has recently judged that “there is no sign of China giving up
its ‘contain India’ strategy which takes several forms: an unresolved territorial
dispute; arms sales to and military alliances with ‘India-wary countries’ (Paki-
stan, Bangladesh, Burma and now Nepal); nuclear and missile proliferation in
India’s neighborhood (Pakistan, Iran and Saudi Arabia); and opposition to In-
dia’s membership in global and regional organizations.”23 Most recently, India’s
defense minister said in September 2005 that the Sino-Indian “situation has not
improved. Massive preparations and deployments by China in the Tibetan and
Sikkim border areas near Arunachal Pradesh and the Aksai Chin . . . has created
an alarming situation.”24
Narrowing its focus to the IO, India cannot help but be wary of the growing
capability of China’s navy and of Beijing’s growing maritime presence.25 In the
Bay of Bengal and Arabian Sea, especially, New Delhi is sensitive to a variety of
Chinese naval or maritime activities that observers have characterized collec-
tively as a “string of pearls” strategy or a “preparation of the battlefield.”26 For
Beijing, this process has entailed achieving the capability, and thereby the op-
tion, to deploy or station naval power in this region in the future. A key focus in
this connection is Burma (Myanmar), where Chinese engineers and military
personnel have long been engaged in airfield, road, railroad, pipeline, and port
construction aimed at better connecting China with the Indian Ocean, both by
sea and directly overland.
Some of this activity, moreover, spills over onto Burma’s offshore islands,
including St. Matthews, near the mouth of the Malacca Strait, and the Coco
Islands (Indian until their transfer to Burma in the 1950s), in the Bay of Bengal.
On the latter, China is suspected of maintaining a communications monitoring
facility that collects intelligence on Indian naval operations and missile testing.
In addition to this “presence” in Burma, China is pursuing a variety of infra-
structure links with Southeast Asia through the Greater Mekong Subregion pro-
gram and is building container ports in Bangladesh at Chittagong, and in Sri
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Lanka at Hambantota—directly astride the main east-west shipping route
across the Indian Ocean. Elsewhere, and perhaps most ominously for India,
China is constructing a large new naval base for Pakistan at Gwadar.27
India also remains somewhat nervous about the large U.S. military presence in
the Indian Ocean to India’s west—in the Arabian Sea and the Persian Gulf. India’s
Maritime Doctrine observes that “the unfolding events consequent to the war in
Afghanistan has brought the threats emanating on our Western shores into
sharper focus. The growing US and western presence and deployment of naval
forces, the battle for oil dominance and its control in the littoral and hinterland . . .
are factors that are likely to have a long-term impact on the overall security envi-
ronment in the [Indian Ocean region].” In similar fashion, the 2004–2005 Annual
Report of India’s Defense Ministry states, “The Indian Navy maintained its per-
sonnel and equipment in a high state of combat preparedness due to the contin-
ued presence of multinational maritime forces in the Indian Ocean Region
resulting in a fast pace of activities in the area.”28
On the other hand, the continuing development of ties with the United States
lately seems to have moderated Indian sensitivity to the U.S. presence in the Ara-
bian Sea. In September and October 2005, for example, the two sides conducted
their first naval maneuvers—MALABAR 05—employing U.S. and Indian aircraft
carriers, and this occurred in the Arabian Sea. Many Indians, moreover, also rec-
ognize that because of Washington’s desire to draw closer to India in response to
overlapping “China” and “terrorism” concerns, the increased American role in
the Indian Ocean region lately has increased India’s “strategic space” and political-
military relevance. Any decrease in the level of U.S. involvement in the region
also would increase pressure here from China. Wariness about China also is a
factor in recent Indian efforts to increase Japan’s profile in the IO. This was most
recently made manifest by the March 2005 Indo-Japanese agreement to develop
jointly natural gas resources in the strategically sensitive Andaman Sea.29 In any
case, as one retired Indian diplomat recently commented, “asking outside pow-
ers to stay away is a pipe dream.”
Of particular note, this last realization has led New Delhi to discard its tradi-
tional rhetoric about the Indian Ocean as a “zone of peace.” That language,
along with “nonalignment” and a diplomatic approach marked by preachiness
and a “moral” dimension, were the policies of an India that was weak. That India
now belongs to history: “India has moved from its past emphasis on the power
of the argument to a new stress on the argument of power.”30
A third factor animating Indian interest in the Indian Ocean region is anxiety
about the threat posed by Pakistan and, more broadly, Islam in a region that is
home to much of the world’s Muslim population. Formerly this may not have
been an important consideration. Today, however, Islamic civilization often
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finds itself at odds with the West and with largely Hindu India, and this conflict
frequently will play out in the Indian Ocean region. India’s Maritime Doctrine,
for example, observed “the growing assertion of fundamentalist militancy fu-
eled by jihadi fervor are factors that are likely to have a long-term impact on the
overall security environment in the [Indian Ocean region].” In a similar vein, In-
dia’s naval chief recently declared that the “epicenter of world terrorism lies in
our [India’s] immediate neighborhood.”31 India, however, will approach these
matters pragmatically, as illustrated by New Delhi’s close ties with Iran.
A fourth motive for India in the Indian Ocean is energy. As the fourth-largest
economy (in purchasing-power-parity terms) in the world, and one almost 70
percent dependent on foreign oil (the figure is expected to rise to 85 percent by
2020), India has an oil stake in the region that is significant and growing (see fig-
ure). Some Indian security analysts foresee energy security as India’s primary
strategic concern in the next twenty-five years and believe it must place itself on
a virtual wartime footing to address it. India must protect its offshore oil and gas
fields, ongoing deep-sea oil drilling projects in its vast exclusive economic zone,
and an extensive infrastructure of shore and offshore oil and gas wells, pumping
stations and telemetry posts, ports and pipeline grids, and refineries. Addi-
tionally, Indian public and private-sector oil companies have invested several
billion dollars in recent years in oil concessions in foreign countries, many of
them in the region, including Sudan, Yemen, Iran, Iraq, and Burma. These in-
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region—3.5 million in the Gulf and Arab countries; they, and their remittances,
constitute a factor in Indian security thinking.32
In light of these interests, India is pursuing a variety of policies aimed at im-
proving its strategic situation and at ensuring that its fears in the theater are not
realized. To these ends, New Delhi is forging a web of partnerships with certain
littoral states and major external powers, according to India’s foreign secretary,
to increase Indian influence in the region, acquire “more strategic space” and
“strategic autonomy,” and create a safety cushion for itself.33 One observer states:
“To spread its leverage, from Iran . . . to Myanmar and Vietnam, India is mixing
innovative diplomatic cocktails that blend trade agreements, direct investment,
military exercises, aid funds, energy cooperation and infrastructure-building.”34
In addition, India is developing more capable naval and air forces, and it is utiliz-
ing these forces increasingly to shape India’s strategic environment.
THE U.S. RELATIONSHIP
India’s pursuit of closer ties with its neighbors in the region and with key exter-
nal actors in the region is not haphazard. Rather, and as one would expect, India
is systematically targeting states that will bring India specific and tangible secu-
rity and economic benefits.
The relationship with the United States is intended to enhance and magnify
India’s own power, and it constitutes perhaps the most important measure that
is intended, inter alia, to promote the realization of India’s agenda in the Indian
Ocean. The United States, of course, is the key external actor in the IO and has a
more significant military presence there—in the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea,
Pakistan, east and northeast Africa, Singapore, and Diego Garcia—than it did
even a few years ago. Thus, America’s raw power in the region has made it imper-
ative that New Delhi, if it is to achieve its own regional goals, court the United
States—at least for some time. The U.S. connection, of course, also promotes In-
dian goals unrelated to the Indian Ocean.
This developing relationship has been abetted by common concerns about
international terrorism, religious extremism, and the rise of China. It also is a
fundamental departure from the past pattern of Indian foreign policy. Since
President William Clinton’s visit to India in 2000 (the first visit by a president in
decades) and, more recently, the realization by the George W. Bush administra-
tion of the importance of a rising India, as well as the 11 September 2001 terror-
ist attack on the United States, the two nations have embarked on a broad
program of cooperation in a variety of fields, especially security. This coopera-
tion has included Indian naval protection of U.S. shipping in the Malacca Strait
in 2002, a close partnership in responding to the 2004 tsunami, combined mil-
itary exercises, U.S. warship visits to India, a dialogue on missile defense,
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American approval of India’s acquisition of Israeli-built Phalcon airborne
warning and control systems, and an offer to sell India a variety of military hard-
ware, including fighter aircraft and P-3 maritime patrol planes.
Indo-U.S. ties recently have advanced with particular speed. In March 2005, no-
tably, an American government spokesman stated that Washington’s “goal is to
help India become a major world power in the 21st century. We understand fully the
implications, including military implications, of that statement.”35 This declaration
was followed, in June 2005, by a bilateral accord, a ten-year “New Framework for the
U.S.-India Defense Relationship,” that strongly implies increasing levels of coopera-
tion in defense trade, including coproduction of military equipment, cooperation
on missile defense, the lifting of U.S. export controls on many sensitive military
technologies, and joint monitoring and protection of critical sea lanes.36
George Bush hosted a summit with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in July
2005, promising to strive for full civil nuclear cooperation with India. In effect, the
president recognized India as a de facto, if not de jure, nuclear-weapon state and
placed New Delhi on the same platform as other nuclear-weapon states. India, re-
ciprocating, agreed to assume the same responsibilities and practices as any other
country with advanced nuclear technology. These include separating military and
civilian nuclear reactors and placing all civilian nuclear facilities under Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency safeguards; implementing the Additional Proto-
col (which supplements the foregoing safeguards) with respect to civilian nuclear
facilities; continuing India’s unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing; working
with the United States for the implementation of a multilateral Fissile Material
Cut-Off Treaty; placing sensitive goods and technologies under export controls;
and adhering to the Missile Technology Control Regime and to Nuclear Suppliers
Group guidelines. The American and Indian delegations also agreed to further
measures to combat terrorism and deepen bilateral economic relations through
greater trade, investment, and technology collaboration. The United States and
India also signed a Science and Technology Framework Agreement and agreed to
build closer ties in space exploration, satellite navigation, and other areas in the
commercial space arena.
Notwithstanding this dramatic advance in relations, which—assuming even-
tual congressional approval of implementing legislation—establishes a very close
United States–India strategic relationship, some bilateral problems will persist.
One is Pakistan.
The U.S. administration’s policy now is to expand relations with both India
and Pakistan but to do so along distinct tracks and in differentiated ways, one
matching their respective geostrategic weights. From New Delhi’s perspec-
tive, this is a distinct advance. Nonetheless, there will remain a residual Indian
suspicion that any American efforts to assist Pakistan to become a successful
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state will represent means, potential or actual, of limiting Indian power in South
Asia and the Indian Ocean.37 Such concerns have been diminishing; nonetheless,
New Delhi will try to weaken or modify U.S. policies intended to strengthen
United States–Pakistan ties, including continuing plans to sell the latter a large
package of military equipment.38
Other lingering problems in Indo-U.S. relations include New Delhi’s close
ties to Iran, apparently continuing Indian reservations about the large U.S. mili-
tary presence in Southwest Asia and the Persian Gulf, India’s pronounced empha-
sis on preserving its “strategic autonomy,” and a persistent disinclination on
India’s part to ally itself with American purposes. In the latter regard, India, like
China, Russia, and the European Union, will remain uncomfortable with a uni-
polar world and will do what it can to promote a multipolar order—in which it is
one of the poles.39 New Delhi, therefore, will need to proceed adeptly to ensure
that ties with the United States continue to develop and expand in such a way that
its own policies and ambitions in the Indian Ocean are buttressed and advanced.40
TOWARD THE ARABIAN SEAS AND THE AFRICAN LITTORAL
In addition to the U.S. relationship, New Delhi is seeking to increase India’s pro-
file almost omnidirectionally from India’s shores. These efforts are intended to
advance broad economic or security interests, including the “security” of the
various “gates” to the Indian Ocean, and to cultivate ties with the nations adja-
cent to these choke points: the Strait of Hormuz (Iran), the Bab el Mandeb (Dji-
bouti and Eritrea), the Cape of Good Hope and the Mozambique Channel
(South Africa and Mozambique), and the Singapore and Malacca straits (Singa-
pore and Thailand), among others. Certain Indian strategic and diplomatic ini-
tiatives also are aimed at gaining partners or client states once having strong ties
with colonial or precolonial India.41
As noted above, India’s Maritime Doctrine underscores the importance of the
Arabian Sea region in the Indian view and highlights a growing attentiveness to
challenges and opportunities arising there. Efforts by New Delhi to advance the
Indian cause to its “near West” and in the “Arabian Seas” subregion have focused
mainly on Pakistan, Iran, Israel, and several African states.
Indo-Pakistani relations have improved since early 2003, when Prime Minis-
ter Atal Bihari Vajpayee extended a “hand of friendship” to Pakistan; in January
2004, the two sides launched a peace process. India’s aims in the current diplo-
matic interchange are to lessen the likelihood of an Indo-Pakistani military con-
flict, reduce pressure in Kashmir, and—especially—increase India’s freedom to
pursue great-power status and to maneuver elsewhere in South Asia, the region,
and the world.
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India does not expect an end, for a very long time at best, to difficulties in its
relations with Pakistan. It is hoping, however, to manipulate the relationship in a
manner that will leave India stronger and Pakistan weaker at the end of the day.
As India is inherently the stronger party, any “closer” relationship between India
and Pakistan will, in the long run, increase Indian leverage with respect to Paki-
stan and decrease Islamabad’s ability to disregard Indian interests. As one Indian
observer recently said, “India’s long-term interest lies in changing Pakistan’s be-
havior.”42 The termination of support for perceived anti-Indian terrorism and
more restraint in Islamabad’s embrace of China, and eventually even the United
States, are among India’s goals.
Elsewhere in the Arabian Sea, India already has enjoyed considerable success
in wooing Iran. That state, with its Islamic government, seems a strange partner
for democratic India, but the two lands have long influenced each other in cul-
ture, language, and other fields, especially when the Mughals ruled India. India
and Iran also shared a border until 1947. Iran sees India as a strong partner that
will help Tehran avoid strategic isolation. In addition, economic cooperation
with New Delhi (and Beijing) dovetails with Iran’s own policy of shifting its oil
and gas trade to the Asian region so as to reduce its market dependence on the
West. For India, the relationship is part of a broader long-term effort, involving
various diplomatic and other measures in Afghanistan and Central Asia, to en-
circle and contain Pakistan.
Obviously, New Delhi also regards the Iranian connection as helping with its
own energy needs. Deepening ties have been reflected in the growth of trade and
particularly in a January 2005 deal with the National Iranian Oil Company to
import five million tons of liquefied gas annually for twenty-five years. An In-
dian company will get a 20 percent share in the development of Iran’s biggest on-
shore oil field, Yadavaran, which is operated by China’s state oil company, as well
as 100 percent rights in the Juefeir oil field. India and Iran also have been cooper-
ating on the North-South Transportation Corridor, a project to link Mumbai—
via Bandar Abbas—with Europe. There also is discussion of the development of
a land corridor that would allow goods to move from India’s Punjab through Pa-
kistan, Iran, and Azerbaijan, then on to Europe.43 India and Iran also have been
pursuing an ambitious project to build a 2,700-kilometer pipeline from Iran
through Pakistan to India that would allow New Delhi to import liquefied natu-
ral gas. If finalized soon, the pipeline would be operational by 2010.44 (The
United States has warned India and Pakistan that the project could violate the
Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996.)45
Security ties with Iran have been advancing as well. The parties have forged
an accord that gives Iran some access to Indian military technology. There are
reports—officially denied—that it also gives India access to Iranian military
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bases in the event of war with Pakistan. Other recent developments include the
first Indo-Iranian combined naval exercises and an Indian effort to upgrade the
Iranian port of Chahbahar, a move that could foreshadow its use eventually by
the Indian Navy. This latter initiative presumably also responds to China’s devel-
opment, noted above, of a Pakistani port and naval base at Gwadar, a hundred
miles east of Chahbahar.46
The Indo-Iranian relationship is not without problems. Iran, of course, has
never been happy about India’s close ties with Israel. Most recently, Iran also was
angered by a 24 September 2005 vote cast by India in support of an International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) resolution that potentially refers the Iranian nu-
clear weapons issue to the United Nations Security Council. The IAEA vote—
passed despite one “no” vote and abstentions from Russia, China, and Pakistan,
among others—follows several earlier hostile comments from India on the Ira-
nian nuclear issue, including one calling on Tehran to “honor the obligations
and agreements to which it is a party.”47
The Indian vote was a blow to New Delhi’s relations with Tehran. However,
while it may augur a more circumscribed future for this connection, it is more
likely that the long-term effects of India’s vote will be limited. The bilateral rela-
tionship is too important for both parties, and New Delhi and Tehran will do
their best to ensure that ties remain on an even keel.48
India, however, recently has tried to reduce its vulnerabilities in the oil-rich
but unstable Persian Gulf by moving beyond Iran and attempting to cultivate a
broader and more diverse set of relationships there. The most significant recent
development has been the new warmth in New Delhi’s ties with Saudi Arabia,
Iran’s traditional foe in the Gulf and India’s largest source of petroleum imports.
Reflecting the change in the temper of Indo-Saudi ties, the new Saudi king was
scheduled to be the main guest in New Delhi at the January 2006 Republic Day cele-
bration. This is a measure of the importance India attaches to its developing con-
nection to Riyadh and an initiative undoubtedly noticed by the leadership in Iran.
Moving farther westward, another key nexus is with Israel. While formal dip-
lomatic ties date only from 1992, the two states have had important connections
at least since the early 1980s. In recent years, numerous senior Israeli and Indian
officials have exchanged visits, and military relations have become so close as to
be tantamount to a military alliance. In 2003, following Pakistan’s shoot-down
of an “Indian” unmanned aircraft manufactured (and perhaps operated) by Is-
rael, President Pervez Musharraf complained “that the cooperation between India
and Israel not only relates to Pakistan, but the Middle East region as a whole.” Is-
rael is now India’s second-largest arms supplier after Russia, and India is Israel’s
largest defense market and second-largest Asian trading partner (after Japan).49
According to one estimate, India will purchase some fifteen billion dollars’
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worth of Israeli arms over the next few years.50 The two sides recently agreed to a
combined air exercise pitting Israeli F-16s against Indian Su-30MKIs (an ad-
vanced derivative of the Soviet Su-27 Flanker).51
Israel possesses an Indian Ocean footprint that apparently encompasses the
Bab-el-Mandeb, the southern entrance to the Red Sea and a key choke point, and
probably points beyond.52 India’s aim here is to link itself with another powerful
state whose sphere thus intersects its own. At the same time, New Delhi also seeks
the advanced military equipment, training, and other help—probably including
technology and advice on nuclear weapons and missiles—that Israel can sell or
provide. The official publication of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, World
Affairs, claims that India is acquiring technology from Israel for its Agni-III mis-
sile as well as for a miniature nuclear warhead—which India would need were it to
deploy a sea-based (i.e., Indian Ocean–based) strategic nuclear deterrent.
Elsewhere in the western Indian Ocean, India forged its first military relation-
ship with a Gulf state in 2002 when New Delhi and Oman agreed to hold regular
combined exercises and cooperate in training and defense production. They also
initiated a regular strategic dialogue and, in 2003, signed a defense cooperation
pact. The pact provides for the export and import of weapons, military training,
and coordination of security-related issues. India and the Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC) also have signed a Framework Agreement for Economic Coop-
eration and have begun negotiations on a free trade pact. New Delhi’s connec-
tions with Oman and the five other GCC states, however, still are relatively
undeveloped. As one Indian observer noted recently, “With our growing depen-
dence on imported oil and gas, stability in this region is crucial for our welfare
and well-being. Around 3.7 million Indian nationals live in the six GCC coun-
tries. They remit around $8 billion annually. . . . The time has, perhaps, come for
us to fashion a new and more proactive ‘Look West’ policy to deal with the chal-
lenges that we now face to our west.”53 A month earlier, India’s commerce minis-
ter offered the same view: “India has successfully pursued a ‘look-east’ policy to
come closer to countries in Southeast Asia. We must similarly come closer to our
western neighbors in the Gulf.”54
Farther afield, India’s ties with the states of Africa’s Indian Ocean coast still
are limited but are expanding. Reminiscent of India’s precolonial relationship
with coastal Africa, New Delhi’s key connections today are with some of the
states in the Horn of Africa, South Africa, Tanzania, Mozambique, and especially
the so-called African Islands, including Mauritius and the Seychelles. In the
Horn, India is providing the force commander and the largest contingent of
troops in the UN mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea. India also just concluded sig-
nificant naval maneuvers in the Gulf of Aden, featuring drills with allied Task
Force Horn of Africa units and a port call in Djibouti.
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At the other end of the continent, a noteworthy connection is developing
with South Africa, through bilateral arrangements and a trilateral (India–
Brazil–South Africa) relationship. Developments in the security arena are striking
and were underscored in late 2004 when the Indian Air Force conducted a com-
bined air-defense exercise with its South African counterpart (and with partici-
pating American, German, and British elements)—the first combined air exercise
ever conducted by India on the African continent. The participating Indian
Mirage 2000 fighters deployed from north central India and flew—with help from
newly acquired Il-78 aerial tankers—to South Africa via Mauritius.55 India and
South Africa conducted combined naval drills off the African coast even more
recently, in June 2005.
A visit by India’s president to Tanzania in 2004 led to an agreement for in-
creased training of Tanzanian military personnel in India and more frequent
calls by Indian warships at Tanzanian ports.56 Farther south, Mozambique and
India recently agreed to continue the joint patrols off the Mozambican coast be-
gun during the African Union summit in Maputo in 2003. The governments also
have begun to negotiate a defense agreement. New Delhi’s links with the African
Islands also are deepening. Since early 2003, India has been patrolling the exclu-
sive economic zone of Mauritius, and it is negotiating a “comprehensive eco-
nomic cooperation and partnership” agreement with what an Indian
spokesperson calls this “gateway to the African continent.”57 In an April 2005
state visit, the Indian prime minister also reiterated India’s commitment to “the
defense, security and sovereignty of Mauritius.” India also has initialed a memo-
randum of understanding with the Seychelles on defense cooperation: patrols of
that nation’s territorial waters, training of Seychelles military personnel, and—
in early 2005—Indian donation of a patrol vessel to help with coastal defense.
India, finally, has been very active in forging a close relationship with the Mal-
dives, a connection undoubtedly reinforced by India’s considerable material and
other assistance in the aftermath of the December 2004 tsunami.
These island-nation initiatives were strengthened in September 2005 by the
creation of a new defense ministry office headed by a two-star admiral charged
with assisting such states. According to the Indian naval chief, these are “vital to
India” and “friendly and well disposed,” but their security remains fragile, and
therefore India cannot afford to see any hostile or inimical power threaten them.58
IN THE BAY OF BENGAL AND “FURTHER INDIA”
Complementing its westward orientation, India also has been diligent in culti-
vating closer relations with a variety of states in the Bay of Bengal and in South-
east Asia, often under the aegis of New Delhi’s “Look East” policy.59 That
approach, initiated in the early 1990s against the backdrop of a struggling Indian
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economy and the sudden
disappearance of the Cold
War framework, has been
a stunning diplomatic
success. As a consequence,
India’s ties with most of
the states of the Bay of
Bengal and Southeast Asia,
except possibly Bangla-
desh, are better than they
were only a few years ago.
India has built a strong
relationship with its im-
mediate neighbor to the
south, Sri Lanka. “India
and Sri Lanka have forged
new, close bonds. There is a
new respect for India,” ac-
cording to one Sri Lankan
observer.60 This “respect,”
moreover, is sometimes re-
flected in reluctance in Co-
lombo to challenge New
Delhi, even on issues, such
as the Sethusamudram Ca-
nal project, that could ad-
versely affect important Sri
Lankan interests. The Indo–Sri Lankan connection was solidified most recently
by disaster relief in the aftermath of the 2004 tsunami, but a string of develop-
ments had already promoted close relations. A free trade agreement that came
into force in 2000 has doubled bilateral commerce and increased significantly
India’s share of Sri Lanka’s trade. In addition, the two neighbors are moving
steadily toward a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA). A
defense cooperation agreement will soon expand Indian training programs for
Sri Lankan troops, strengthen intelligence sharing, supply defense equipment
(including transport helicopters) to Colombo, and refit a Sri Lankan warship.
These states’ first combined military exercise, EKSATH, took place in December
2004 and involved the Indian Coast Guard and Sri Lankan Navy. (New Delhi,
however, has apparently rejected a Sri Lankan request for combined naval pa-
trols against the Tamil “Sea Tigers.”)61
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A memorandum provides for Indian help in reconstructing the vital Palaly
airstrip on the Jaffna Peninsula in northern Sri Lanka. Colombo has rebuffed an
Indian request that the field be reserved for use solely by Sri Lanka and India;
however, taken in conjunction with a recent maritime surveillance pact, the ac-
cord could imply Indian utilization of that base eventually.62 New Delhi also has
agreed to build a modern highway between Trincomalee, a Sinhalese pocket in
the Tamil north and east, and Anuradhapura, in the Sinhalese heartland. It will
be named after former Indian prime minister Rajiv Gandhi, who was killed by a
suicide bomber of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in 1991. India
likely also is contemplating the possibility of eventually using Trincomalee’s leg-
endary harbor. In a quiet deal in 2002, the Lanka Indian Oil Corporation, a
wholly owned Indian government subsidiary in Sri Lanka, was granted a thirty-
five-year lease of the China Bay tank farm at Trincomalee as part of its plan to
develop petroleum storage there. Also suggestive of wider Indian aims is the
possible construction of a Trincomalee offshoot of the proposed pipeline be-
tween the southern Indian cities of Chennai and Madurai and Sri Lanka’s capi-
tal, Colombo.
Another of India’s immediate neighbors is Bangladesh. The relationship has
long been strained by such issues as illegal Bangladeshi migration, trade, and
water use (notably New Delhi’s “River-Linking Project”), but some improve-
ment may be under way. Agreement by India and Bangladesh in January 2005 to
move forward with an “Eastern Corridor Pipeline” to bring gas from Burmese
fields through Bangladesh to India now appears to have been shelved. Notwith-
standing this setback, Indian prime minister Manmohan Singh visited Dhaka in
conjunction with the thirteenth summit of the South Asian Association for Re-
gional Cooperation in November 2005 and has invited Bangladeshi prime min-
ister Kaleda Zia to visit India. One Bangladesh newspaper observed that “an
improvement in the bilateral ties is seemingly an important foreign policy . . .
[goal] that New Delhi wishes to achieve. . . . If India could put confidence build-
ing measures in place with Pakistan, its nuclear rival, we see no reason why Ban-
gladesh’s outstanding problems with India cannot be put behind.”63
The “Look East” policy also has produced gains with the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). India became a sectoral partner in 1991, a
full dialogue partner in 1995, and a member of the ASEAN Regional Forum in
1996. In late 2004 India and ten ASEAN countries—meeting at the tenth sum-
mit in Vientiane—signed a historic pact for peace, progress, and shared prosper-
ity. They also pledged to cooperate in fighting international terrorism and
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The four-page accord and nine-
page action plan envisage cooperation in multilateral fora, particularly the
World Trade Organization; in addressing the challenges of economic, food,
7 4 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
T:\Academic\NWC Review\NWC Review Spring 2006\Ventura\NWC Review Spring 2006.vp
Tuesday, April 11, 2006 8:22:46 AM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
80
Naval War College Review, Vol. 59 [2006], No. 2, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol59/iss2/1
human, and energy security; and in boosting trade, investment, tourism, cul-
ture, sports, and people-to-people contacts. The pact commits India to creating
a free trade area by 2011 with Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Singa-
pore, and by 2016 with the rest of ASEAN—the Philippines, Cambodia, Laos,
Burma, and Vietnam.
Within ASEAN, India has focused particularly on developing close ties with
Burma, Singapore, and, most recently, Thailand. Progress with Burma has been
significant since New Delhi began to engage that nation about a decade ago,
partly from concern about Chinese influence there. The emphasis now, however,
is not mainly defensive but reflects India’s regional ambitions, desire to use Ran-
goon from which to compete with China farther afield in Southeast Asia (in-
cluding the South China Sea), and interest in Burmese energy resources, as well
as its need to consolidate control in its own remote northeastern provinces.
Most recently, India’s position in Burma was strengthened when strongman
Khin Nyunt, known for pro-China inclinations, was deposed in October 2004
and placed under house arrest. Less than a week later, Than Shwe, head of
Burma’s ruling military junta, visited India and signed three agreements, includ-
ing a “Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in the Field of
Non-Traditional Security Issues.” The general also assured New Delhi that
Burma would not permit its territory to be used by any hostile element to harm
Indian interests. Soon thereafter, India and Burma launched coordinated mili-
tary operations against Manipuri and Naga rebels along the frontier.64
Indo-Burmese ties also are advanced by both countries’ membership in the
Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Coopera-
tion (BIMSTEC), the first setting in which two ASEAN members have come to-
gether with three countries in South Asia for economic cooperation.
Significantly, neither China nor Pakistan is part of this grouping. These steps
and others—resumption of arms shipments to Burma, New Delhi’s acquisition
of an equity stake in a natural gas field off Burma’s coast, the proposed India-
Burma Gas Pipeline, the reopening of the Indian and Burmese consulates in
Mandalay and Kolkata, and a recent India-Burma naval exercise—all reflect a
significant deepening in Indo-Burmese relations in recent years.
Burma ties as well into larger Indian agendas, to which eastward transporta-
tion is vital. New Delhi is building a road—the India-Myanmar-Thailand trilat-
eral highway, a portion of the projected Asian Highway—connecting Calcutta
via Burma with Bangkok. India also is building roads to connect Mizoram with
Mandalay and has extended a fifty-six-million-dollar line of credit to Burma to
modernize the Mandalay-Rangoon railroad.65 New Delhi is likely also to carry
out port and transportation improvements at the mouth of the Kaladan River
(the Kaladan Multi-modal Transport Project) in western Burma, opening trade
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opportunities with Burma and Thailand and expanding access to India’s north-
east. In addition, New Delhi has begun to study the feasibility of building a
deep-water seaport at Dawei (Tavoy), on the Burmese coast, possibly allowing
access from the Middle East, Europe, and Africa to East Asian markets without
transiting the Malacca Straits. Taken together, these eastward transportation
plans will give India an alternative route to the Malacca Straits subregion as well
as land access to the South China Sea. They reflect a land-sea strategy for pro-
jecting Indian influence to the east—a strategy intended to counter China’s stra-
tegic ambitions in Southeast Asia and toward the Indian Ocean.
India’s perceived need to compete with China in Southeast Asia, particularly
in its littoral nations, has helped produce a courtship of Singapore. It also under-
scores the importance India attaches to key choke points—that it may need to
block a Chinese move toward or into the Indian Ocean (the principal mission of
the Indian bases in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands). Singapore is ideally situ-
ated to supplement the infrastructure in the Andamans; facilities there could, by
the same token, allow India to project power into the South China Sea and
against China. The Singapore relationship is modest but deepening. Trade has
been growing rapidly, surging by nearly 50 percent in 2004; a Comprehensive
Economic Cooperation Agreement in June 2005 should boost trade further. In
addition, a security pact in 2003 extended an existing program of combined na-
val exercises to encompass air and ground maneuvers and initiated a high-level
security dialogue and intelligence exchange. Singapore and India held their first
air exercise late in 2004 and their first ground exercises from February to April
2005, in India.66 Notably, in February and March 2005 their annual naval ma-
neuvers took place for the first time in the South China Sea (vice “Indian” waters).
New Delhi also has stated willingness—in principle—to allow the Singapore Air
Force to use Indian ranges on an extended basis.
The developing Indian relationship with Thailand, finally, is a recent one and
has been fed by, among other factors, Bangkok’s growing concern with Islamic
militants in Thailand’s south: “The Thais know they are in a difficult situation
and are looking left, right and center to see who is in the game on their side.” A
team of Indian intelligence officials visited Bangkok in November 2004; Thai-
land’s National Security Council chief reciprocated the following month. In ad-
dition, India’s military has been coordinating closely with Thailand’s navy and
coast guard in and near the Malacca Strait, signing a memorandum of under-
standing in May 2005. Thailand also has been cooperating more than previously
on matters related to the various insurgencies in India’s northeast.67 More
broadly, Bangkok welcomes the “rise of India,” given Thailand’s historical pref-
erence that no single power—not Britain or France in the nineteenth century,
and not China today—achieve hegemony in its neighborhood. In any case, says
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one Thai pundit, “Our ancestors taught us to enjoy noodles as well as curry
dishes.”68 To this end, Bangkok is pursuing what it calls a “Look West” policy, and
Thai officials have welcomed the Indian efforts to cultivate influence—poten-
tially at China’s expense—in Burma.
STRENGTHENING AND USING INDIA’S ARMED FORCES
Supplementing its diplomatic and political initiatives, India is shaping its grow-
ing military capability. These forces should be able, should the need arise, to:
keep China’s navy out of the Indian Ocean; enter the South China Sea and pro-
ject military power directly against the Chinese homeland; project military
power elsewhere in the Indian Ocean—at key choke points, on vital islands,
around the littoral, and along key sea routes; and—in a presumably altered stra-
tegic environment—pose an important potential constraint on the ability of the
U.S. Navy to operate in the IO. At present, the overall thrust is to get weapons to
project power, especially systems with greater lethality and reach. To this end,
India ordered $5.7 billion in weapons in 2004, overtaking China and Saudi Ara-
bia and becoming the developing world’s leading weapons buyer. Likewise, India
stands as the developing world’s biggest arms buyer for the eight-year period up
to 2004.69 The drive toward improved military capabilities is reflected in a vari-
ety of ongoing developments.70
The most significant development will be a strengthened nuclear-weapon
strike capability relevant to the Indian Ocean as a whole. While land-based mis-
siles may yet assume significance in this regard, New Delhi mainly is focused on
equipping its navy and air force with nuclear capabilities that could be employed
in a contingency.
India’s intention to add a sea-based leg to its nuclear posture is longstanding
and was a prominent feature of the Draft Nuclear Doctrine promulgated by In-
dia’s National Security Advisory Board in 1999. The Cabinet Committee on Se-
curity also implicitly endorsed this goal in its 2003 restatement of many of the
Doctrine’s key points. Most recently, the new Indian Maritime Doctrine and the
naval service chief, Admiral Arun Prakash, affirmed in September 2005 the im-
portance of a sea-based leg.71
Indian Airpower
Another key development is the acquisition of an air force with longer range. A
critical advance was the purchase in 2003 of Il-78 aerial tanker aircraft, New
Delhi’s first of the type. These tankers have supported the deployment of fighter
and transport aircraft to a variety of far-flung locations, including South Africa
and Alaska. Refueling also has recently allowed nonstop flights of Su-30s from
Pune, their main operating base southeast of Mumbai, to Car Nicobar in the Bay
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of Bengal, a potential staging location adjacent to the Strait of Malacca and the
South China Sea approaches to China’s populous heartland. A second airpower
force multiplier will be the acquisition in 2007 of three Phalcon airborne warn-
ing and control system (AWACS) aircraft. These AWACS platforms, designed for
360-degree surveillance out to 350 nautical miles, will detect aerial threats and
direct strike aircraft to targets. Like the tankers, the AWACS will not have a
mainly passive, defensive role; rather, they will allow other air assets to strike tar-
gets at greater distances and with much more effect. New Delhi also is develop-
ing an indigenous AWACS system, to be deployed by 2011. In addition, India’s
Tu-142M and Il-38 maritime surveillance/antisubmarine warfare aircraft all are
receiving upgrades. Finally, the Navy is raising three squadrons of Israeli-built
Heron II unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and probably will acquire P-3C
Orions from the United States.72
India’s air force also will achieve greater range and lethality with the acquisi-
tion of a variety of new combat aircraft—many of them clearly intended for
strategic strike operations. In this regard, the planned acquisition of 190
long-range and air-refuelable Su-30 fighters (140 of which will be built from kits
in India) through 2018 is particularly striking. New Delhi also has begun up-
grading its fleet of Jaguar aircraft. The package—an almost definitive sign that
these aircraft will continue to have a nuclear strike mission—includes more
modern navigation systems, new electronic countermeasures gear, and new ar-
mament pods.73 As these aircraft are capable of air-to-air refueling, the Il-78s
significantly enhanced their radius of action. New Delhi also has ordered addi-
tional Jaguars (seventeen two-seat and twenty single-seat) from Hindustan
Aeronautics Limited.
In addition, India plans to get 126 new multirole combat aircraft from a for-
eign supplier, either Lockheed Martin (the F-16), Boeing/McDonnell-Douglas
(F-18 Hornet), Russia (MiG-35), Dassault Aviation of France (Mirage 2000-5),
or Gripen of Sweden. Some of these airframes will be assembled in India. If Mos-
cow and New Delhi can come to terms, at least four Tu-22M3s may be leased
from Russia. These Backfires have a range of almost seven thousand nautical
miles and can carry a payload of about twenty-five tons—the equivalent of two
dozen two-thousand-pound bombs, or a large number of standoff air-to-
ground missiles. India and Russia also are discussing the development and
coproduction of a fifth-generation fighter aircraft.
Many of these strike platforms will be equipped eventually with powerful, long-
range cruise missiles. The joint Indo-Russian Brahmos, with a 290-kilometer range
and supersonic speed, will be deployed first on Indian warships, but an aerial
version is planned. As one observer comments, “India’s co-development with
Russia of the Brahmos missile for India’s air (and naval) forces introduces . . . a
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highly lethal, hybrid (cruise plus ballistic) missile that is most likely to be used as
a conventional counterforce weapon against naval ships, ordnance storage facil-
ities, sensitive military production facilities, aircraft hangars, military commu-
nication nodes and command and control centers.”74
A final aviation-related development, one reflecting the new over-the-horizon
focus of the Indian Air Force, is the expected formation—with Israeli help—of an
aerospace command that will feature a ground-based imagery center, intended to
leverage India’s growing space “footprint” for air force and missile targeting and
battlespace management.75 The new command will be linked to a military recon-
naissance satellite system, expected to be operational by 2007.76
Indian Seapower
India’s surface navy is to become more capable and lethal than today. India’s first
naval buildup occurred in the 1960s; there followed a period of robust growth in
the mid-1980s. The latter expansion, marked by a focus on power projection,
grew out of a perception of threat from the U.S. Navy, which was increasing its
presence in the Indian Ocean. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi warned, “The
ocean has brought conquerors to India in the past. Today we find it churning
with danger.”77 However, between 1988 and 1995 a retrenchment occurred, due
to the disintegration of the USSR, a financial crisis in India (and East Asia), de-
mands for social investment, and a virtually worldwide deemphasis on military
expenditures; the Indian Navy did not acquire a single principal surface combat-
ant, either from abroad or from domestic shipyards.78 The environment had
changed again by the mid-1990s—as the international situation grew darker
and the Indian economy strengthened—and the prospect is now for a navy that,
if still modest in size, about forty principal combatants, will be significantly im-
proved in quality.
The surface navy currently consists primarily of a single vintage aircraft carrier,
three new and five older destroyers, four new and seven vintage frigates, three new
tank landing ships (LSTs), and assorted corvettes and patrol craft. Within five years,
this force likely will comprise instead two new (that is, to India) aircraft carriers, six
new and only a few vintage destroyers, twelve new and a few older frigates, corvettes
and patrol craft, five new LSTs, and a refurbished seventeen-thousand-ton ex-U.S.
landing platform dock. All of the new warships, including the projected two aircraft
carriers, will be much more formidable than their respective predecessors. For ex-
ample, the Type 15A frigates now under construction in Mumbai will be equipped
with sixteen vertical-launch Brahmos cruise missiles. In addition, some warships
are likely to be equipped eventually with U.S.-supplied Aegis radar systems.79
The carriers are particularly suited and intended for force projection. More-
over, with their aircraft and other weapons, they will constitute a quantum
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advance over the present carrier, INS Viraat, which is scheduled for decommis-
sioning in 2010. One of the future carriers will be the 44,500-ton Soviet-built
Admiral Gorshkov, now INS Vikramaditya, to be delivered in 2008. The refitted
ship will carry at least sixteen MiG-29Ks and six to eight Ka-31 antisubmarine
and airborne-early-warning helicopters. India also has the option of acquiring,
at current prices for up to five years, another thirty MiG-29Ks—a substantial in-
crease in capability over the Harriers currently on the Viraat. Also,
Vikramaditya’s range of nearly fourteen thousand nautical miles—vice the five
thousand of Viraat—should represent a massive boost in reach.
The other new aircraft carrier will be indigenously constructed, India’s first; it
was laid down in April 2005. The forty-thousand-ton vessel, designated an Air
Defense Ship (ADS), is designed for a complement of fourteen to sixteen
MiG-29K aircraft and around twenty utility, antisubmarine, and antisurface heli-
copters. This will potentially equip the navy with two aircraft carriers by about
2010 (Vikramaditya and the ADS), thus allowing the service to maintain a
strong presence along both the eastern and western shores. Indian naval leaders,
however, envisage the navy as a three-carrier force—one on each coast and one
in reserve—by 2015–20.
India continues to upgrade its existing submarine fleet while also developing
or acquiring newer, more advanced boats. Many of these submarines are being
fitted with cruise missiles with land-attack capabilities, reflecting the service’s
emphasis on littoral warfare. Over time, these cruise missiles almost certainly
will be armed with nuclear warheads.
The Indian Navy’s principal subsurface combatants currently are four Ger-
man Type 1500 and ten Russian-produced Kilo submarines. The Kilos are un-
dergoing refits in Russia, including the addition of Klub cruise missiles, believed
to have both antiship and land-attack capabilities at ranges up to two hundred
kilometers. The five boats already refitted with these weapons constitute the first
Indian submerged missile launch capability. New Delhi is similarly upgrading
one of its Type 1500s. The Indian government also recently authorized the pur-
chase of six French-designed Scorpene submarines, with the option of acquiring
four more. The first three boats will be conventional diesel-electric submarines,
with subsequent ones incorporating air-independent propulsion. The design re-
portedly allows for the installation of a small nuclear reactor. The Scorpene con-
tract apparently also provides for Indian acquisition of critical underwater
missile-launch technology.80 Other expected Indian submarine acquisitions in-
clude four to six Amur 1650 hunter-killer boats (SSKs) and two each of the more
advanced versions of the Kilo and Shishumar submarines.
India also has lately accorded higher priority to the construction of an in-
digenous nuclear-powered missile submarine, the Advanced Technology Vessel.
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Fabrication of the hull and integration (with Russia’s assistance) of the nuclear
reactor could already to be under way. In the long run, its main armament will be
nuclear-armed cruise missiles. Finally, New Delhi seems likely to lease from Rus-
sia two Akula II nuclear-powered attack submarines. Reportedly, Indian naval
officers will begin training for these submarines at a newly built center near St.
Petersburg in September 2005.81 These boats are normally configured with
intermediate-range cruise missiles capable of mounting two-hundred-kiloton
nuclear warheads, but India is expected instead to use the Brahmos cruise mis-
sile—eventually with a nuclear warhead—as their principal weapon.
Basing and Presence Ashore
A better network of forward military bases is in prospect. One of the most im-
portant of its elements is INS (Indian Naval Station) Kadamba, a naval and naval
air base—slated to be Asia’s largest—under construction at Karwar (near Goa)
on the Malabar Coast and recently inaugurated by Defense Minister Pranab
Mukherjee. More centrally located with respect to the Indian Ocean than
Mumbai, the site of India’s longtime Arabian Sea naval complex, this facility will
be India’s first exclusive naval base (others are colocated with commercial and
civilian ports). INS Kadamba will be able to receive India’s new aircraft carriers;
it is to become the home of several naval units beginning late in 2005 and, ulti-
mately, of the headquarters of India’s Western Naval Command. It will report-
edly serve as the principal base for the nuclear submarines that the Indian Navy
is to lease from Russia and some that it will build indigenously. The construction
of a naval air station will begin this year.
Farther south, India has been enhancing the infrastructure at Kochi (Cochin)
in Kerala, where India’s first full-fledged base for unmanned aerial vehicles re-
cently was established. The UAVs are providing the Navy a real-time view of the
busy sea-lanes from the northern Arabian Sea to the Malacca Strait. As Kochi
also is India’s key center for antisubmarine warfare, the UAVs almost certainly
also are employed for that purpose. One observer, commenting on the strategic
significance of this site, notes that “its situation, close to the southern tip of In-
dia’s west coast and the central Indian Ocean, makes Cochin more than any
other base a regional guard (see, for example, its proximity to the Maldives and
the rich fishing grounds off India’s west coast); a challenge to the United States
in Diego Garcia [sic]; and the terminus of the trans-oceanic link with
Antarctica.”82 In addition to Kochi, the Indian Navy is establishing UAV bases at
Port Blair, the site of India’s Andaman and Nicobar Command, and in the
Lakshadweep Islands.83 The latter archipelago, off India’s west coast in the Ara-
bian Sea, is a key choke point between the Persian Gulf and the Malacca Strait
that has until now received little attention from military planners.
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New Delhi sees as even more strategically significant the Andaman and
Nicobar Islands. It was to strengthen India’s military presence in the Bay of Ben-
gal that the unified Andaman and Nicobar Command was established in 2001.
The islands had been recognized by the British as early as the 1780s as dominat-
ing one of the key gateways to the Indian Ocean.84 One analyst, writing from
Port Blair, has claimed that “India was double-minded about retaining the is-
lands until the 1998 Pokhran nuclear tests. Top officials say the original plan was
to abandon the Andaman and Nicobar Islands after exploiting its natural re-
sources.” India, for example, transferred the Coco Islands to Burma in 1954.85
However, by 1962—in the aftermath of the war with China—New Delhi clearly
was becoming sensitive to the archipelago’s value, and in 1998 or before “the
Vajpayee government woke up to the islands’ huge strategic importance.”86
Whether or not India ever doubted its worth, the archipelago likely will have
importance in the future—notwithstanding damage to infrastructure from the
recent tsunami. India’s navy chief has stated that “this theater will steadily gain
importance . . . in the coming years.”87 Another Indian has characterized the new
Andaman and Nicobar command as “India’s ticket to strategic relevance”and “In-
dia’s Diego Garcia.”88 In this connection, New Delhi almost certainly intends to
use the islands as forward bases for cruise-missile-launching submarines, eventu-
ally with nuclear weapons. The islands also will play a key role in Indian efforts to
parry Chinese inroads in Southeast Asia and to advance the “Look East”policy.89
Indian assistance in upgrading and developing the Iranian port of Chah-
bahar, the headquarters of Iran’s third naval region, has been noted. A construc-
tion initiative of another kind is the Sethusamudram project, also mentioned
above, to cut through the Palk Strait and so permit Indian intercoastal shipping
to avoid the long trip around Sri Lanka. Aside from its potential economic im-
portance, such a route will enable warships from India’s eastern and western
fleets to quickly reinforce one another. In those terms the project is analogous to
the 1914 completion of the interoceanic Panama Canal by the United States.90
“Military Diplomacy”
Supplementing the foregoing new weapons and military infrastructure ad-
vances, New Delhi also will use India’s navy and air force, through “military di-
plomacy,” to advance the Indian agenda in the Indian Ocean. India’s new
Maritime Doctrine declares, “Navies are characterized by the degree to which
they can exercise presence, and the efficacy of a navy is determined by the ability
of the political establishment of the state to harness this naval presence in the
pursuit of larger national objectives.” To this end, “the Indian maritime vision
for the first quarter of the 21st century must look at the arc from the Persian Gulf
to the Straits of Malacca as a legitimate area of interest.”91
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India’s navy and air force were indeed utilized in this manner in response to
the December 2004 tsunami, perhaps the world’s first global natural disaster. In-
dia was quick to extend help to Sri Lanka, the Maldives, and Indonesia. Indian
relief operations were fully under way in Sri Lanka and the Maldives by day three
of the tsunami (28 December), and the Indian military reached Indonesia by day
four. The subsequent relief operation was the largest ever mounted by New
Delhi, involving approximately sixteen thousand troops, thirty-two naval ships,
forty-one aircraft, several medical teams, and a mobile hospital.92
Other recent instances of Indian military diplomacy include a continuing
program of coordinated patrols with Indonesia in the Malacca Strait, naval sur-
veillance of the Mauritius exclusive economic zone since mid-2003, and patrols
off the African coast in connection with two international conferences in
Maputo, Mozambique—the African Union summit in 2003 and the World Eco-
nomic Forum conference the next year. An Indian Navy spokesman asserted that
in these patrols the “Indian warships [were] demonstrating the Navy’s emer-
gence as a competent, confident, and operationally viable and regionally visible
maritime power.”
The Indian military also has been very active in pursuing combined exercises
with a variety of IO partners. These maneuvers underscore the new flexibility
and reach of Indian military forces. A Chinese newspaper, for example, com-
mented that in one two-month period early in 2004 New Delhi conducted seven
consecutive and quite effective combined exercises: “The scale, scope, subjects
and goals of the exercises are unprecedented and have attracted extensive con-
cern from the international community.” That instance was not unique; the In-
dian Navy conducted simultaneous combined exercises with Singapore in the
South China Sea and with France in the Arabian Sea in late February and early
March 2005. All this was followed immediately by a multiservice, combined
planning exercise with the United Kingdom in Hyderabad; a naval exercise with
South Africa and a port call by warships in Vietnam in June; and the deployment
of a large flotilla to Southeast Asian waters in July. The agenda for late 2005 in-
cluded naval maneuvers with the United States in the Arabian Sea in September,
with Russia in the Bay of Bengal in October, and with France in the Gulf of Aden
in November. In addition, New Delhi partnered with Russia in a combined
air-land exercise near the Pakistan border in October, and with the United States
in November in a COPE INDIA air exercise (that latter in a location that clearly
suggests mutual strategic concern about China). New Delhi, moreover, is ex-
pecting the advent of combined exercises with Japan’s navy in the Sea of Japan
and the Bay of Bengal in the not-too-distant future.93
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WHAT CAN WE EXPECT OF INDIA IN THE INDIAN OCEAN?
Over the past few years, India has placed itself on a path to achieve, potentially,
the regional influence in the Indian Ocean to which it has aspired. To this end,
New Delhi has raised its profile and strengthened its position in a variety of na-
tions on the littoral, especially Iran, Sri Lanka, Burma, Singapore, Thailand, and
most of the ocean’s small island nations. India also has become a more palpable
presence in key maritime zones, particularly the Bay of Bengal and the Andaman
Sea. Of equal or greater importance, India’s links with the most important exter-
nal actors in the Indian Ocean—the United States, Japan, Israel, and France—
also have been strengthened. These are significant achievements, and they derive
from India’s growing economic clout and from a surer hand visible today in In-
dian diplomacy.
Gaps inevitably remain in India’s strategic posture. New Delhi will need to
strengthen further its hand in coastal Africa and the Arabian Peninsula. More
work also will be required to upgrade still somewhat distant relationships with
Australia and Indonesia.94 At the same time, India will need to be more skillful
than it has been in cultivating—or “compelling”—better relations with, and an
environment more attuned to Indian interests in, Pakistan and Bangladesh. Fur-
ther, much will depend on the performance of the Indian economy and on In-
dia’s ability to avoid domestic communal discord. Another variable will be the
extent to which other states—particularly China and the United States but also
Pakistan and others in southern Asia—are willing or able to offer serious resis-
tance to India’s ambitions. The future of political Islam is another wild card.
However, barring a halt to globalization—one of the megatrends of the contem-
porary world—the rise of India in the IO is fairly certain.
That will have a transforming effect in the Indian Ocean basin and eventually
the world. In the region, the rise of India will play a key role in the gradual inte-
gration of the various lands and peoples of this basin. Whether in the Arabian
Sea or the Bay of Bengal, this trend—while still nascent—is already evident. The
long-term result will be a more prosperous and globally more influential region.
India’s rise in the Indian Ocean also will have important implications for the
West and China. Perhaps most significantly, New Delhi’s ascent suggests
strongly that the ongoing reordering of the asymmetric relationship between
the West and Asia will be centered as much in the Indian Ocean as in East Asia. It
was in the IO, moreover, that the effects of Western power first made themselves
manifest in the centuries after 1500. On one hand, it would therefore not be sur-
prising if it were here that the Western tide first receded. On the other, India’s
role will for a long time to come be no longer in opposition to the United States
but in cooperation with it.
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Moreover, its rise will be welcomed by the United States and other “Western
states” to the extent that it counteracts the challenge posed by China, the world’s
other salient rising power. Seen from Beijing, the rise of India in the Indian
Ocean will be an opportunity but, even more, a challenge. A strong and influen-
tial India will mean a more multipolar world, and this is consistent with Chinese
interests. Nonetheless, as China increasingly regards India—not Japan—as its
main Asian rival, India’s rise in the Indian Ocean also will be disturbing. As has
been the case with virtually all great powers, an India that has consolidated
power in its own region will be tempted to exercise power farther afield, includ-
ing East Asia.
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CHINA’S MATURING NAVY
Rear Admiral Eric A. McVadon, U.S. Navy (Retired)
The East Asia security environment in which China is emerging demands thatthe matter of a maturing Chinese navy be put in a political context. Tension
across the Taiwan Strait has recently relaxed. In Beijing, the leaders of economi-
cally successful and internationally active China do not want to jeopardize the
nation’s prospects for a bright future by initiating military conflict with Taiwan
and the United States—quite the contrary. In Taipei, despite profound disagree-
ment with Beijing and a major stir in domestic politics, a cautious posture in rela-
tions with Beijing now prevails. So, remarkably, amid deep, persistent, and mutual
distrust, the current prospects for avoiding conflict across the Taiwan Strait are
good. Well-informed Chinese officials and prestigious
Americans who have had exchanges with senior Chi-
nese leaders confirm the relaxed circumstances and ex-
press the conviction that Beijing is confident about the
situation as Chinese leaders see it developing and that
Taiwan, again content with the status quo, will remain
measured in its actions. War across the Taiwan Strait is
not looming.
Nevertheless, Beijing is, by modernizing its mili-
tary, ensuring that things will not go awry in Taiwan,
that its policy of intimidation continues to work. The
indisputable reality is that this military—the People’s
Liberation Army (or PLA), and particularly its naval
component, the PLA Navy (or PLAN)—is growing
greatly in capability; further, it is a growing concern
Rear Admiral McVadon is a consultant on East Asia se-
curity affairs and part-time director of Asia-Pacific
Studies at the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, spe-
cializing in international security factors shaping the
Asia-Pacific region. During a thirty-five-year career in
the U.S. Navy, he served in a variety of operational and
policy planning positions, including commanding officer
of a Pacific Fleet P-3C squadron; Deputy Director for
Strategy, Plans and Policy, on the Navy Staff; Com-
mander, Iceland Defense Force; and U.S. defense and
naval attaché at the American embassy in Beijing. Re-
cent publications include the book China’s Foreign
Military Relations (1999). He holds an MS in interna-
tional affairs from George Washington University and
is a distinguished graduate of the National War College,
the Naval War College, and the Naval Postgraduate
School.
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to defense and naval leaders in Washington, D.C., and other capitals, including
Tokyo and Taipei. In a time of American preoccupation with the global war on
terrorism, it is appropriate to draw attention to the crucial features of this modern-
ization of components of the PLA. Beijing, if the “Taiwan problem” were to
suffer a dramatic reversal, would have available an impressive force acquired for
this purpose. If that force were effectively deployed, it would be sufficient in
terms of hardware to undertake a two-pronged, PLA Navy–led campaign, with a
big maritime component, against Taiwan and U.S. forces in a fashion that could
be termed “jointness with Chinese characteristics.”
A MILITARY TO DEFEND AND DETER
When pressed on the subject, Chinese officials began some months ago to de-
liver both publicly and privately (to the author and undoubtedly many others)
the consistent message that the military budget is not excessive, manpower is
shrinking, and the newly modernized PLA is not a threat.1 Chinese characterize
the PLA instead as a deterrent force—as were U.S. forces during the Cold War,
they are quick to remind. When pressed further, they accept unabashedly the re-
tort that the modernization surge is, so far, narrowly focused on the Taiwan con-
tingency. It is directed to deterring Taiwan’s movement toward independence,
which they consider the top “threat to Chinese sovereignty,” and to curbing the
ability of the United States to intervene rapidly and effectively were China com-
pelled, as Beijing perceives it, to use military force against Taiwan.2
So the concern is that hard-liners in Beijing, obsessed by the “Taiwan prob-
lem,” might not allow prudence to prevail in decision making in a crisis and,
consequently, could order the use of military force because of what they perceive
as intolerable “splittist” conduct by Taipei. In evaluating the risks of an impru-
dent decision by Beijing, it might be asked rhetorically whether the current Chi-
nese Communist Party is capable of as bad a choice in a future Taiwan crisis as
most observers think the party made with the Great Leap Forward, the Cultural
Revolution, and the actions in 1989 now referred to simply as “Tiananmen.”
Some observers increasingly find reason to be optimistic, but it is hard to offer
unqualified assurance that Beijing could not again make a very bad decision.
It is the result of decisions obviously made several years ago that a new, mod-
ern, and much more capable PLA Navy has, along with the Air Force and 2nd Ar-
tillery Corps (the ballistic- and long-range-cruise-missile force), been acquired
and deployed. A stunning modernization effort continues. Regardless of how
Beijing’s intentions are viewed, the surge in PLA modernization has radically
changed the military situation for Taiwan. Taipei is more than ever forced to
look to Washington to cope with this more advanced, capable PLA, with the
strategic depth of huge China behind it.
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Moreover, the PLA now hopes to bring to reality concepts its strategists have
written about, such as how an inferior force can prevail against a superior oppo-
nent—that is, China versus the United States. Specifically, the critical aspects of a
new navy and the highly significant synergies that may develop between it and the
missile and air forces warrant full attention, because they are directed specifically at
deterring, delaying, or complicating timely and effective American access and inter-
vention. U.S. forces must be able, should the Taiwan pot boil over, to turn the tables
and deter Beijing from using its proclaimed deterrent forces—or to ensure a favor-
able outcome if mutual deterrence fails. The ultimate American goal, however,
should be to make the chances of conflict even less than they are. Understanding the
important developments described here seems a necessary step toward that goal.
STARTING WITH QUESTIONS
The following questions and answers may be an unusual way to begin probing the
specific naval aspects of the issue, but they focus on an often neglected, but argu-
ably the most surprising, single PLAN acquisition program—its bold move to
build quickly a modern nuclear submarine force despite its troubled past in this
arena. These incisive questions—posed to the author in 2005 by experts on the
Chinese submarine force—are especially useful in that they take the PLA’s Taiwan
obsession fully into account but also look beyond. They reveal the layers of com-
plexity and uncertainty inherent in the very rapid and impressive modernization
of the PLA Navy—a navy that, it is worth emphasizing, is arguably the only one in
today’s world that the U.S. Navy must deter or be able to defeat, but also a navy
that under different circumstances could become a high-seas partner.
• How “mature” is China’s navy? Does the PLAN have the requisite human
capital, organizational practices, and exercise regimen to become a world-
class fleet? The PLAN is most nearly mature with respect to platforms and
weapons but, approximately in the order listed, progressively less so in
human capital, organizational practices, and exercise regimen. It is working
to become better in each.
• Are nuclear submarines a good fit for China’s emerging naval strategy? Will the
balance of forces (i.e., nuclear versus diesel submarines) change in the future?
The currently emerging balance is a good fit, especially vis-à-vis China’s
current set of potential adversaries. If the Taiwan problem were eliminated
somehow, a shift toward nuclear submarines to protect more distant sea-
lanes would be a logical option. This makes the PLAN nuclear submarine
program a possible bellwether for future naval policy more generally.
• What are the trends in undersea warfare and antisubmarine warfare (ASW)
in the western Pacific region? The superiority of the U.S. nuclear submarine
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force will continue; however, the Chinese are apparently developing
ballistic missiles with maneuvering warheads and terminal seekers to hit
ships at sea. This capability to lob numerous accurate ballistic missile
warheads high over the heads of all defenders could effectively circumvent
the anticipated quiet and capable U.S. nuclear attack submarines. The
PLAN has previously seen these submarines as all but impossible to
penetrate with its own submarines (or surface ships) to reach the carriers
and cruisers it wants to disable. Despite the PLAN’s ineptitude at
antisubmarine warfare, short of a (plausible) major breakthrough, the
trend in submarine/ASW competition is going China’s way: the PLAN’s
submarine numbers and diversity trump, or at least could saturate, likely
ASW opposition for the foreseeable future, especially in case of the short
war Beijing contemplates. With respect to Taiwan’s ASW capability (almost
an oxymoron now), the Republic of China (ROC) Navy would still have to
learn to use its P-3C antisubmarine patrol aircraft after getting them; its
prospective new submarine force of eight diesel submarines, if approved
for acquisition (as currently seems unlikely), would be a decade or more
from operational status and even then inadequate for antisubmarine
warfare against what would by then have become a remarkably numerous,
diverse, and advanced PLAN submarine force.
• What strategic dilemmas might Washington encounter as a result of China’s
new nuclear submarine force? Beijing’s smug confidence that Washington
must always keep in mind China’s status as a nuclear power will be
reinforced if the PLAN is successful with its ongoing program to build
several modern Jin-class (Project 094) nuclear-powered ballistic-missile
submarines (SSBNs). Its sequential construction of Shang-class (Project
093) nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) adds the component of
reach (range and speed) to the existing qualities of numbers of its nuclear
and conventional submarines, as well as quietness for a growing portion of
that force and potency of weapons for a similar portion—especially for the
new Kilo-class diesel submarines from Russia, with their long-range,
supersonic, sea-skimming antiship cruise missiles (ASCMs). A “new
PLAN” with these new nuclear-powered submarines and stunning array of
other new and modern platforms and weapons is highly likely to view itself
in a different strategic light, as yet unrevealed, than has the “old PLAN.”
A MATURING BUT STILL ADOLESCENT NAVY
Harking back to the title of this article, the PLA Navy might best be described as
an adolescent rather than mature navy, with the caution that adolescents can
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exhibit qualities across the range from juvenile to adult, often commit crimes
that warrant treatment as adults, and mature unpredictably. To extend the ado-
lescence analogy a bit more, the PLAN is growing remarkably in size and
strength, even “bulking up” (in the American vernacular); all observers remark
how it has grown since the last time they saw it.3
Simply fielding more modern units does not make the PLAN a truly modern
operational force. The limits on how China’s and the navy’s leaders are able to
employ their new capabilities represent significant shortcomings, and success in
the effort to overcome them is far from assured. Put another way, the PLAN has
matured remarkably insofar as acquiring platforms and equipment (ships, sub-
marines, aircraft, radars, and so on) and weapons (antiship cruise missiles, air
defense missiles, torpedoes, and the like) is concerned, but this “new PLA Navy”
has not matured fully in exercising its forces and developing the command and
control capabilities, coordination means, and intelligence and targeting support
needed to make that force fully operational—especially in comparison with its
most important and most capable potential adversary, the U.S. Navy.4
Better officers are on the way up—if they make it. The PLAN recognizes that
to conduct complex joint operations, exercise greatly enhanced command and
control, and effectively employ modern weapons it needs a better-educated,
more worldly officer corps, and it is striving to do that, or so it says.5 PLAN offi-
cers are taking more prominent positions in institutions that do strategic think-
ing; for example, in two recent firsts for naval officers, Admiral Zhang Dingfa
headed the Academy of Military Science (he now serves as the commander of the
PLAN), and Rear Admiral Yang Yi is still director of the Institute of Strategic
Studies at the National Defense University in Beijing. The PLA Navy seeks offi-
cers educated in first-rate civilian universities.6 The emphasis, however, appears
to be on specific technical and scientific education;7 this approach neglects, it
seems, the parallel need for specialists in operations, security issues, strategic
studies, and international affairs.8
Details aside, an important and yet unanswered question is whether the PLA
Navy wants officers better educated or considers them better Red. That is, will
competent, forward-thinking officers be selected for flag rank, or will party loy-
alty and personal connections continue to prevail as the paramount selection
criteria?9 This author has lectured and conferred at the National Defense Uni-
versity and other PLA institutions on several occasions at which junior officers
asked all the questions and did all the talking while flag and general officers who
were students remained silent—at least in part, it appeared, for fear of being
outshone in these lively and insightful discussions. It would seem that at some
point the demands of a modern PLA will force the promotion of more of the of-
ficers who have all the intelligent questions and original thoughts.
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Organization is improving, but maybe not yet enough. The PLA Navy struc-
ture has been streamlined: naval aviation no longer stands alone as though an al-
most separate service; closer ties have been established with the PLAN’s marine
corps; and there are fewer layers in the chain of command.10 Nevertheless, the
author has observed and been told, there is still much deadwood at the top: indi-
viduals in green uniforms with two or more stars on their shoulders (PLA
ground-force generals) who persist in treating the PLAN as mostly an adjunct to
the army, and senior officers who, through lack of vision, fail to move decisively
toward true joint operations. These generals represent obstacles at a time when
real coordination with the 2nd Artillery Corps and the PLA Air Force would lead
to enormous advances in the ability to polish off Taiwan, threaten American inter-
vention capabilities, and keep Japan off balance.
China’s navy is still failing to conduct exercises needed to develop its potential
capability. It continues to steam in the littoral for the most part. However, the
PLAN aspires to, and is erratically striving to conduct, training and exercises in
more distant waters; to make its training more like combat; to challenge itself in
exercises with active, maneuvering opposition forces; and otherwise to add real-
ism to its training and exercise activity. It has even been so bold as to engage, in
August 2005, in a major multiphased exercise with the Russian Navy, a notable
advance beyond the minor, very basic exercises it has conducted with the French,
British, Australian, Pakistani, and Indian navies in recent years.11 A few years ago
the PLAN would not have participated in such exercises at all, fearing not only
prying (as well as spying) but embarrassment, that its shortcomings and back-
wardness would be revealed. Chinese naval leaders now seem sufficiently confi-
dent in their crews to seek international partners for exercises. (It will be
interesting to see if several unflattering post-exercise Russian media reports re-
juvenate concerns that bilateral exercises lead to ridicule and embarrassment.)12
Still, the import of the Russian-Chinese exercise should not be overstated. It
was initially described by many as preparation for countering U.S. forces in the re-
gion. As later and more accurately described, however, it primarily demonstrated
that Sino-Russian bilateral relations are strong, especially military-to-military re-
lations and arms sales. The exercise itself, held in waters just off the Shandong
Peninsula, was hardly a simulation of access denial against approaching U.S.
forces. Its significance in that respect would seem to be less direct. The fact that it
was held at all suggests that the Russians are more likely than we might have sur-
mised to provide logistic and possibly intelligence support—specifically, to offer
to resupply missiles and spare parts for the key Russian weapon systems that
China would employ in combat with Taiwan and the United States.13
If it would be exaggeration, then, to assess this exercise as a sign of emergence
as a fully mature force, the PLAN is creeping toward real blue-water exercises
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with composite task forces including surface combatants, submarines, and avia-
tion. So far, only in occasional and isolated distant submarine transits does it ap-
proximate the task of confronting an enemy, the U.S. Navy, that it might need to
keep at arm’s length, many hundreds of miles from the Chinese coast.14 In short,
the PLAN is not visibly conducting exercises, alone or with other services, that
rehearse confrontation with approaching U.S. Navy forces. The United States
should be alert to such a development with this new force, a force designed to
have the capabilities that could make such operations feasible.
ATTACKS FROM SEVERAL AXES
A new aspect of budding maturity, what could facetiously be termed “socializa-
tion,” is looming and demands attention—the prospect that the PLAN and the
2nd Artillery Corps could (and should) join hands to bolster the nation’s capa-
bility to attack Taiwan and pose a significantly greater and more diverse threat to
the ability of the United States to intervene in the region. The greatly increased
number and highly improved accuracy of China’s medium- and short-range
ballistic missiles (MRBMs and SRBMs), plus strategic and technical writings,
suggest strongly that senior Chinese military leaders have recognized the en-
hancement of naval capabilities that would result from support by ballistic and
land-attack cruise missiles. China’s MRBMs (the DF-21C) and SRBMs (DF-15
and -11), with conventional warheads, have capabilities well beyond the psycho-
logical intimidation of Taiwan.15 Prospective synergies stem from the ability of
these potent missile arsenals to suppress Taiwan’s offensive and defensive air
power, support amphibious and airborne assaults on the island, strike American
bases in the region, and possibly damage heavily Taiwanese naval forces before
they could leave port.
However, the most important aspect of the increasing ballistic-missile threat
is the prospect that within a few years China may be able seriously to threaten
not only American land bases but also carrier strike groups, with maneuvering
reentry vehicles (MaRVs).16 MaRVed missiles, with conventional warheads,
would maneuver both to enhance warhead survival (defeat missile defenses)
and home on mobile (or stationary) targets.17 The implications for the PLAN of
this prospective 2nd Artillery capability are, of course, profound; they include
the ability to degrade U.S. air and missile defenses (including the Aegis systems
and carrier flight decks). That would allow follow-on attacks by layered, diverse,
and appropriately redundant PLAN submarine, air, and surface forces firing
large numbers of very modern and capable ASCMs, torpedoes, and even their
guns if the earlier attacks suppress most defenses.18 This and what follows are in
clear outline the sort of threat the PLA and PLA Navy wish to pose to U.S. Navy
forces. The precisely focused force the Chinese have built and what they have
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written about its use leave no doubt about the concept—although there are
grave doubts about their ability to conduct it.
Whether, or how soon, the ballistic-missile threat becomes a factor in the
ability of the PLAN to deter, confuse, and delay or, alternatively, confront ap-
proaching U.S. Navy forces, the ability to launch lethal antiship-cruise-missile
attacks is an area where the PLAN is already near or at maturity—even if the tar-
geting of American forces at which to launch them has not reached a mature
state. The PLAN became early a cruise-missile navy, as a way of overcoming
other deficiencies. Now it must be described as a modern cruise-missile navy, at
least with respect to the platforms and lethal, evasive missiles it is deploying.19
The PLAN’s four newest classes of submarines, armed with potent ASCMs, fall
just below MaRVed ballistic missiles in the hierarchy of potential or emerging
threats to U.S. forces.
At the top of the submarine component of the overall threat are the eight new
Kilo-class diesel-electric submarines from Russia that are now being succes-
sively delivered to China. These submarines threaten carrier strike groups
through their ability to launch, while submerged over a hundred miles away, the
SS-N-27B/Sizzler antiship cruise missile.20 After a subsonic flight to the target
area, the SS-N-27B makes a supersonic, sea-skimming, evasive attack.21 It is de-
scribed by its marketers and others as part of the best family of cruise missiles in
the world and, in the opinion of some, as able to defeat the U.S. Aegis air- and
missile-defense system that is central to the defense of carrier strike groups.22
Shang-class (Type 093) SSNs are possible partners for the new Kilos. The sur-
prisingly rapid construction of successive units in this new class of nuclear-powered
attack submarine implies special utility in a Taiwan contingency. The Shangs
could, if they prove sufficiently quiet and fast and are properly equipped with
sensors, be part of the net by which the PLAN locates and identifies approaching
U.S. carrier strike groups.23 If used this way, they could be part of a matrix com-
posed of such detection and reporting means as satellites, merchant ships, and
even fishing boats with satellite phones.
Having served as part of the matrix that detects targets for the ballistic mis-
siles and Kilos, the Shangs could then join with the Song- and Yuan-class non-
nuclear submarines (SSs) in attacks against selected U.S. forces that have, as
expected in the sequenced PLA attack concept, suffered by that point significant
degradation of their air and missile defenses.24 These three classes of submarines
could carry out, from several attack axes, submerged launches of large salvoes of
subsonic, but still very capable, ASCMs. Of course, further follow-on attacks by
torpedoes cannot be discounted if they appear to be needed.
China’s other new nuclear-powered submarine program, the Jin-class (Project
094) ballistic-missile submarine, is primarily a part of China’s strategic deterrent,
M C V A D O N 9 7
T:\Academic\NWC Review\NWC Review Spring 2006\Ventura\NWC Review Spring 2006.vp
Tuesday, April 11, 2006 8:22:48 AM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
103
Naval War College: Full Spring 2006 Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2006
but it will necessarily play a role as backdrop for this Taiwan scenario.25 As with
China’s modernized and augmented land-based intercontinental ballistic mis-
siles, Beijing can act more confidently in bold undertakings vis-à-vis the United
States when its strategic forces are more secure. With the Jins, Beijing is adding a
layer of insurance that American missile defenses could be saturated—and that
Washington would know it. Washington, of course, would have to take into ac-
count the fact that it is dealing with a capable nuclear power whose missiles have
become very mobile and hard to detect.
A DAUNTING ASW CHALLENGE
The success of the described PLAN submarine attacks using submerged-launch
antiship cruise missiles depends to some degree on thwarting or coping with
U.S. antisubmarine warfare capabilities, primarily aircraft (P-3Cs and to a lesser
extent shipborne helicopters) and SSNs. One method by which the Chinese
might complicate the ASW picture for the Americans is to use large numbers of
submarines, including the score or more older submarines—Han-class SSNs
and Romeo- and Ming-class SSs—which may be noisy but cannot be ignored. In
round numbers, the PLAN might, in a campaign where it has chosen the time to
ready the crews and initiate operations, be able to deploy more than twenty
modern SSNs and SSs and roughly the same number of older submarines.26 The
long range of the ASCMs carried by the new Kilos means that those submarines
need not come within a hundred miles of the target ships, if targeting informa-
tion can be obtained remotely—greatly expanding the areas that American SSNs
and P-3Cs would have to search. The speed and practically unlimited under-
water endurance of the new Shang SSNs could allow them to close targets
promptly to launch their shorter-range ASCMs after the initial attacks by longer-
range missiles have degraded defenses.
The role of Taiwan in antisubmarine warfare deserves some attention. Tai-
wan’s current ASW capability is minimal. That capability might improve in the
foreseeable future were Taiwan to obtain from the United States the much-
discussed P-3Cs, but that will depend on how seriously the ROC Navy pursues
the demanding task of learning how to do antisubmarine warfare with that air-
craft. If it does that well, Taiwan’s P-3Cs might offer a measure of help in the
big ASW problem that the PLAN could create in the East China Sea and be-
yond.27 The Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force would offer another mea-
sure of assistance, if Tokyo were to make a political decision to involve its
forces in that way. All this said, China’s growing and improving submarine
fleet has outpaced U.S., Japanese, and Taiwanese ASW in the difficult littoral
waters of the region, which generally favor submarines seeking to escape detec-
tion.28 Open-ocean areas may be a slightly riskier proposition for the PLAN’s
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submarines, unless they actually achieve the elusive new levels of stealth to
which China aspires.
The previously described antisurface-warfare roles seem the most likely ones
for the PLAN’s new Shangs. It does not seem likely that the PLAN, inexperienced
compared to the U.S. Navy in undersea warfare, would use its few new SSNs—
precious to the Chinese but almost certainly not comparable to American SSNs
in capability and stealth—in an effort to strip the carrier groups of their sub-
marine protection. So far, China has conceded that aspect of the game to the
United States and chosen to avoid dueling with the superior American sub-
marines. By electing to develop a land-based ballistic-missile threat against
ships at sea, China is pursuing a path that could keep U.S. submarines from
blocking a critical initial attack on carrier strike groups. If in the event the ballistic-
missile concept is not usable or fails in execution, the new Kilos with the
SS-N-27B, the many other submarines with ASCMs, and the increasingly capa-
ble PLA naval air force B-6s, FB-7s, and Su-30MK2s (to be mentioned in more
detail later) provide other alternatives that largely avoid American underwater-
warfare superiority. The point is that as the Shangs are introduced into the fleet,
it seems unlikely that they will be expected to take on American SSNs directly.
ENOUGH TO MAKE WASHINGTON PAUSE?
The intensity and persistence of PLAN attacks on U.S. Navy forces could well be
affected by Beijing’s perception of the fragility of a government on Taiwan sub-
jected to a major assault from everything from ballistic missiles to aircraft to
special forces—and much more. It should be remembered that the primary pur-
pose of denying or delaying access by U.S. forces would be to convince Taipei
that waiting for help is futile, that capitulation and negotiation—on Beijing’s
terms—are the only reasonable option. Success against U.S. forces is, therefore,
important largely for its effect on Taipei’s will to fight on. Success in such con-
flict would be sweetest for the PLA if the United States never became actively in-
volved, concern about the capabilities of a modernized Chinese force having led
American leaders to delay or withhold carrier strike groups.
Returning from strategic considerations to the fight itself, were one to occur,
the Chinese can be expected next to deliver air-launched antiship cruise missiles
once the air defenses of the U.S. strike groups, and possibly regional bases as
well, are degraded. So this “layer” in the assault might be the PLA Navy Air
Force, attacking several hundred miles out to sea from China (in some cases
possibly much farther) with potent new air-launched ASCMs fired from new
aircraft from Russia (the Su-30MK2) and indigenous long-range B-6s (a new
version with new missiles) and FB-7 maritime interdiction aircraft, also with
new ASCMs.29 (Note how many times the word new appeared, correctly, in that
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sentence.) Some PLA Air Force aircraft have similar capabilities. At a minimum,
the U.S. Navy would have to be concerned about vulnerability to such an attack
and, if it had, indeed, sustained damage, might feel it had to retreat. Beijing
would make sure that such a development was not lost on Taipei—and we are
seeking here to understand more fully how Beijing envisions a conflict with its
modernized forces, not necessarily the reality.
Surface combatants would be a final layer if a supposedly casualty-averse
Washington and teetering Taipei have not yet taken the point. Cleanup attacks
might in such a case be intended, with very capable ASCMs from the several new
or upgraded classes of destroyers and frigates. These warships are led, with re-
spect to lethal firepower, by Russian Sovremennyys (soon to increase from two to
four) with supersonic, very evasive SS-N-22s.30 China has built or is building
enough new and modernized destroyers and frigates to form several modern
surface action groups, each capable of long-range attacks with almost equally le-
thal, although subsonic, ASCMs. Also—and here it is finally beginning to over-
come a long-standing shortcoming—the PLA Navy is on the way to acquiring
good fleet air defenses using surface-to-air missile systems.31
To capture succinctly the scope of the modernization of the surface combat-
ant force, it can be said that the Chinese are now building and dramatically up-
grading more classes of modern destroyers and frigates (these combatants
clearly outmatch those of Taiwan) than previous rates suggested they might ac-
quire ships in this decade.32
The question that cannot now be answered is whether such a visible and
slow-moving force, even with dramatically improved air defense, could actually
engage even a damaged U.S. force and not be subject to devastating attack by
other American strike forces. There are, however, broader uncertainties for the
PLAN. As noted, the concepts outlined above emerge from the force Beijing is
building and from PLA doctrinal and other writing. Beijing has made hard deci-
sions and executed expensive programs in the ongoing surge in the moderniza-
tion of the PLA, with great emphasis on naval, air, and missile forces for such
operations as described. But surveillance and targeting support will be needed if
this force is to deter or confront American intervention efforts. To that end, it
appears that China is making significant efforts to gain a varied capability from
space, land, sea (including undersea), and air to locate, identify, track, and target
naval forces.33 China is lagging in this arena—real success in the intelligence, sur-
veillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) arena could take a decade—but one might
make a guess that some rudimentary, if not reliable and consistent, capability
could be cobbled together within a couple of years. In other words, there is im-
pending danger that U.S. ships could be detected and effectively targeted. At
least equally important is whether China will be able to coordinate, command,
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and control such operations—that is, what of the C4* to go with the ISR? The
PLAN, although now more realistic and somewhat bolder in its training and ex-
ercises, as mentioned above, has not, for example, touted or otherwise given evi-
dence of rehearsals of encounters with simulated carrier strike groups hundreds
of miles east of China, as it might do as part of a deterrence scheme.
There is, as described, no doubt about the acquisition of modern platforms
and threatening weapons, but there remains puzzlement as to whether and how
promptly the PLA Navy and the other crucial components of the PLA will make
all this capability truly operational. There is, nevertheless, an additional serious
corollary as to whether Beijing would feel compelled in some circumstance to
initiate hostilities against Taiwan and to confront U.S. forces even if prepara-
tions were short of optimal. It is hard to relax with respect to Beijing and Taiwan,
even if we think Chinese command and control is not up to the task.
This all adds up to a complex planning and execution challenge for an inexpe-
rienced PLA. In the scenario depicted above, it would be conducting two major
campaigns simultaneously: one to subdue Taiwan and the other to delay effec-
tive American intervention. The campaign against Taiwan would likely include
initial ballistic-missile and land-attack cruise-missile attacks; special forces,
fifth-column sabotage, and other such actions; information operations; major
air attacks; and amphibious and airborne assaults to secure lodgments to allow
occupation and control of Taiwan. The campaign against the United States, in
addition to being preceded by extensive efforts temporarily to cripple American
C4ISR,† would, it should be remembered, consist of the described ballistic- and
cruise-missile attacks on carrier strike groups and possibly regional U.S. bases,
submarine attacks using various forms of antiship cruise missiles, and then se-
lections from such follow-on options as ASCMs from air or surface forces. This
would be an extraordinarily demanding undertaking against a daunting foe for
a PLA leadership that has no experience in such combat.
The author’s guess is that the PLA would quickly succeed against Taiwan but
would probably falter against U.S. forces, against which it would encounter sur-
prises, countermeasures, and other capabilities that would likely cause severe re-
versals. It must also be remembered, however, both that China’s best strategic
and military minds are working on these problems and that Beijing may feel it
has to act against Taiwan regardless of how challenging the prospect may appear.
Moreover, it is unlikely that the leaders of today’s modernized PLA would tell the
civilian leadership that their military is not ready. On the contrary, Beijing and
M C V A D O N 1 0 1
* C4: command, control, communications, and computers.
† C4ISR: command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance.
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the military have reason to believe that their forces are of such a nature as to
avoid American strengths, like SSNs and advanced C4ISR, and to make the most
of China’s strengths, such as its ballistic and cruise missiles and new conven-
tional and nuclear submarine forces. The United States has the task not only to
deter this modern military that could embolden Chinese leaders but also, irre-
sistibly yet subtly, to lead those leaders to the conviction that a decision to attack
Taiwan is not in China’s interests and would not likely result in reunification.
BEYOND “THE TAIWAN PROBLEM”
The PLA, especially the PLAN, now seems almost wholly, even obsessively, fo-
cused on the Taiwan problem. Two other factors should be taken into account,
however, and already seem to be intruding into Chinese strategic thinking. First,
an emerging China wants to build a military appropriate to the country that it is
becoming. Second, China’s all-important national economic growth, which
keeps the Communist Party in power, is dependent on ocean commerce. As the
PLA Navy tries to look beyond Taiwan or to decide what, even now, it should be
thinking about besides that, it sees a long-term capability to secure sea and land
routes for the flow of oil and natural gas, as well as other commodities, as a lead-
ing priority for China.
Will we see an organic air capability and a shift to more nuclear submarines?
A PLA Navy able to carry out that mission would almost certainly have some
form of organic air, so that it could effectively operate beyond the range of
land-based aircraft—far south in the South China Sea, the Strait of Malacca,
even to the Indian Ocean. Current shipyard work on the incomplete aircraft car-
rier Varyag may be the start of a move in that direction, unlike so many Chinese
aircraft-carrier rumors of past decades.34 Another consideration could be a lean-
ing toward submarines with greater range, speed, and independence from land
bases. This could mean that nuclear-powered attack submarines, despite the
added cost, might be preferred over diesel-electric or even air-independent-
propulsion submarines.
SSNs are a possible bellwether of PLAN strategic thinking. China is now build-
ing and buying three classes of nonnuclear submarines: the Kilos, the Songs, and
the Yuans (some speculate about the exact character of the Yuan propulsion sys-
tem). These submarines, along with the older Mings and remaining Romeos,
represent a major investment and will almost certainly constitute a majority of
the submarine fleet for the next fifteen years or more. It will, nevertheless, be
worthwhile to keep an eye on China’s success with the Shang attack class, to
ascertain whether it will feel the need suggested above for a faster, more inde-
pendent force to protect distant sea lanes, and whether an emerging China will
follow the American example and diversify its SSN fleet to include land-attack
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cruise-missile capabilities and the ability to insert special forces—or possibly
other, novel capabilities needed in emerging missions for an emerged China.
China’s navy has developed in many remarkable ways, but perhaps the biggest
test of maturity is the bold attempt to leap to a new status in the prestigious and
unforgiving domain of nuclear submarines—where it had previously faltered.
To a significant degree, the success or failure of its new nuclear-powered sub-
marines, the Jin-class ballistic-missile class as well as the Shangs, is likely to de-
termine future decisions for the Chinese submarine force. The American
example in diversifying its nuclear submarines may also become a factor, in the
form of an example. The outcome for the nuclear submarine force could set the
tone for a navy that either comes to feel that it ranks with the best or, having
“tried out for the pros,” finds that once more it has faltered.
In any case, it is instructive to imagine a particularly intelligent and compe-
tent young Chinese naval officer just beginning his service. That junior officer
must today see the prospect, at least, of a promising career ahead as a nuclear
submariner in a globally capable “real navy”—the prospect of professional chal-
lenge and esteem comparable to that of an American counterpart. That in itself
is a remarkable and telling change from a few years ago, when serving on trou-
bled Chinese nuclear submarines was thought by some to be as much a joke as a
job. Such success as the Chinese submarine force attains would tend to be infec-
tious and to bolster the professionalism of other components of the modern
PLAN, where newfound pride is thriving as well. The PLA Navy is not fully ma-
ture, but it has established its potential for that status in the air, on the sea, and,
conspicuously, under the sea.
NOTE S
This article is adapted from a paper delivered
at the Naval War College’s “China’s New Nu-
clear Submarine Fleet” Research Symposium,
26–27 October 2005.
1. Previously, the author had been told privately
that the PLA was surging in capability because
it finally had the funds from Beijing, the tech-
nologies and assistance from Moscow, and the
realization that Washington was not going to
accept Beijing’s position on Taiwan. Promi-
nent in the recent public exchange was the
Chinese response to three events: first, Secre-
tary of Defense Rumsfeld’s complaints about
the large PLA budget, made at a conference
sponsored by the International Institute for
Strategic Studies in Singapore on 4 June 2005;
second, his similar comments in Beijing in
October 2005; and third, the 2005 annual De-
partment of Defense report to the Congress
on PRC military power. Typical of the
strongly stated disagreement were the widely
noted immediate objection expressed by Cui
Tiankai, top Chinese representative at the
Singapore conference, and the sharp retort of
Vice Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi, the former
Chinese ambassador in Washington, as
quoted in the Washington Post on 21 July
2005, p. A24. He chastised the United States
for “improper comments about China’s de-
fensive national defense policy and measures”
and called the buildup “normal national de-
fense building.” Yang asserted that most of
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the new spending went for improving living
conditions for troops, noting, rather disingen-
uously, that the military also “updated some
weapons equipment.”
2. On 4 December 2005, while preparing this ar-
ticle, the author met with two longtime Chi-
nese colleagues, a diplomat (senior foreign
service officer) and a senior PLA Navy officer,
both of them well informed and well con-
nected. They agreed with each other (and un-
knowingly with American observers) that
conflict with Taiwan and the United States
was unlikely and that cross-Strait relations
were relaxed. The diplomats said that
Beijing’s relaxed attitude stemmed in part
from recently enhanced confidence with re-
spect to political developments in Taipei fa-
vorable to Beijing and prospects for eventual
peaceful resolution. They offered no apology
or explanation for the fact that PLA modern-
ization is focused on the Taiwan issue; both
seemed to consider the unprecedented mili-
tary buildup simply appropriately responsive
to the task of deterring and being able to cope
with China’s most important contingency—
the Taiwan-U.S. “threat.”
3. For a description of this PLA Navy, Air Force,
and 2nd Artillery modernization surge, see
the author’s testimony on Capitol Hill on 15
September 2005 before the U.S.-China Eco-
nomic and Security Review Commission,
available at www.uscc.org or at www.ifpa.org/
pdf/mcvadon.pdf. For an exhaustive but illu-
minating description by a non-American
source of the PLAN program, see Mikhail
Barabanov, “Contemporary Military Ship-
building in China,” Eksport Vooruzheniy, 1
FBIS CEP20050811949014, August 2005. This
piece (perhaps unexpectedly) is a remarkably
accurate and uniquely comprehensive open-
source reference on the recent stunning surge
in modernization of the PLAN.
4. U.S. Defense Dept., FY04 Report to Congress
on PRC Military Power (available at www
.defenselink.mil/pubs/d20040528PRC.pdf),
states on page 6: “China has continued to im-
prove its potential for joint operations via de-
velopment of an integrated command and
control network, a new command structure,
and improved C4ISR platforms. As in previ-
ous years, China’s leaders realize that most of
the PLA’s C4ISR equipment lags generations
behind that of the West and are encouraging
a new generation of researchers, engineers,
and officers to find ways to adapt to the de-
mands of the modern battlefield. The acquisi-
tion of advanced C4ISR technology is one of
the principal objectives of PRC collection
activities.”
5. David Shambaugh, Modernizing China’s Mili-
tary: Progress, Problems, and Prospects (Berke-
ley: Univ. of California Press, 2002), pp. 32,
46–47. “The PLA is still the party’s army, all
officers above the rank of senior colonel are
party members, and the CCP still institution-
ally penetrates the military apparatus.” “The
rules of the game . . . have changed as a result
of several developments: [among Shambaugh’s
listed developments]—Increased profession-
alism in the senior officer corps and a con-
comitant decline in the promotion of officers
with backgrounds as political commissars.”
6. Paul H. B. Godwin, “China’s Defense Estab-
lishment: The Hard Lessons of Incomplete
Modernization,” in The Lessons of History:
The Chinese People’s Liberation Army at 75,
ed. Laurie Burkitt, Andrew Scobell, and Larry
M. Wortzel (Carlisle, Penna.: U.S. Army War
College, Strategic Studies Institute, July
2003), p. 33. Godwin states: “Officer recruit-
ment has been changed to an emphasis on
college graduates rather than selecting from
the ranks of serving enlisted men and
women, and advancement in rank now re-
quires attendance at the appropriate PME
schools.”
7. Bernard D. Cole, “The Organization of the
People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN),” in
The People’s Liberation Army as Organiza-
tion: Reference Volume v1.0, ed. James C.
Mulvenon and Andrew N. D. Yang (Santa
Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2002), p. 476. “The
PLAN is emulating the U.S. reserve officer-
training corps (ROTC) programs for producing
well-educated, technically oriented candidate
officers.”
8. Beijing Xinhua, 17 August 1999, translated in
FBIS-CHI-99-0817: “The Chinese navy plans to
recruit about 1,000 officers from non-military
universities and colleges yearly beginning this
autumn in an effort to meet its need for com-
mand and technical talent. . . . [these officers]
will account for 40 percent of all naval offi-
cers by the year 2010.” This was originally
cited in Cole, “The Organization of the Peo-
ple’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN),” p. 477.
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9. Elizabeth Hague, “PLA Leadership in China’s
Military Regions,” in Civil-Military Change in
China: Elites, Institutes, and Ideas after the 16th
Party Congress, ed. Andrew Scobell and Larry
Wortzel, eds. (Carlisle, Penna.: U.S. Army War
College, Strategic Studies Institute, September
2004), pp. 247, 250. Two extracts from this
chapter illustrate that party loyalty, guanxi
(connections), and a reputation for not rock-
ing the boat remain important in promotion
decisions: “Several military region command-
ers have been promoted . . . to the national
level. . . . [I]n all cases they involve a candidate
. . . valuable for a national-level position—even
when other factors, such as connections, were a
strong factor in a promotion” [emphasis origi-
nal]. Further, “Military leaders reflect PLA pri-
orities, even in some cases when what the
leader has to offer is continuity rather than
new ideas or techniques.”
10. The author and another longtime American
specialist on the PLAN were separately told of
these organizational changes by knowledge-
able PLAN officers.
11. These exercises with foreign navies consisted
of search-and-rescue drills, communications
exercises, and even replenishment alongside
in at least one case; however, conspicuously
absent were tactical operations. The author
has been told authoritatively that planned or
proposed exercises with Thailand and other
ASEAN countries will also have the goal of
fostering bilateral relations, not of achieving
operational capability.
12. Nikolay Petrov, “Moscow and Beijing Did
Not Mention Their Loses [sic] That They In-
curred during the Joint Maneuvers,” Moscow
Kommersant, FBIS CEP20051013330001, 8
September 2005. The following FBIS reports
contain left-handed compliments and question
PLA competence: “Chinese Army’s ‘Iron Disci-
pline’ Impresses Russian Defense Minister,”
Moscow RIA-Novosti, CEP20050825002002,
25 August 2005; “Russia: Results of Joint Mil-
itary Exercise with China Assessed,” Moscow
Rossiya television, CEP20050927027016, 24
September 2005; “Russian TV Looks at Military
Cooperation with China Post-Exercise,” Mos-
cow Zvezda television, CEP20050919027182, 19
September 2005.
13. “China-Russia: PRC Media on Sino-Russian
Military Exercises Project Image of Con-
verging Interests in Asia,” FBIS Feature,
FEA20050831007588, 31 August 2005. This
analysis of the August 2005 Russian-Chinese
exercise quotes the principal Chinese and
Russian generals involved as saying the exer-
cise represented “a major strategic decision of
the Russian and Chinese leaders” aimed at
deepening “strategic cooperative partnership”—
a phrase described by the FBIS analyst as nor-
mally used to describe bilateral relations.
14. Richard Halloran, “Chinese Sub Highlights
Underseas Rivalries,” Japan Times, 30 Novem-
ber 2004, available at search.japantimes.co.jp/
print/opinion/eo2004/eo20041130a1.htm.
15. U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report
to Congress: The Military Power of the People’s
Republic of China 2005, July 2005, pp. 12–13;
available at www.defenselink.mil/news/
Jul2005/d20050719china.pdf. On MRBMs,
see Mark A. Stokes, “Chinese Ballistic Missile
Forces in the Age of Global Missile Defense:
Challenges and Responses,” in China’s Growing
Military Power: Perspectives on Security, Ballistic
Missiles, and Conventional Capabilities, ed.
Andrew Scobell and Larry M. Wortzel
(Carlisle, Penna.: U.S. Army War College, Stra-
tegic Studies Institute, September 2002), p.
113, available at www.strategicstudiesinstitute
.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB59.pdf. The DF-21
family is also called the CSS-5. On SRBMs,
see ibid., p. 116. The DF-15 and DF-11 fami-
lies are also called the CSS-6 and CSS-7,
respectively.
16. Stokes, “Chinese Ballistic Missile Forces in the
Age of Global Missile Defense,” p. 150 note 12.
17. See Eric A. McVadon, Recent Trends in China’s
Military Modernization, written statement
prepared for testimony before the U.S.-China
Economic and Security Review Commission,
15 September 2005, available at www.ifpa.org/
pdf/mcvadon.pdf. The information was de-
rived from many translated Chinese articles
during recent years; sources can be identified
for serious researchers.
18. Admiral Lowell E. Jacoby, Director, Defense
Intelligence Agency, Current and Projected
National Security Threats to the United States, state-
ment (excerpted) to the Senate Select Commit-
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19. See Barabanov, “Contemporary Military
Shipbuilding in China,” for an open-source
catalogue of PLAN modernization efforts.
20. John R. Benedict, “The Unraveling and Revi-
talization of U.S. Navy Antisubmarine War-
fare,” Naval War College Review 58, no. 2
(Spring 2005). “The recent sale [to China] of
eight additional Project 636 Kilos equipped
with wake-homing antiship torpedoes and
submerged-launch 3M54E Klub-S [the
SS-N-27B] antiship cruise missiles is indica-
tive of the transformation of this submarine
force. The Project 636 Kilo ‘is one of the quiet-
est diesel submarines in the world’ [quoting
the Office of Naval Intelligence]; . . . the Klub-S
missile has a 220-kilometer maximum range . . .
and a terminal speed of up to Mach 3. Such a
capability represents a very formidable threat to
American and allied surface units” (p. 102).
21. “Klub (SS-N-27) ASCM,” Barat Rakshak: The
Consortium of Indian Military Websites, 12
September 2004, www.bharat-rakshak.com/
navy/Klub.html. This and several of the fol-
lowing citations from public sources serve
usefully to describe Chinese acquisitions and
deployments; the varied character of these
sources also illustrates that reasonably accurate
descriptions of the ongoing PLA moderniza-
tion are publicly available. The problem can be
culling inaccurate reports; the author is often
able to do so by asking knowledgeable PLA
officers and through active exchanges with
other diligent specialists.
22. “Russia to Deliver SS-N-27 to China,” Chinese
Defence Today, 29 April 2005, available at www
.sinodefence.com/news/2005/news29-04-05
.asp.
23. On quietness and sensors, see Zachary Moss,
“Nuclear Submarines Worldwide: Current
Force Structure and Future Developments,”
Bellona Nuclear Naval Vessels, 13 May 2004,
www.bellona.no/en/international/russia/
navy/northern_fleet/vessels/34070.html. On
employment, see Globalsecurity.org, www
.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/
2005/d20050719china.pdf. The U.S. Defense
Department, in its 2005 Annual Report to the
Congress: The Military Power of the People’s
Republic of China, states on page 33: “China is
developing capabilities to achieve local sea
denial, including . . . developing the Type-093
nuclear attack submarine for missions requir-
ing greater at-sea endurance.”
24. “Yuan Class Diesel-Electric Submarine,” Chi-
nese Defence Today, available at www.sinodefence
.com/navy/sub/yuan.asp. For the Song class,
“Type 039 Song Class Diesel-Electric Subma-
rine,” ibid., www.sinodefence.com/navy/sub/
039.asp.
25. Jing-Dong Yuan, “Chinese Responses to U.S.
Missile Defenses: Implications for Arms Con-
trol and Regional Security,” Nonproliferation
Review (Spring 2003), available at cns.miis.edu/
pubs/npr/vol10/101/101yuan.pdf, p. 89.
26. This is an estimate based on the author’s ac-
quaintance over fifteen years with the PLAN
submarine force and discussions in recent
years with others who have extensive experi-
ence concerning that force.
27. With respect to Taiwan’s ASW capability and
potential, the author drew on numerous ex-
changes with ROC naval officers and think-
tankers over many years, including numerous
visits to Taiwan. For judgments on other as-
pects of the ASW environment, the author re-
lied on his three decades of ASW experience
flying P-2 and P-3 aircraft, the major portion
of which was gained with the U.S. Seventh
Fleet in western Pacific waters.
28. Benedict, “The Unraveling and Revitalization
of U.S. Navy Antisubmarine Warfare,” p. 97
fig. 2, where the ASW situation for 2003 is
described as, “Few new ASW sensor &
weapon capabilities fielded to counter diesel
subs in littorals.” Also, on pp. 99–100, the
U.S. Navy vice admiral commanding Atlantic
submarine and ASW forces is quoted as say-
ing, “Our ASW capabilities can best be de-
scribed as poor or weak,” and the Pacific Fleet
commander as warning, “We will need
greater ASW capability than we have today. . . .
[F]uture technologies are essential to counter
the growing submarine threat.”
29. For the Su-30, Charles R. Smith, “New Chi-
nese Jets Superior, Eagle Loses to Flanker,”
NewsMax.com, 26 May 2004, at www.newsmax
.com/archives/articles/2004/5/26/154053
.shtml. This article illustrates that open
sources were reporting this PLA naval air
force acquisition and its antiship role soon
after its purchase from Russia was consum-
mated: “China is about to receive 24 ad-
vanced Sukhoi Su-30MK2 Flanker fighters
from Russia. . . . The new Chinese fighters are
reportedly equipped with enhanced anti-ship
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strike capabilities including the Kh-31 Kryp-
ton supersonic anti-ship missile. . . . The PLA
Naval Air Corps will deploy the latest batch
of Su-30MK2 fighters.” For the B-6, Robert S.
Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, “Chinese Nu-
clear Forces, 2003,” 2003 Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists 59, no. 6 (November/December
2003), pp. 77–80, available at www.thebulletin
.org/article_nn.php?art_ofn=nd03norris.
Using the Chinese designation for B-6—that
is, H-6—this article states: “Although in-
creasingly obsolete as a modern strike
bomber, the H-6 may gain new life as a plat-
form for China’s emerging cruise missile ca-
pability. The naval air force has used the H-6
to carry the C-601/Kraken anti-ship cruise
missile for more than 10 years, and Flight In-
ternational reported in 2000 that up to 25
H-6s would be modified to carry four new
YJ-63 land-attack cruise missiles.” For the
FB-7, see “JH-7 [Jianhong Fighter-Bomber]
[FB-7]/FBC-1,” Globalsecurity.org, 27 April
2005, www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/
china/jh-7.htm: “China reportedly is devel-
oping an improved version of the FB-7. The
twin-engine FB-7 is an all-weather, super-
sonic, medium-range fighter-bomber with an
anti-ship mission. Improvements to the FB-7
likely will include a better radar, night attack
avionics, and weapons.” For ASCMs, see Nu-
clear Threat Initiative (NTI), China’s Cruise
Missile Designations and Characteristics, 26
March 2003, www.nti.org/db/china/
mimport.htm. This material is produced in-
dependently for NTI by the Center for
Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey In-
stitute of International Studies.
30. “Naval Forces,” Strategy Page, 20 March
2005, www.strategypage.com/htmw/htsurf/
articles/20050320.aspx. This source states: “The
primary weapon of the Sovremennyy is the
SS-N-22 Sunburn, a high-speed sea-skimming
missile with a huge 660-pound warhead. The
Sunburn is probably the best anti-ship missile
in the world.” This article is cited primarily to
illustrate the widespread reputation of the
Sunburn missile as extremely lethal and
evasive.
31. “Type 052c (Lanzhou Class) Air Defence Mis-
sile Destroyer,” Chinese Defence Today, 27
August 2005, available at www.sinodefence
.com/navy/surface/052c.asp: “Jiangnan
Shipyard started to build two Type 052C de-
stroyers . . . with more advanced weapon sys-
tems and sensors specifically for fleet air
defence role. . . . The most notable feature is
the four-array multifunction phased array ra-
dar (PAR) similar to the U.S. AN/SPY-1
Aegis system. Additionally, the destroyers are
also fitted with the vertical launch system
(VLS) for the indigenous HQ-9 long-range
air defence missile system.”
32. The U.S.-China Economic and Security Re-
view Commission annual report for 2005,
chap. 3, sec. 1, based on testimony of expert
witnesses, available at www.uscc.gov/annual
_report/2005/chapter3_sec1.pdf, states: “The
PLA Navy (PLAN) is engaged in an unprece-
dented level of construction and acquisition
of major surface combatant ships. It currently
is deploying seven new major ship classes at
one time, building up to two new ships in
each class per year. These include the Project
956 Sovremennyy-class guided-missile de-
stroyer (DDG); the Type 52B DDG; the Type
52C, Aegis-like DDG; the Type 54 guided-
missile frigate.”
33. U.S. Defense Dept., FY04 Report to Congress on
PRC Military Power, states on pp. 43–44: “Ac-
quisition of modern ISR systems remains a
critical aspect of Beijing’s military moderniza-
tion. China is developing its ISR capabilities
based on domestic components, supplemented
by foreign technology acquisition and pro-
curement of complete foreign systems. PLA
procurement of new space systems, AEW [air
early warning] aircraft, long-range UAVs [un-
manned aerial vehicles], and over-the-horizon
radar will enhance its ability to detect, moni-
tor, and target naval activity in the western Pa-
cific Ocean. It appears, from writings on PLA
exercises, that this system currently lacks inte-
gration and that a fused, efficient ISR capabil-
ity will not be achieved for many years.” See
also Richard A. Bitzinger, “Come the Revolu-
tion: Transforming the Asia-Pacific’s Militar-
ies,” Naval War College Review 58, no. 4
(Autumn 2005), pp. 42–43, 46.
34. For the saga of China and aircraft carrier ac-
quisition, see Ian Storey and You Ji, “China’s
Aircraft Carrier Ambitions: Seeking Truth
from Rumors,” Naval War College Review 57,
no. 1 (Winter 2004).
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THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF WAR GAMING
Robert C. Rubel
Anyone who has conducted or has studied actual warfare knows well its mas-sive complexities.1
These complexities do not relieve humans from the responsibility for making
decisions—difficult decisions—aimed at navigating their organizations suc-
cessfully through campaigns, be they in a theater of war or in the halls of the
Pentagon. Minds must be prepared beforehand, both in their general, educated
functioning and in the specific, sophisticated understanding of conflict and the
competitive environments they face. This preparation must be predicated on the
internalization of “valid” knowledge about the conflict environment. There are
many ways of gaining such knowledge: the study of
history and theory, practical experience, and exposure
to the results of various kinds of research and analysis.
Each of these methods of developing knowledge has
its own particular epistemology—formally, a “theory
of the nature and grounds of knowledge, especially
with reference to its limits and validity,” or more prac-
tically, rules by which error is distinguished from
truth. War gaming is a distinct and historically signifi-
cant tool that warriors have used over the centuries to
help them understand war in general and the nature
of specific upcoming operations. The importance of
war gaming demands serious examination of the na-
ture of the knowledge it produces.
Professor Rubel is chairman of the Wargaming Depart-
ment in the Naval War College’s Center for Naval War-
fare Studies. Before retiring in the grade of captain, he
was a naval aviator, participating in operations con-
nected with the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the 1974 Cy-
prus crisis, the 1980 Iranian hostage crisis, the TWA
flight 847 crisis, and DESERT SHIELD. He commanded
Fighter Attack Squadron (VFA) 131 and served as the
inspector general of U.S. Southern Command. He at-
tended the Spanish Naval War College and the U.S.
Naval War College, where he served on the faculty be-
fore his present appointment. He has a BS degree from
the University of Illinois, an MS in management from
Salve Regina University in Newport, Rhode Island, and
an MA in national security and strategic studies from
the Naval War College (1986).
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Before going farther, it is worthwhile to define exactly what we mean by “war
game.” Peter Perla provides as good a definition as any: a war game is “a warfare
model or simulation whose operation does not involve the activities of actual
military forces, and whose sequence of events affects and is, in turn, affected by
the decisions made by players representing the opposing sides.”2 War gaming,
rightly considered, is inherently a method of research, regardless of how people
apply it. The essence of war gaming is the examination of conflict in an artifi-
cial environment. Through such examination, gamers gain new knowledge
about the phenomena the game represents. The purpose of a game is immaterial
to this central epistemological element. Moreover, the gaining of knowledge is
inherent and unavoidable, whatever a game’s object. The real question is
whether such knowledge is valid and useful. This question is all the more im-
portant because of the growing reliance on gaming techniques in an increasingly
complex world.
This article will attempt to initiate a professional dialogue on the underlying
logic structure of gaming by examining the epistemological foundations of
gaming in general and ways in which the knowledge gained from specific games
can be judged sound.
Perhaps the most compelling reason to conduct such an inquiry is the possi-
bility of insidious error creeping into war games. War gaming, even after centu-
ries of practice, is still more a craft than a discipline, and it is quite possible for
rank amateurs, dilettantes, and con artists to produce large, expensive, and ap-
parently successful but worthless or misleading games for unsuspecting spon-
sors. There is little incentive to apply incisive criticism to games in which heavy
investments have been made, and persons or organizations inclined to do so are
hampered by lack of an established set of epistemological theory and principle.
This does not mean that the majority of games are fatally flawed; it does mean
that there is no accepted set of criteria to determine whether they are or not.
Judgment as to the success and quality of a war game, especially one of high pro-
file and consequence, is too often the result of organizational politics.
EPISTEMOLOGY
Some elaboration of the meaning of this somewhat esoteric term is essential. To
avoid getting sidetracked by philosophical complexities, we can adopt a conven-
tion based on current thinking. One widely accepted branch of modern
epistemological theory holds that knowledge results from the building of sim-
plified mental models of reality in order to solve problems. The “validity” of a
model (or knowledge) emanates from its utility in problem solving.3 This ap-
proach seems sufficient for our purposes. Knowledge is a practical human re-
sponse to the challenges of our environment. Valid knowledge is that which has
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sufficient practical correspondence to our environment to be useful for problem
solving.
Readers with knowledge of modeling and simulation will immediately find
resonances in this definition with widely used definitions of computer simula-
tion validity—for example, “substantiation that a computerized model within
its domain of applicability possesses a satisfactory range of accuracy consistent
with the intended application of the model.”4 Thus we are not so much con-
cerned with the validity of knowledge in an absolute sense as with the practical
utility of knowledge emanating from a game relative to the projected warfare en-
vironment in which it will be applied. Most war games are oriented in some way
to the future, either explicitly or inherently; accordingly, the predictive value of
knowledge emanating from a game is critical. At this point many veteran gamers
will cry foul, as it is widely accepted that war games are not predictive (although
there are some who will disagree). To untangle this knot, let us go back to our
baseline definition of valid knowledge—that which is useful for problem solv-
ing. This presupposes that the environment can to some degree be shaped by de-
cisions. If it were not, war gaming—in fact, any decision-support tool—would
be irrelevant. If the environment is malleable, however, there are “right” and
“wrong” decisions available to the decision maker.5 Ignorant decision makers
would be at the mercy of chance; their decisions would be shots in the dark, or
worse. An informed decision maker—one who possesses valid knowledge about
the environment and the potential consequences of alternate choices—could do
better than that in a future situation. Valid knowledge is predictive to that extent.
However, since life in general and war in particular are influenced by thousands
of little happenstances that are beyond the control of any single decision maker
(a true definition of Clausewitz’s “friction”), “right” decisions do not guarantee
success. If they did, war would be formulaic and gaming unnecessary. For that
reason, although valid knowledge of the environment is inherently predictive—
in that it indicates potentially valid cause-and-effect relationships through
which decision makers can bring about their intent—a war game can never be
truly predictive.
Setting aside, for now, arguments about certain war games in history that
have seemed in some way predictive, we are left with the uncomfortable ques-
tion of what games are good for if they cannot truly predict. Indeed, why do we
game at all?
WHY GAME?
If we accept the notion that war gaming is inherently a research tool (a definition
that includes the produced effects of education, training, experimentation, and
analysis) and one that generates potentially valid knowledge, we must ask under
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what conditions, or for what problems, it can have validity. Can it be used validly
in lieu of other tools, or does it occupy a unique relationship to a class of prob-
lems for which it is the only valid tool?
Perhaps the deepest treatment of this question is that of John Hanley, who re-
lates the inherent nature and structure of war gaming to the amount and kind of
“fuzziness” (indeterminacy) attending a problem. Indeterminacy comprises
those things we do not know about either the initial conditions of relevant ele-
ments of the problem or about the effects of our potential attempts to solve it.
Hanley posits a spectrum of indeterminacy, as follows:
• No indeterminacy. The elements of the problem are known and amenable
to engineering solutions.
• Statistical indeterminacy. The initial set of conditions is a random variable
whose statistics we know, and the effects of our actions upon it can be
determined. For instance, the chances of a submarine being in a particular
area of ocean could be calculated from intelligence, and our search efforts
would be shaped thereby.
• Stochastic indeterminacy. The initial set of conditions may be known, but
the process by which new states of affairs (for instance, battle outcomes)
are produced by our actions is subject to statistical variation—the “roll of
the dice.”
• Strategic indeterminacy. The initial set of conditions is known, but there are
two or more competing “players” whose independent choices govern the
end state.
• Structural indeterminacy. Significant elements of the problem are so little
known or understood that we cannot define the problem in terms of the
other forms of indeterminacy. Such elements might be “indeterminacy in
current conditions, the kinematics of the process, acts of nature, the
available response time, and the perceptions, beliefs and values of the
decision makers.”6
Hanley describes war gaming as a weakly structured tool appropriate to
weakly structured problems.7 Such problems are those so complex or poorly de-
fined as to require a tool that can accommodate their considerable imprecision.
Warfare in general and many of the problems subsumed within it are certainly
weakly structured—that is, marked by structural indeterminacy. This adds up to
the first part of the answer to our question: We war-game because we must.
There are certain warfare problems that only gaming will illuminate.
This imprecision, or lack of solid structure, characterizes both the problem
and the tool, and therefore governs the nature of the knowledge produced by a
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war game. That knowledge is not in the form of a solution to an engineering
problem. It is commonly said that war games produce insights, not proofs. This
conventional wisdom is correct insofar as it goes, but it is not sufficiently devel-
oped to stand as an epistemological principle. Following Hanley’s line of thought,
we can say that the knowledge emanating from a game is also weakly structured,
meaning that such knowledge is conditional and subject to judgment in applica-
tion. Our confidence in the structural calculations for a bridge can be very high
if we combine accepted engineering formulae, accurate measurements, and
building materials of the pre-
dicted quality. In contrast,
however, our confidence in
answers produced by popula-
tion sampling cannot be 100
percent; further, any answers produced by game theory for a particular conflict
situation must be understood to be conditional on the scope for free choice
enjoyed by the opponent. Answers produced by war games are yet more condi-
tional, due to the wide scope of significant variables attendant to warfare, whether
or not incorporated into the game. Perhaps the best way to characterize this con-
ditionality is to say that knowledge produced by war games is indicative—that is, at
its best it can indicate the possibilities of a projected warfare situation and certain
potential cause-and-effect linkages.
Indicativeness is no mean thing when dealing with a very complex or weakly
structured problem. The primary mechanism through which war games pro-
duce such knowledge is visualization. Games allow players and observers to see
relationships—geographic, temporal, functional, political, and other—that
would otherwise not be possible to discern. Seeing and understanding these re-
lationships prepares the mind for decisions in a complex environment. This
holds true whether the purpose of the game is education or research.
While weak problem structure is a compelling reason to war-game, there are
other equally compelling reasons, each of which has epistemological implica-
tions. A common reason for mounting a war game is socialization, either of con-
cepts or people. Many organizations within the U.S. government sponsor games
in order to get a wide and diverse set of stakeholders to “buy into” a set of con-
cepts or doctrine. Military “Title X” games (that is, Title Ten, referring to the fed-
eral statute that directs the armed services to raise, maintain, and train forces)
frequently have this as at least a tacit purpose. Knowledge emerging from such
games is less conditional than in other settings, at least with respect to the con-
sensus they are meant to generate. A recent joint war game revealed that none of
the military services had invested sufficiently in the suppression of enemy air de-
fenses to support an aggressive airborne assault early in a particular scenario.
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That revelation was more than just indicative—it was usable intelligence. Such
knowledge could be used to alter budgets or even service roles and missions.
Some games are used to acquaint organizations with each other. This has
been an important aspect of homeland security gaming in the wake of 9/11. For
instance, in a recent homeland security game, a state emergency management
agency learned that it had formally to request federal assistance in a disaster, not
just expect it to show up. That knowledge was not in the least conditional; the
game provided to key officers of a state agency concrete knowledge of federal
requirements.
SIMULATION
War games are inherently simulations of reality. By this we mean that they are
simplified representations of a potential future (or perhaps past) warfare situa-
tion. Simulation has epistemological implications all its own. Most fundamen-
tally, simulation is a calculation technique, and as such it is coupled to the
phenomena it seeks to represent along Hanley’s spectrum of indeterminacy. For
instance, physicists use simulation techniques to explore subatomic interac-
tions. They can do this with high confidence because the problem set they are
dealing with contains no more than statistical indeterminacy. Naturally, then,
simulation of war is less closely coupled to its parent phenomenon because of
the high degree of structural indeterminacy involved. In other words, it is far less
likely that any warfare simulation would be “valid” due to all the imponderables
that are necessarily distilled out.
A war game is an artificial representation—that is, simulation—of war that is
used to learn more about a particular situation. A common misconception is
that computer simulations are war games. Computer programs are not in them-
selves war games, although they are frequently referred to as such; war games re-
quire human players, who may employ computer programs to assist them. In a
broad sense, simulation is the attempt to represent reality to the degree neces-
sary to explore the warfare phenomena in which we are interested. Thus when
we talk of simulation in this article, it is in the general sense of war-game design
and not the narrower sense of computer software.
Following Hanley, we can attack the issue of warfare simulation by establish-
ing a vertical spectrum of sorts, based on the degree of fidelity a simulation pos-
sesses. At the bottom of the spectrum exist such games as Go and chess. These
games are abstractions; all that is retained of reality is the essence of conflict.
That does not mean that valid knowledge cannot be gained from these games;
many wise generals have extolled their virtues in preparing the mind for actual
battle. At the top of the spectrum are detailed simulations, attempts to capture as
much reality as possible. In between exist what we will call “distillations”—
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games in which significant simplifications of reality are made for specific pur-
poses. In a sense, all simulations are distillations, because a perfect representa-
tion of reality would be reality. To put it more practically, exact simulation of real
warfare is not possible. Admiral Arleigh Burke illustrated the matter well when
he said, “Nobody can actually duplicate the strain that a commander is under in
making a decision during combat.”
This distilling process has epistemological implications for simulation. Pur-
suing farther the logic we have been following, we could easily conclude that the
knowledge produced by highly distilled games is more conditional and less pre-
dictive than that from simulations having greater fidelity. Such reasoning would
force us to conduct nothing but elaborate and expensive games. Fortunately,
such an epistemological blind alley can be avoided by linking purpose to predic-
tiveness. All war games have explicit purposes, and rarely are these purposes so
holistic as to demand unsparing investment in fidelity. Bringing the purpose of a
game into focus leads quite naturally to distillation; many games are able to set
aside significant aspects of reality. To the extent that distillation promotes clar-
ity, highlighting relationships in the aspect of warfare we are studying, the
epistemological damage of failure to include all possible factors is counter-
balanced. Since knowledge gained from a war game is in the eye of the beholder
(player or analyst), obfuscation caused by excessive comprehensiveness is at
least as damaging as the omission of some significant element.
Epistemologically speaking, we conclude that a war game should be designed
with as much fidelity as possible without including factors that, because they are
not clearly related to its purpose, risk diluting or masking valid knowledge that
might legitimately be gained.
There is another implication of simulation that must be addressed: the com-
mon wisdom holding that war games are not experiments, as they cannot prove
anything. This is clearly true, in terms of John Hanley’s logic, since knowledge
emerging from games is conditional. The proposition is confirmed also by the
nature of warfare simulation; the lack of close coupling with its parent phenom-
enon due to structural indeterminacy makes it always incomplete and defective
in some, possibly unknown, way.
Nevertheless, there is an aspect of war gaming that can accommodate experi-
mentation. Some war games focus on command and control. In them, players are
organized into cells, each of which represents a command or perhaps an element
of a staff organization. These cells are provided with communications devices
(most recently networked computers) and command and control (C2) doctrine.
The war game provides a venue in which command and control processes can
take place. The point here is that within the context of the game, actual—not
simulated—command and control occurs. Thus, knowledge gained from this
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activity can be treated like experimental data, subject to all the epistemological
principles and injunctions of the scientific method. One caveat is that war games
are most commonly one-time affairs, so the data cannot be treated with the same
confidence as that gained from experiments run a number of times. On the other
hand, simple and appropriately distilled games have been used as substrates
within multiple-run C2 experiments, the output of which constitutes valid statis-
tical data.8 However, in games featuring a significant command and control focus,
information gained from the underlying simulation must be treated differently
than that derived from the command and control “layer.”
GAME ARTIFACTS
Games can easily produce information that is invalid. Commonly, such infor-
mation is produced by what are termed “game artifacts,” defects of simulation
that corrupt a game’s cause-and-effect relationships. If, for instance, a Control
umpire somehow used the wrong weapons-effects table to look up the outcome
of a tactical engagement, subsequent player decisions based on that assessment
would be tainted. Similarly, defects in display may cause players to be artificially
misled as to where units are. Simply ascribing such defects to the “fog of war”
and allowing them to be folded into the game’s flow is as much an
epistemological mistake as assigning too much significance to game outcomes.
It is entirely reasonable to build the fog of war into a game, which can be done
in various ways. These devices, such as revealing to players only that information
which their reconnaissance assets could “see,” normally place bounds on the na-
ture of misinformation that may crop up. Players may, for instance, make un-
warranted assumptions about the location of enemy forces due to a lack of
information; they might equally do so in the real world, and such imperfection
of information does no violence to the intellectual validity of cause and effect or
critical analysis. However, if a computer-generated operational picture through
some system defect placed a “Red” unit far out of position and thereby affected
“Blue’s” decision making, we cannot explain it away as the result of a Red com-
puter attack or some sophisticated deception. Nor can it be chalked up to equip-
ment failure that might happen in real life; unless it is known that the game’s
designers provided for this real-world factor, it cannot be assumed to be a part of
the simulation.
A game artifact that is perhaps easier to understand but more difficult to de-
tect or avert is invalid decision making by players. It is a fundamental, if tacit, as-
sumption of war gaming that players will make the best decisions they can. They
need not be the right decisions—after all, somebody has to lose—but they must
not be capricious or negligent. Players are expected to try to win, or at least to
carry out doctrine in a faithful way. When they do not, as a result of alienation,
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inattention, or malice, the game’s results are contaminated. This can happen all
too easily. In some games, Red is constrained by Control, in order to shape the
game in some needed way, from certain otherwise reasonable actions it wants to
take; if Red players react with disillusionment or cynicism, they may “mentally
disengage” from the game and make very different decisions than if they were
properly immersed and motivated. Another source of defective decision making
is ignorance or improper training among players. If the goal of the game is to ex-
amine the efficacy of a particular concept or doctrine but the key players do not
know or understand the material, the game results cannot be accepted.
Another player artifact, one that is harder to account for, crops up in games as
well: players tend to be more aggressive than they would be in the real world with
real lives at stake. There are several inherent reasons for this. First, it is just a
game, and therefore real lives are not at stake. Second, depending on the extent of
the simulation, there are no tactical commanders screaming bloody murder if
the operational-level player puts them in a unnecessarily dangerous situation.
One of the most common misfortunes to attend Blue players in Cold War games
was the loss of amphibious groups because the Blue players had let them sit in
exposed positions. Third, since every game has a defined end point or specific
set of victory conditions, there is no “tomorrow” to be provided for by players
after the last move. Game designers must therefore understand these tendencies
and attempt to structure their games to minimize the likelihood and intensity of
this player artifact.
THE WAR GAME AS MILITARY HISTORY
We have seen that knowledge gained from war games is conditional—that its
validity is ultimately dependent on its effects on decisions made in real-world
operations. But analysts examine games after the fact, and all participants have
the opportunity to learn from their findings. How should this information be
handled, sorted, and considered? How can it be converted into valid knowledge?
Because it is not scientific data, it cannot be statistically reduced or otherwise
treated in ways appropriate for “hard” data. Perhaps information produced by
war games is best considered artificial military history. Game data can then be
approached with the full array of methods available to the historian. Moreover,
the trap of treating mere discussions as games can be avoided. Insiders have a
term for nongames masquerading as games: BOGSAT (“Bunch of Guys Sitting
around a Table”). If the data derived from an event consists solely of what partic-
ipants said, it was not truly a war game, and its results should not be accorded
the stature that knowledge gained from a real game should have.
Perhaps the best commentary on converting military history into useful
knowledge is to be found in the writings of Carl von Clausewitz. Clausewitz
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regarded history as a real-life laboratory of war, one that can be mined for infor-
mation useful for preparing the minds of future commanders. His approach was
what he called Kritik, or critical analysis: researching the facts, tracing effects
back to their causes, and evaluating the means employed.9 This process (which
emerges from a close reading of Book Two, chapter 5, of his classic treatise On
War) is as valid today as it was in Clausewitz’s time. These three steps constitute
more than a method; they establish a criterion for the extraction of valid knowl-
edge from a war game. It is not enough simply to list the facts of what happened
in the game; these are meaningless in themselves, because the game was a simu-
lation. We must examine why these events occurred—the combinations of
player decisions and umpire determinations that produced them.
Clausewitz himself, however, acknowledges the limits of the method: at some
point, results must be allowed to speak for themselves. The critic, “having ana-
lyzed everything within the range of human calculation and belief, will let the
outcome speak for that part whose deep, mysterious operation is never visible.”10
In other words, war cannot be completely understood in its full complexity; ulti-
mately criticism must recognize that there are factors at work whose functioning
can be revealed only by the actual victories or defeats of a commander being
studied. This is perfectly reasonable with respect to real warfare. It might also be
true for war games, but its useful-
ness is limited by the fact that they
are simulations. For example, a
common method of introducing
uncertainty into battle-outcome calculations is rolling dice to represent the
probabilistic nature of certain phenomena, like sonar or radar detection. Beyond
this narrow use of stochastic indeterminacy, game designers frequently aggre-
gate complex interactions of large combat forces with a combination of dice
rolls and structured combat-results tables. Here the die simulates the effects of a
wide range of variables that are not explicitly modeled.
It would be easy enough, lacking any other good explanation of the
cause-and-effect relationships between player decisions and outcomes, to sense
here the presence of invisible factors. But if such “deep, mysterious” elements ex-
ist in war games, they are not those of which Clausewitz speaks. A roll of the dice
is simply that. To say it simulates unmodeled portions of reality is going too far.
The most one can say is that there are physical forces at play on the die itself that
players cannot calculate and therefore cannot predict. This is different from ad-
mitting one does not understand all the complexities of a real battlefield. Thus,
we cannot approach the results of a war game as a military critic would the out-
come of a real battle or campaign. Results of a war game cannot be used to fill in
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analytical blanks in the way Clausewitz describes, nor can theory or judgment be
derived from them in the way historians do from real events.
Nevertheless, we can ascribe a certain significance to war-game outcomes. If
the game is run according to a specific set of rules and those rules constitute a
valid distilled simulation of reality, outcomes of individual “moves” or entire
games can yield useful knowledge. To understand when this can be the case, we
need to understand the difference between rigidly assessed and freely assessed war
games. We describe as “rigidly assessed” those games that proceed strictly ac-
cording to rules governing movement, detection, and combat. Such games pro-
duce situations governed by player decisions, the rules, and combat-results
tables (manual or computerized). Assuming the absence of artifacts and within
the limitations of dice rolls, we can in such a case ascribe significance to game, or
even move, outcomes. The game goes where the rules take it; if the rules and the
combat-resolution tables are good representations of reality, the outcome con-
stitutes artificial military history, and one can usefully work backward from out-
comes and look for reasons. This would be so whether the game is played by
hand around a board or at computer workstations. Inputs are generated, and
these, by means of a known system, produce results that cannot be predicted or
influenced. The game goes where it goes.
Freely assessed games are somewhat different epistemological animals. In
these, the flow of the game is governed by umpires and game directors. Instead
of following game rules, players make plans and decisions as they would in real
life, more or less, and umpires, collecting the interacting moves of all the players,
translate them into force movements, detections, and combat results. The um-
pires may be aided by computers. The key difference is that the game’s progress,
including move results, are governed by the objectives of the game’s sponsors,
the time available, and sometimes the conflicting interests of stakeholders. Con-
trol may determine that a certain set of conditions must occur at a specific point
if the game’s objectives are to be met. This is most commonly the case in educa-
tional games, but it can also occur in research games. In such a case, Control de-
fines in operational game terms the needed conditions, looks at the situation at
the end of the previous move, and then figures out what—within the bounds of
plausibility, given the players’ new moves—must have happened in order to get
from that situation to the desired condition.
That is, the umpires deduce tactical outcomes, the necessary inputs, by work-
ing backward from a set of desired results. This fact does not negate the validity
or value of the game, but it does mean that its outcome does not have the same
analytical weight as that of a rigidly assessed game. Freely assessed games can be
valuable for discovery purposes—perceiving relationships or finding defects in
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plans—but they cannot be used to see “who would win.” Similarly, they cannot be
regarded as artificial military history to the same extent as rigidly assessed games.
MONTE CARLO VERSUS DETERMINISTIC COMBAT RESULTS
A Naval War College elective course on war-gaming theory and practice recently
designed and played an instructional board game. In the course of it, a Blue
player exclaimed in frustration, “This is a dice game, not a capabilities game!”
His observation was trenchant as well as accurate. In the game—which com-
bined various types of dice and combat-results tables—a small Red force had
just hammered a larger Blue fleet after four or five very lucky die rolls. The rules
had attempted to reflect lower Red strength by awarding hits only on rolls of one
or two on a ten-sided die, but five consecutive rolls of one or two now produced
a David-slaying-Goliath result. How does one deal with such an outcome?
As we have seen, there are several reasons to roll dice—that is, to use Monte
Carlo methods to produce uncertainty in outcomes. Perhaps the best reason is
to simulate real-world phenomena that are in fact probabilistic. Some good ex-
amples are certain types of radar detections and the reliability of weapons sys-
tems. Epistemologically, there are few reasons to object to such an application of
probabilistic simulation.
Another reason to roll the dice is to represent the aggregate performance of
complicated systems that are at least partially dependent on human perfor-
mance. If, for instance, we assign an 80 percent probability of a hit by an antiship
missile and its purely mechanical reliability is on the order of 99 percent, the
other 19 percent of uncertainty would consist of such things as operator error
and, perhaps, brilliant maneuvering by the target ship. Here, epistemologically
speaking, we start to get a bit uneasy, because the moment probability enters
into the picture, we introduce the possibility of very-low-probability occur-
rences, such as the string of lucky rolls by Red just mentioned. Could such a
thing happen? Of course it could—anything is possible—but we must ask our-
selves if such an ascription of exceptional human incompetence or brilliance has
any place in the intellectual architecture of game objectives. On some level, we
may accept the validity of the knowledge produced by such simulation method-
ology, but the student’s complaint haunts us: Is it a dice game or a capabilities
game? To put it differently, does the introduction of Monte Carlo methodology
distort the intellectual structure of the game?
We have previously asserted that it is not valid to substitute dice rolls for
unmodeled aspects of reality. Here we see one reason why—that luck in dice
rolling is a special phenomenon in itself. The actual likelihood of unmodeled
factors all lining up in a way that would be represented by rolling five ones or
twos in a row is likely to be far smaller than the roughly three-in-ten-thousand
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odds of such a string of rolls. It would be different if we contemplated a hundred
or even a thousand iterations of the game; by looking at the most frequent out-
comes, we might then place the “outliers” in their proper perspective. This is
done in campaign analyses via computer simulations; scenarios are iterated very
many times at high speed to produce a population of results that are subject to
statistical reduction. However, most war games are conducted once, and thus the
impact of outlying results arising from the peculiarity of Monte Carlo methods
must be considered. What validity should we ascribe to a web of human deci-
sions impacted by quirky dice rolls? From this point of view, it appears that in-
valid Monte Carlo methods can produce game artifacts.
The obvious alternative to Monte Carlo simulation is deterministic calcula-
tion, using algorithms. Playing pieces are assigned numbers to represent their
capabilities on offense, defense, and perhaps other aspects of combat power.
Combat-result tables based on some predetermined formula are consulted to
determine outcomes. One simply compares offensive points to defensive points
to find a ratio and enters the table with that ratio to look up the result. Every
time that ratio arises, the same result ensues. For this methodology, game valid-
ity is a function of the accuracy with which the embedded algorithms describe
real combat interactions. In a deterministic game, neither human idiocy nor
brilliance exists, below the level of the game player; the impact of player deci-
sions is sharply highlighted. This leads us back to the axiom that games should
model reality with as much fidelity as possible without masking the phenomena
we are trying to elucidate.
STRATEGY AND EFFECTS
Clausewitz extended his Kritik from the tactical and operational levels into the
realm of strategy through the device of concentric analytic rings. He undertook
to analyze and critique the decision of Napoleon Bonaparte (then a general in
the field, under the French Directory) to make the peace of Campo Formio by
examining the wider strategic context in stages, working from narrower to wider
views. In other words, he examined the context for Napoleon’s northern Italy
campaign to ascertain whether the latter’s decision to make peace with the Aus-
trians when and where he did was justified.11 Such analysis might be possible in
war games, but the analyst must decide whether the strategic context of the game
was established with sufficient detail and realism to stand as a criterion for judg-
ment. Operational-level war games are frequently accompanied by unrealistic
or truncated strategic contexts, in order to allow the fighting called for by game
objectives to take place. Assessments of operational decision quality or utility
based on such strategic criteria are likely to be invalid.
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As an example, the Naval War College’s Global War Game series (played an-
nually from 1979 until 2001) focused on rapid, operational-level decision mak-
ing, supported in later years by an advanced, networked collaboration
environment and computer-analysis tools.12 In 2000 the scenario featured a
brink-of-war situation in which Blue players had to generate high “speed of
command” in the conflict’s first exchanges in order to avoid catastrophic casual-
ties. The national-level command apparatus was played by Control, which as-
signed the role to a small cell of subject-matter experts. Pressure from the game’s
directorship resulted in quick, streamlined, and aggressive decision making by
this cell (also recall the player aggressiveness artifact mentioned previously), al-
lowing operational-level players to preempt and gain a smashing victory. The
postgame judgment was that network-enabled speed of command was a very
good thing.13 However, in fact, the strategic-level command apparatus context
had been so unrealistic as to invalidate any such assessment. In any case, games
that incorporate detailed play at both the strategic and operational levels are
uncommon, for a number of reasons, including the practical matter that free
play at the strategic level tends to constrain or disrupt operational-level
processes.
Strategic games have a long history, and they can produce knowledge as valid
as that from games at the operational and tactical levels. It is possible to explore
the strategic conflict environment in order to discern relationships between fac-
tors, including the structure of incentives that influence players. Sometimes
these games are used as background for subsequent operational-level games. If
so, consistency must be achieved between the scenarios, orders of battle, and
player assumptions of the various games, or it will not be possible to relate their
outcomes to each other—they will be “apples and oranges.” Moreover, analysts
must rigorously identify artifacts in the first game in order to prevent them from
affecting player decisions or analysis in following games.
There is yet another issue related to strategic context and critical analysis that
must be considered—“effects-based operations,” or EBO. This concept, which is
permeating the U.S. military lexicon today, has been an aspect of war gaming for
the last few years. EBO focuses on the second- and higher-order effects of mili-
tary actions, with an eye toward making these actions more effective and avoid-
ing adverse side effects, in terms of broader purposes. At the tactical and
operational levels, the prediction of battle effects is reasonably straightforward,
at least in the physical realm. Consequently, assessing war-game move outcomes
when players are using EBO planning methods is fairly straightforward. Even
“moral” effects at these levels are possible to assess; for instance, units that are
outflanked tend to lose cohesion, and generals faced with the cutting of main
supply routes can be expected to withdraw their forces to avoid encirclement.14
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However, at the strategic level, the degrees of freedom proliferate, and assess-
ment of possible effects on populations and on national leaders is highly prob-
lematic.15 If it is difficult in real war, as has been proven time and again, it is
doubly hard in war games, which look to an uncertain future.
There is an epistemological solution. It lies in understanding that while war
games are not crystal balls, they can highlight the relationships between factors.
We could, for example, decide to explore the political terrain of war termination
under given mind-sets or policies of the enemy leadership. Game designers
would “script” a set of presumed conditions faced by enemy leadership—per-
sonal proclivities, influence distribution among top leadership, and the like—
establishing a “moral context” for strategic decision making. Players would
role-play and umpires assess strategic effects strictly within this context. Such a
game would have a chance at generating indicative information concerning, say,
the relationship between the course of one’s own offensive operations and the
willingness of an enemy leadership to negotiate. Iterative gaming involving dif-
ferent internal enemy conditions would at the very least prove educational.
COMPARING WAR GAMES
A large military organization with a mission of experimentation and concept
development once developed a system for synthesizing the data gained from
multiple war games so that it could capitalize upon the considerable investment
in gaming by the services. The key to the system was correlation; the more fre-
quently a particular result emerged, the more weight was ascribed to it.
Epistemologically, there is potential validity to this approach, but it was imple-
mented in a way that had serious defects. First, the system essentially captured
and digested the comments of senior and experienced subject-matter experts
who participated in the games and interpreted their results. However, that in ef-
fect reduced games to BOGSATs; the system processed people’s opinions, not
game results (i.e., plans, decisions, and move assessments). Second, since the
same senior folks tend to be invited to games, one after another, an expert with a
particular outlook or agenda is likely to make very similar comments at each
game, thus lending these “findings” artificial weight. It is easy enough to pick
apart such a correlation system, but less easy to establish a sound way of compar-
ing results of different war games.
Experienced gamers, for instance, quite naturally on the basis of running
many games, derive rules of thumb and gaming techniques; also, a number of
phenomena tend to occur in similar and consistent ways even in games of very
different kinds. One example is the tendency of players to “fight the scenario”—
that is, to object to certain aspects of the game’s story line, structure, or orders of
battle and use these objections to hedge against the possibility of “losing.” Such
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underlying commonalities with respect to game process can lead gamers to as-
sume that equivalent commonalities exist in terms of game substance. They be-
lieve that they can derive on that basis, in an essentially correlative way,
synthesized lessons from the substantive outputs of multiple games. But such an
attempt is intellectually unsupportable, on several grounds.
First, unless games are specifically designed to be analyzed in conjunction
with other games, there are almost certain to be differences in objectives and de-
sign so fundamental as to prevent it. For instance, imagine two games producing
results that, taken together, point to an apparent vulnerability of the littoral
combat ship (LCS)—in
both games several of
that ship type are sunk.
Closer scrutiny reveals,
however, that whereas in
one game the objective
was indeed to examine the utility of the LCS in littoral warfare, with consequent
close attention in move assessment to ship defenses, the other was meant to ex-
plore maritime command and control processes, with assessments focusing on
the handling of various kinds of reports and orders by the C2 system. In the lat-
ter game, umpires in fact imposed ship losses specifically in order to generate re-
ports and command responses. To attach significance to the fact that several LCSs
were lost in both games distorts conclusions, since in the second game at least
some of the losses were “artificial.” This example is a bit contrived, in order to
define the issue clearly; in reality, many games appear to offer numerous oppor-
tunities for comparison, because their methods and outputs appear compara-
ble. Even then, however, there can exist subtle, disabling differences.
A second reason why correlation of seemingly similar events in different
games fails at the substantive level (even inside the scenario) arises from the very
nature of gaming. Games are not reality, and players are likely to do things they
simply would not do in reality. A common manifestation, as previously dis-
cussed, is inadvertently leaving important forces unprotected, to be knocked off
by the enemy. Controllers and umpires, however, rarely identify such instances,
making it almost impossible to go back after the game and determine when this
tendency was in play.
What then can be gleaned from comparing multiple games? First, we must re-
member what games can reliably produce: knowledge about the nature of a war-
fare problem, such as potential flaws in a plan, the potential importance of
geographic features, gaps in command and control, logistical needs, etc. The fa-
miliar metaphor of blind men feeling around an elephant tells us that multiple
games, almost regardless of their individual methodologies, can contribute
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incrementally to the understanding of a particular warfare problem. That prob-
lem may be a specific scenario, such as a war on the Korean Peninsula, or it may
be a function, like close air support. If we avoid attaching significance to the
number of times something happens, we can derive epistemologically sound
knowledge. We can collect anecdotes of various game happenings, lessons
learned, and analyses, to be pieced together into a more complete, qualitative
understanding of the issue in which we are interested. In one game we may learn
that command and control arrangements for close air support are flawed, in an-
other that certain types of preferred weapons are in short supply. These specific
outcomes can be combined to form a picture of the “elephant.”
LISTENING TO WHISPERS
Our general thrust to this point has been to identify limitations on what can be
said to have been learned from a war game. Still, there is an epistemological rea-
son to wrest from a game all the valid knowledge it has to offer. If it is easy to over-
state what was learned from a game, it is also easy to ignore what it did produce—
all too easy, if that information or knowledge is either subtle or somehow threat-
ening. Such information, being tempting to dismiss, might be called “whispers.”
We have seen that the results of a war game are in the eyes of the beholder
(player or analyst), because of conditionality. That is, game-generated knowl-
edge, being merely indicative in itself, must be combined with judgment in or-
der to have useful predictive value. But such application of judgment is rarely
easy or straightforward. For example, in war games at the Naval War College in
the 1920s and ’30s, despite the repeated indications of the importance of the
Mariana, Caroline, and Marshall island groups—then known as the Mandated
Islands—as intermediate logistics bases in any campaign to relieve the Philip-
pines and defeat Japan, it took many years for the U.S. Navy to abandon fully the
idea of mounting a direct thrust on the Philippines from Pearl Harbor.16 The
games, apparently, were telling officers things many did not want to hear. Condi-
tional knowledge can be a slippery thing. Games are complex affairs that almost
always produce more information than their designers intended to generate.
Moreover, game results are often equivocal, open to interpretation.
The subjective nature of game-produced knowledge is nowhere clearer than
in games that generate information that is bureaucratically or politically threaten-
ing to players or sponsors. It is all too easy either to ignore or put a favorable spin
on game events or results that do not fit comfortably into existing doctrines or
accepted theories. A notable historical example of this phenomenon was a war
game conducted by the Japanese Combined Fleet staff prior to the Midway op-
eration. Historians have made much of the fact that the umpires resurrected a
Japanese carrier that had been sunk by American aircraft operating out of
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Midway, citing it as evidence of “victory disease.” In fact, however, the Japanese
umpires were perfectly justified—a dice roll had given a highly improbable hit to
level-flying bombers (that is, as opposed to dive-bombers), which had proven
generally ineffective in attacking ships. They were properly attempting to pre-
vent a capabilities game from becoming a dice game. However, at another point
during the game it was asked what would happen if an American carrier task
force ambushed Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo’s carrier force while it was raid-
ing Midway, and that uncomfortable question seems to have been ignored. The
existing plan was based on deception and surprise, tenets and war-fighting val-
ues dear to the Imperial Japanese Navy. To acknowledge the existence of an
American task force northeast of Midway in a position to ambush Nagumo’s
carriers would have been to discount the possibility of surprise. The Japanese plan-
ners simply did not want to admit that—it would have negated their plans, and
there was no time to start again from scratch. At the very least the game should have
suggested more extensive searches in that sector, but the plan was not modified
even to that extent. It was easier to ignore this particular game outcome.17
The “whispers” phenomenon has important implications for war-gaming
policy. As the Japanese example shows, players and sponsors are almost never
objective about their games. Games are played in a setting of institutional impera-
tives, such as budget justification, or the need to affirm a service’s foundational
theory and doctrine (“airpower is decisive,” “the infantryman is the ultimate
strategic weapon,” and so on). Moreover, as in the Japanese case, games may be
linked in some way to imminent deadlines. All of these factors tend to deaden ears
to the whispers. But these whispers are frequently the most important outcomes
of war gaming. How can an organization increase its ability to hear them?
The key is objective, disinterested sponsorship, or at least analysis. A sponsor-
ing organization (the agency that “gives,” or initiates, the game, as distinct from
the facility that stages it) cannot realistically be relied upon, especially if con-
strained by time, political imperatives, or the dictates of theory and doctrine, to
hear whispers from its own games. A frequent alternative is the use of civilian
contractors; the difficulty is that contractors, paid for their services and gener-
ally hoping for follow-on contracts, have a built-in incentive, regardless of the
talent or intellectual integrity of the individuals and companies involved, to tell
sponsors what they want to hear, or at least not press them to hear whispers. An-
other option is academia. The service colleges frequently perform this role, and
each has a war-gaming center. These facilities, however, must have a sufficient
degree of autonomy—specifically, protection from firing of personnel or other
sanctions for games that produce uncomfortable results. The gaming depart-
ments themselves must incorporate a culture of rigorous intellectual objectivity
and commitment to the discipline of war gaming.
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Finally, the results of war games must receive proper handling. Perhaps most
importantly, the heads of sponsoring organizations must commit themselves to
receiving game results directly and personally from gaming organizations, and
not after filtering and sanitizing by their own staffs.
A GUILD OF WAR GAMERS
In professional war gaming the stakes are high. Not only do games cost money
and time, but their results can influence important operational and program-
matic decisions. This holds true for the business as well as military worlds. Many
organizations conduct war games, and even more consume their results, but few
if any individuals involved have rigorous understanding of whether the games
produce valid knowledge. As we have seen, it is entirely possible for games to
produce valid-looking garbage. It is not easy to distinguish error from insight; it
can be accomplished only if game design, execution, and analysis are conducted
with discipline and rigor, and according to principles like those outlined here.
Even then, however, wheat cannot be sifted from chaff with consistency and con-
fidence unless another step is taken.
War gaming is currently a craft. There are a few highly experienced and
skilled game designers and directors “out there,” and these individuals each op-
erate by rules of thumb they have learned over the years. Approaches vary. A
large war game might be proclaimed a success by sponsors but at the same time
be criticized severely—in private—by players, observers, and analysts. Who is
right? What is missing is a universal set of standards, an accepted body of knowl-
edge, such as established academic disciplines possess. In the “hard” sciences,
even the social sciences, there is less room for charlatanism and sloppiness. Prac-
titioners there have frameworks for understanding their disciplines and becom-
ing credentialed in them. War gaming needs the same if it is to warrant the
resources invested in holding games and the confidence routinely vested in their
results. Such a step is all the more important today in light of the changing na-
ture of warfare and the concomitantly receding utility of traditional
force-on-force gaming techniques. “Fourth-generation warfare” blends politics,
mass media, global information flows, culture, and religion, with combat in a
highly complex way; games attempting to simulate it can lead to catastrophic in-
tellectual error if not conducted under the aegis of a sound, overarching
framework.
The substrate for founding a gaming discipline exists. The nation’s war and
staff colleges all have war-gaming departments whose directors have profes-
sional contact with each other and with key figures in the wider war-gaming
world. Certain academic institutions, notably the Naval Postgraduate School,
teach courses in war gaming. These organizations could come together in a
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“guild” of sorts to establish standards and promote the formalization and
professionalization of a war-gaming discipline. This professional society, in ef-
fect, could draw members from outside the military, such as business and acade-
mia, whose contributions would universalize standards and add vitality. The
society might publish a professional journal, with refereed articles. All this is
necessary if war-game output is to merit a level of epistemological confidence
commensurate with the uses made of it.
Valid knowledge can emerge from war games, but only if due diligence is ap-
plied. That diligence is considerably hampered today because war gaming is a
craft or an art, not a true profession, a discipline. Much more work must be
done. Those who believe in the value of games must now link up and work to-
ward the goal of truly professional war gaming.
NOTE S
1. For background on the theory and practice of
war gaming, see Robert C. Rubel, “War-
Gaming Network-centric Warfare,” Naval
War College Review 54, no. 2 (Spring 2001),
pp. 61–74.
2. Peter P. Perla, The Art of Wargaming: A Guide
for Professionals and Hobbyists (Annapolis,
Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1990), p. 164.
3. F. Heylighen, C. Joslyn, and V. Turchin, eds.,
Principia Cybernetica Web (Brussels: Principia
Cybernetica, 1995), available at pespmc1.vub
.ac.be/EPISTEMI.html.
4. S.[tewart] Schlesinger et al., “Terminology
for Model Credibility,” Simulation 32, no. 3
(1979), pp. 103–104.
5. Right and wrong are not absolute terms. For
the purpose of this discussion, “right” means
a decision the likely outcome of which has
envisioned benefits for the decision maker.
Clearly, even “right” decisions could result in
failure due to bad luck (statistically speaking)
or the intervention of imponderable factors.
6. John T. Hanley, On Wargaming (dissertation,
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Mich.;
University Microfilms International, 1991),
p. 13.
7. Ibid., pp. 19–25.
8. Peter Perla, Michael Markowitz, and Christopher
Weuve, Game-Based Experimentation for Re-
search in Command and Control and Shared
Situational Awareness, CRM D0006277.A1/
Final (Alexandria, Va.: Center for Naval
Analyses, 2002). This document reports on
the Naval War College’s Scud Hunt experi-
ment and offers some excellent prescriptions
for achieving additional progress in game-
based C2 experimentation.
9. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans.
Peter Paret and Michael Howard (Princeton,
N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1976), p. 156.
10. Ibid., p. 167.
11. Ibid., pp. 159–61. The Treaty of Campo
Formio of 17 October 1707 between France
and Austria produced, aside from various ter-
ritorial annexations and guarantees of sup-
port, the latter’s retirement from the War of
the First Coalition (1793–97, originally pitting
Austria, Prussia, Great Britain, Spain, Sar-
dinia, and the Netherlands against France).
12. For the Global games see Rubel, “War-Gaming
Network-centric Warfare”; Kenneth Watman,
“Global 2000,” Naval War College Review 54,
no. 2 (Spring 2001), pp. 75–88; Bud Hay and
Bob Gile, Global War Game: The First Five
Years, Newport Paper 4 (Newport, R.I.: Naval
War College Press, 1993); and Robert H. Gile,
Global War Game: Second Series, 1984–1988,
Newport Paper 20 (Newport, R.I.: Naval War
College Press, 2004).
13. Global 2000 Network-centric Warfare: Gaming
the Navy Capstone Concept for Operations in
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the Information Age (Newport, R.I.: Naval
War College, December 2000). The report of-
fers glowing endorsements of networked
speed of command. The assessment of the
national command authority play is that of
the author, who was an observer during the
game. See also Watman, “Global 2000.”
14. Clausewitz, On War, p. 137. Clausewitz talks
extensively and explicitly in On War about ef-
fects, except with much greater lucidity than
is commonly found in the current literature,
which is riddled with unsupported assertions
and esoteric jargon.
15. Ibid., p. 178. A brief passage is referred to,
but Clausewitz devotes considerable space to
the difficulties of strategy, extolling its suc-
cessful practitioners precisely because of the
many imponderables at the strategic level.
16. Edwin Miller, War Plan Orange: The U.S.
Strategy to Defeat Japan 1897–1945 (Annap-
olis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1991), p. 168.
Miller describes in this passage some of the
Newport war games that indicated the folly of
attempting to sail the U.S. fleet directly from
Hawaii to the Philippines. However, despite
these results, the “thrusters,” who advocated
such a strategy, held sway until the mid-1930s.
17. Mitsuo Fuchida, Midway: The Battle That
Doomed Japan (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Insti-
tute Press, 1955), pp. 96–97.
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Art Cebrowski put it this way: “We live between two great chapters of humanhistory, in the messy interspaces between the industrial age we are leaving
and the information age we are entering. This time, however, the transition is oc-
curring much faster and it is far more global. Military affairs, military competi-
tion, and the stakes of military competition are in the balance.”
Vice Admiral Arthur K. Cebrowski (U.S. Navy, Ret.), former President of the
Naval War College, former director of the Office of Force Transformation (in the
Office of the Secretary of Defense), N-6 on the Navy Staff, J-6 on the Joint Staff,
carrier battle group commander, aircraft carrier commander, and naval aviator,
passed away on 12 November 2005. He joins the pantheon of American military
innovators, along with George Patton, Hyman Rickover, and Billy Mitchell. He
was the prime intellectual architect of U.S. military
transformation and network-centric warfare.
In 2001, shortly before the terrorists attacked the
World Trade Center and the Pentagon, Cebrowski
accepted Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s
request to join his office as Director, Office of Force
Transformation. He served in that position for nearly
four years, leaving because the cancer that was to de-
feat him several months later had now so wounded
him that he was no longer, he believed, able to help
transform the U.S. military. He saw this last position
as a culmination and a fulcrum. It culminated his
personal intellectual efforts over the four previous
James Blaker is currently a vice president at Science Ap-
plications International, Inc. He previously served in
the Department of Defense as the Senior Advisor to the
Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense (policy analysis); Deputy Under-
secretary of the Air Force; and Personal Representative
of the Secretary of Defense at the Mutual Balanced
Force Reduction negotiations with the Soviet Union.
Mr. Blaker, who served as a company-grade infantry of-
ficer in the U.S. Army, has also been vice president of the
Hudson Institute and a department director at the Cen-
ter for Naval Analyses. He collaborated with Vice Ad-
miral Cebrowski on a book draft about U.S. military
transformation until shortly before the latter’s death.
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decades to explain military force and to reconcile its destructive violence with
morality. It was a fulcrum, he believed, from which he could help lever the U.S.
military to greater effectiveness in the new age. “We would be wrong to let our
current military dominance lull us into arrogance or lethargy,” he would say.
“We should choose to transform what is today the world’s most powerful mili-
tary. We should accelerate some of the changes that are emerging. We should
push—more rapidly, strongly, and diligently than we have—the potential capa-
bilities that technology opens into the way we organize, structure, train, and use
the U.S. military. We should do this for the sake of our children, their children,
and their children’s children. And we should do it because it is morally correct.”
CEBROWSKI’S CAREER
Cebrowski retired from the Navy in August 2001 as the Navy’s senior vice admi-
ral, stepping down from the presidency of the Naval War College in Newport,
Rhode Island. He had served in the Navy for almost thirty-seven years after re-
ceiving his commission through the Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps, or
NROTC, upon graduating from Villanova University. The general course of his
Navy career was set just prior to graduating, for in 1963 Admiral Hyman
Rickover, father and then absolute ruler of the American nuclear submarine
force, conducted his annual survey to find the NROTC members getting the
highest marks in science and mathematics. Cebrowski’s name popped up.
Rickover invited him to interview for the elite nuclear community he was put-
ting together. “Rickover was just a name I’d read in Time magazine, I had no un-
derstanding of who he was at the time, and here he was asking me to come to
Washington on a Saturday,” Cebrowski recalled. “So, I sent back a polite note
saying thanks, but I was busy. This was, of course, before my commissioning and
before I had any real experience with the intricacies of military protocol. To me
at that time, admirals were some exalted, mythical beings who had nothing at all
to do with ensigns. As far as I was concerned the pinnacle of the Navy was the
captain who headed the NROTC detachment at Villanova.” Rickover was not
amused by Midshipman Cebrowski’s polite regrets and called the captain to in-
quire, in his inimitable way, what was amiss in the captain’s detachment. “I re-
member the captain’s face when he asked in a voice louder than normal if I knew
who the Admiral was and just what did I want to do in the Navy now that there
was no way I could ever have a successful Navy career. Remembering the captain
was an aviator, I replied [that] with all due respect to Admiral Rickover, or what-
ever his name was, I had always wanted to fly Navy jets, thus setting my Navy ca-
reer for many of the next thirty years.”
He flew 154 combat missions during two tours in Vietnam in the 1960s, al-
most all of them over North Vietnam. “I focused on two things then: completing
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the missions and getting back alive,” he would tell his wife. It was an early intro-
duction to the military challenge of striking the correct balance between central
control and individual discretion and to the dangers of focusing on military
problems too narrowly. Reminiscing in 2004, he related an example of the
challenge:
I remember an apocryphal story circulating through the fleet in the 1960s. Those
were the early days of dodging SAMs [surface-to-air missiles], and some credited the
missiles with extraordinary power, sometimes referring to them as a new kind of
death ray. Navy intelligence had discovered a limitation to the missiles, however.
They had difficulty locking onto aircraft flying below about eight hundred feet [of]
altitude. The solution down the chain was clear: reduce the missile threat by flying
low. For a while, the pilots did as directed, and the losses to the SAMs went down.
But our overall loss rate went up sharply, not because the missiles got better but be-
cause the eight-hundred-foot operating altitude made it so much easier for the Viet-
namese antiaircraft gunners. For us aviators, the short-lived quandary was how to
balance the need to follow central direction with what we experienced at the tactical
level. Ours was a pretty straightforward perspective. As long as the prospect of get-
ting shot down was a function of both missiles and gunfire, we were going to do
things that tried to reduce the probability of both. We were after a higher level of
truth, if you will, even if it seemed more complicated.
Cebrowski came out of his Vietnam experiences with some combat axioms.
“One was to beware the narrow view; try always to look beyond the immediate
issue and see it as part of a larger problem. Always start with the assumption that
your opponent is not dumb. And always value the perspectives of the individual
warriors. No one learns as quickly as someone being shot at, and usually no one
in senior headquarters is being shot at.” He believed strongly that the Navy ap-
plies these axioms pretty well. “It tells its people what to do and not how to do it.
It’s the officers’ job to understand this and get those they lead to implement or-
ders without denigrating or ignoring the insights of their subordinates who
were carrying them out.” But he also believed an officer was obligated to keep his
or her seniors from issuing unfortunate or uninformed orders. “If he fails in
that, his next job is to see to it that they are not carried out in unfortunate or un-
informed ways. This is a moral dimension that distinguishes the American mili-
tary from others,” he said. “It places value on honesty and on maintaining the
flow of information throughout the chain of command. That moral dimension
is, as it should be, a driving factor in the new American way of war. And as I grew
to understand during my career in the military, it applies to how we ought to
think about and build military capabilities, too.”
In the 1970s and 1980s he moved upward through the naval aviator’s levels of
command. Not all of it involved flying. “In the early 1970s, I got interested in
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large-scale integrated circuits—computer chips. I saw the chips as technical mar-
vels, because, unlike the older vacuum tubes, they didn’t generate much heat. Vac-
uum tubes did. That made them fail. But you could never be very sure when they
would. You could predict more accurately when the chips would fail. And you
could increase their use without a proportional increase in their potential failure
rates. That meant a reduction of technical risk. Lower technical risk meant you
didn’t have to have as many backups. At the individual aircraft level, for example,
that meant more capability and improved reliability at less cost, risk, and weight.”
He thought large-scale integrated circuits had stra-
tegic importance, that they could help deal with mili-
tary complexity. “My experience had come from
flying combat aircraft. While I did it well enough to
stay alive, I never saw myself as one of those ‘naturals’
who seem to fly almost effortlessly. To me, it took a lot
of effort to fly through air defenses, maneuvering
quickly to present as unpredictable a target as possible,
watch for the flak patterns and missiles, locate the tar-
get, getting the approach right, timing the bomb drop,
and then getting out. It was a complex situation, and
success depended on manipulating that complexity—
making it as complex as I could to the defenders with-
out missing the target. Transistors and the large-scale
integrated circuits they built promised to shift some of
the complexity to the aircraft and the weapons it car-
ried. The military that could do that on a large scale, I
thought, would have an edge. It could lead to a strategic advantage, an ability to
shift the terrible burden of warfare complexity and the risks it carried away from
you onto your opponent.”
Yet it was clear that the transition from technical promise to strategic effect
was anything but automatic. In the 1970s advances in military technology came
largely from taxpayer-funded research and development. But Cebrowski real-
ized that the military was not coming up with uses for large-scale integrated cir-
cuit technology—the civilian sector was. The promises that the technology
brought were one thing; converting those promises to military effectiveness was
another. Could it be that technology was only an initial step and that the military
had within it structural, organizational, and cultural barriers to bringing techni-
cal promise to fruition? “Thirty years ago I began to think the answer was yes.
But then it was an ill-formed answer, without much related thought about the
question that answer framed: So, what are you going to do about it? I started to
develop some answers to this difficult question over the next two decades.”
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One assignment involved research on how the F-14 could defend the fleet
against waves of Soviet Tu-22 Backfire bombers, which the Navy then saw as a
key threat. The analysis compared the theoretically best way of using the aircraft
with what exercise data indicated could actually occur in an attack on a U.S. car-
rier battle group. The theory said a central air controller with perfect under-
standing of the defense scheme, excellent understanding of what was occurring
in the airspace a hundred miles around the aircraft carrier, and perfect commu-
nications would always be able to mount the most effective defense. Equations
demonstrated this, as did supporting simulations.
But exercise data indicated that sometimes a squadron of F-14s operating without a
central air controller was more effective in intercepting and destroying attackers than
what the algorithms said centralized control could provide. The data said several pi-
lots, each with only part of the engagement picture, could do better than a single air
controller could with a perfect, full picture. We wanted to see why this happened. It
turned out to be my introduction to the potential power of self-synchronization.
We found that the information the pilots got from communicating with each other
produced better results than following directions from a central control point. Even
if none of them had as much information as a central controller, the pilots could
build a rich, operational knowledge of what was going on. And they added nuances,
depth, and correlations to the information they passed back and forth, in effect
building a common appreciation that was, literally, greater than the sum of the bits
of information each contributed.
Involved here, he concluded, were different ways of dealing with the complex-
ity of armed conflict generally. One approach was the classic military solution—
concentrate information in a central point so that greatest of all computers, the
human mind, could make sense of it and direct the defenders accordingly. “The
other was to do the processing in parallel, using the minds of all the defenders
with less comprehensive information and letting them self-synchronize to cut
through the complexity. I think that was the beginning of my views on the value
of pushing information and decision authority down in the military, some-
thing I knew went against the traditional view of how militaries are supposed
to work.”
In 1981, the Navy established the Strategic Studies Group at the Naval War
College and sent a handful of carefully selected captains and commanders to it
for a year of strategic thinking, discussion, and research. It selected “war fight-
ers,”people whose careers had for the most part kept them in the fleet, away from
the Washington, D.C., arena of budget fights, program management, and poli-
tics. These were officers who had done well enough in their first decade and a
half of service to emerge as prospective flag officers. Cebrowski was the youngest
B L A K E R 1 3 3
T:\Academic\NWC Review\NWC Review Spring 2006\Ventura\NWC Review Spring 2006.vp
Tuesday, April 11, 2006 8:22:53 AM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
139
Naval War College: Full Spring 2006 Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2006
member of the first class. He joined another young commander, a submariner
named Bill Owens, destined to lead the American “revolution in military affairs”
as the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the mid-1990s. As the lowest-
ranking and youngest members of the select group, Cebrowski and Owens
formed a friendship based on three shared perspectives: first, that change in mil-
itary affairs was essential; second, that it was not going to come easily; and third,
that therefore, the logic for changing had to be solid and its articulation
relentless.
Following the year at Newport, Cebrowski returned to the fleet in a series of
command positions. He commanded a carrier air wing, then a helicopter carrier,
and then an aircraft carrier during Operation DESERT STORM. After promotion
to rear admiral in 1992, he took over a carrier battle group.
Those assignments let me observe and fly the F/A-18. It was an epiphany of sorts. It
was the first aircraft I piloted that really flew itself, letting you focus on your mission
rather than trying to control the airplane. And the information that was available to
the pilot in the cockpit was so much better. To me, the F-18 represented a shift from
the physical to the information and the cognitive realms. The limit on what the pilot
could do was no longer a matter of physical strength or reflexes. The real limit was
the level of awareness and knowledge the pilot had of both the mission and of the en-
vironment in which he operated. That awareness turned on the information flowing
from parts of the aircraft, what the pilot could see from the aircraft, and—this was
the big change—from what other pilots or sensors could see far beyond. That was the
revelation. It was no longer the airplane or its pilot that counted the most; it was
what the pilot could do as part of a networked environment.
By the time he returned to the Pentagon in 1994, he had developed some gen-
eral assumptions about military innovation. “I realized that military competi-
tion wasn’t about how fast one could align with reality but how fast one could
leap over it and create a new reality. I spent the next ten years trying to figure out
how to do that. I was never fully successful, because I couldn’t align my own in-
tellectual compass fast enough. The world was changing too rapidly, and the
changes were digging down into the foundations of society—into basic assump-
tions and what we had accepted as rules. Information technology was driving a lot
of it. But I increasingly thought the kind of changes we all felt were diastrophic—
that we were in the midst of a shift to a new age.”
It was his deep interest in the moral nexus with military power that distin-
guished Cebrowski and his thought. His focus stemmed from a set of personal
beliefs in which his reading of Augustine, Aquinas, and the Jesuit John Courtney
Murray were prominent. He was firmly in the American pragmatist tradition
and had studied just-war theory—because, as he once explained, his profession
had brought him in direct contact with the dilemma of how to use violence
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morally. “How to draw the line between the moral and immoral use of military
force is a constant companion to those in the military profession; we wrestle
with it throughout our careers. Most of us are acutely attuned to the moral need
to avoid bringing violence to bear on the innocent.”
Cebrowski was convinced that the American military stood on the threshold
of an explosion of information, knowledge, and understanding of warfare, as
well as, and most importantly, greater precision in waging it. “All that had great
moral seductiveness,” he said. “It promised to make it easier to protect the inno-
cent in using the great destructive power of the U.S. military.”
For most of the 1990s, Cebrowski was at the center of the military’s growing
interest in the digital information era, increasingly trying to push the edge of
that interest beyond conventional wisdom. In the mid-1990s, as Director of
Command, Control, Communications, and Computers on the Joint Staff (J-6),
he joined Owens, now the vice chairman, in contending that information tech-
nology challenged many of the precepts of American military thinking, suggest-
ing that information could substitute for mass and pushing for radical
force-structure changes. Most of Cebrowski’s military colleagues agreed that in-
formation technology was of growing significance. Many could also accept that
information technology was changing military capabilities. DESERT STORM was
still reverberating through the military in the mid-1990s; while the U.S. victory
there had come from overwhelming force, senior military professionals appreci-
ated the potential of the emerging technology and understood that changes in
the military were always under way.
But that was about as far as most of the senior military in the mid-1990s
would go. Information was certainly a good thing to have in a battle. However,
any suggestion of a trade-off between military mass and information faced
strong skepticism, even though “smart” bombs, dramatically improved ground
navigation afforded by the Global Positioning System, networked warships, and
other emerging technology suggested just such a trade-off. “Never saw and don’t
believe bytes of information kill enemy soldiers,” Lieutenant General Paul Van
Riper of the Marine Corps was fond of asserting: “Bytes of information can be
very valuable in war, but it’s bullets that kill enemies.” Cebrowski and Owens
were arguing, however, not only that rapid change was called for but that there
was a moral imperative to make the leap to a different way of warfare. Most of
the military leadership remained unconvinced. Some questioned whether “the
revolutionaries” understood armed conflict or the lessons of history. If there was
a moral imperative here, colleagues told Cebrowski, it was to oppose his views.
One of the best indications of the nature of the debate, and perhaps the
high-water mark of the revolutionary argument, was a public 1997 description
of future military operations issued by General John Shalikashvili, as chairman
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of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The document was entitled Joint Vision 2010. Billed
as a “template for future U.S. military operations,” it had been eighteen months
in gestation and when finally published was neatly bifurcated between compet-
ing views. The first half of the thirty-page document read like an enlistment ad-
vertisement, underlining the importance of tradition, the need for highly
trained, dedicated, and disciplined personnel, and the lessons of the past. The
last half, the part that Owens and Cebrowski had pushed, was very different. The
operations envisioned for 2010 centered on a term that had become a buzzword,
a rallying point of revolutionary sentiment—“dominant battlefield awareness.”
Under that rubric, Owens and Cebrowski believed, new operational concepts
would come into play. U.S. military operations would emphasize agility and
speed, the ability to beat opponents to the punch at all levels of conflict. They
would move from sequential to concurrent actions, a concept that not only con-
tradicted contemporary planning assumptions but challenged the linear opera-
tional concepts that had conditioned training, doctrine, and equipment since
the Civil War.
Much of Cebrowski’s and Owens’s argument wove through the final pages of
Joint Vision 2010. Information superiority, not military mass, was the key to mil-
itary success. Overwhelming force would be less useful or effective than decisive
force applied quickly and precisely. Military structures, equipment design,
training, and organization would have to change accordingly—and those
changes needed to be complete by 2010, when the 1997 vision of the future was
to be reality. “We actually believed it could be done by 2005,” Cebrowski later
said. “But we knew that would be too controversial to get people behind our ef-
forts to accelerate change.”
To many senior military officers, this was too bold a vision, far too disruptive.
They were comfortable with the existing rate of change the military had relied
upon since the end of World War II. Compared to what Owens and Cebrowski
were proposing, this was a snail’s pace, tied to design-change processes and ca-
reer patterns measured in generations and decades. On average, between 1948
and 1997 it took major naval surface combatants seventeen years to move from
the drawing board to their first cruise. Navy planners anticipated that once in
the fleet, a ship and the logistics systems and shore infrastructure needed to sup-
port it would remain in place for at least twenty-five years. It took the Air Force’s
F-16 almost two decades to advance from concept to an operational sortie; the
F-15, the B-1 and B-2 bombers, and the F-117 stealth fighter took sixteen, seven-
teen, fourteen, and fifteen years, respectively, to make the same journey. The ini-
tial design of the Abrams tanks that so dramatically outgunned and
outmaneuvered Iraqi armored forces in 1991 had been approved in 1968. In the
thirty years between 1967 and 1997, the Army introduced a total of four new
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courses to its Infantry School at Fort Benning, Georgia; each of them needed be-
tween five and eight years to get through the design, test, and implementation
process. Cebrowski began asking why this had to be the case.
The answers he got were appeals to history, assertions that “the revolutionar-
ies” failed to understand the nature of warfare, that such challenges ignored the
timeless wisdom of the nineteenth-century military commentator Carl von
Clausewitz. In fact, the American revolution in military affairs led by
Shalikashvili, Owens, Cebrowski, and a handful of other flag and general officers
ran into a counterrevolution in 1998. Shalikashvili and Owens retired. The sta-
tus quo ante returned as their successors reverted to earlier joint staff processes
and discarded the modifications made to the Joint Requirements Oversight
Council, which Owens had sought to mold into a revolutionary vanguard. Joint
Vision 2010 became Joint Vision 2020, still officially a guide to future operations
but slipping the goal a decade beyond the horizon of plans, programs, and bud-
gets. The disturbing phrase “revolution in military affairs”—with its connota-
tions of radicalism, speed, and decentralized control—slipped from the lexicon,
replaced by the more indeterminate and benign “transformation.”
Cebrowski remained in his staff position, with planning and programming
responsibilities for Navy command and communications systems, until ap-
pointed as President of the Naval War College, with additional supervisory au-
thority over the newly established Navy Warfare Development Command, also
in Newport. Captain Terry Pudas, today the acting director of the Office of Force
Transformation, served under Cebrowski during this assignment. “He wanted
to be an intellectual leader at the War College,” Pudas recalls, “and to engage the
intellectual power there in three great questions: What was the world of the
twenty-first century going to be like? What should the Navy of the twenty-first
century become to deal with that world? And how was twenty-first-century war-
fare going to differ from past and present conflict?”
In his first convocation speech Cebrowski challenged the faculty, staff, and
students to innovate, to investigate alternate concepts, to be suspicious of con-
ventional wisdom, and to look beyond history and outside the Navy so as both to
understand and influence the future. At the College he was to advocate new and
different kinds of naval ships, not only to stir debate but to investigate alterna-
tive operational concepts. His proposals for fast logistics ships with nontradi-
tional hull forms elicited deeper understanding of the relationship of the cost of
greater speed to the value of time in modern conflict. His “Streetfighter,” a new
conceptual class of smaller, faster, stealthier vessels woven together by advanced
communications networks, were an approach to the broader question of widely
distributed operations—not just on the sea but on and above the earth’s surface.
His proposed “corsairs”—small aircraft carriers carrying relatively few
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aircraft—afforded insights into the benefits of more highly networked plat-
forms in more widely distributed operations that might be gained from greatly
extended breadth and speed of maneuver.
The assignment gave him the authority and time to work out the details of the
theoretical construct he had pursued over the previous decade. “It was at the Na-
val War College, during my last active-duty assignment,” he would reminisce
four years later, “that network-centric warfare [emerged as], with all apologies
to Clausewitz and the legions of military historians, truly a new theory of war.”
When Secretary Rumsfeld asked Cebrowski to become the director of the Of-
fice of Force Transformation, he agreed. He arrived at the Pentagon two weeks
after terrorists flew a Boeing 757 into the building’s south side. “As I walked
through the military cordon around the Pentagon, past the destruction, and into
the lingering odors of the fires and water damage,” he later recalled, “I knew—
more than ever before—that the world had changed. And that the U.S. military
had to transform. And that it had to do it much faster than it thought.”
Cebrowski was not sure why Rumsfeld had brought him in.
We had not worked together before, and while I vaguely remember his first tour as
secretary of defense in the mid-1970s, it was from afar, geographically and in terms
of rank. While I was generally aware he had been secretary of defense, I had been a
lot more interested then in what much lower ranks in the chain of command at con-
siderable distance from the senior leadership were telling me to do. I don’t remember
ever meeting him face to face and doubt if he had any awareness of me prior to the
late 1990s. So I was surprised when he called and asked me to come and talk with
him. When we met, he went straight to the point. He had heard what I’d been doing
for the last several years, he said, and asked how I could help him accelerate the
transformation of the U.S. military.
But before I answered, Rumsfeld answered for me. I was to serve as a conceptual en-
gine for the effort and help him sift from all the programs claiming to be “trans-
formational” the ones that best fit the path he wanted to blaze into the new century.
He was not particularly clear in that discussion as to what he meant by his path. But
he talked of a need for big changes, undertaken quickly, and of the controversy he ex-
pected to stir. He spoke of his need for a “think and do tank” and [of] how I would
work directly with him in formulating what should be done and then getting it
started. I accepted immediately.
There had never been an office of force transformation before; Rumsfeld gave
Cebrowski wide discretion in establishing its size, location, budget, and role.
Cebrowski opted for a small office, brought in several civilians with whom he
had worked previously, including the recently retired Terry Pudas, and asked
each of the military services to provide representatives (mostly officers in the
grade of captain or colonel). He selected facilities outside the Pentagon for his
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main office but capitalized upon his authority to work directly with the secre-
tary on transformation matters, authority that exempted the office from the De-
fense Department’s regular policy and planning processes. The secretary invited
him to attend meetings of the Senior Level Review Group, an assembly of the
Pentagon’s top civilian and military leaders. Rumsfeld launched this privy coun-
cil with a series of meetings, usually on weekends, focused on defining transfor-
mation. He would ask attendees what they understood by the term and then lead
a collective parsing of whatever definition had been offered.
“Rumsfeld didn’t care what we came up with,” Cebrowski recalled; “regard-
less of who offered a definition, he kept asking them to explain it. He was relent-
less about it. In meeting after meeting, he’d go back to the definition. And we
argued over every single word. What Rumsfeld was doing was making three
points. First, that whatever its definition, the senior leadership had to own it and
they were not to delegate their ownership down into the various staffs. Second,
transformation was a top priority, worthy of the personal time and energy of the
leaders; and, third, that the secretary of defense was going to be relentless in its
pursuit.”
Cebrowski’s access to the secretary on issues of force transformation was the
source of his influence. Rumsfeld relied on Cebrowski, trusted him, and ac-
cepted his advice and views, using his insights and formulations in speeches and
public discussions of transformation as well as in Pentagon and interagency pol-
icy and planning evolutions. Such stature was not ignored by the press or, more
importantly, by the other participants in these processes. For his own part,
Cebrowski was not shy about offering his thoughts on transformation to those
who solicited them, including congressional committees, senior members of the
military services, defense agencies, and major combatant commands. Nor was
he bashful about speaking and writing. But he was surprised at the influence his
views enjoyed.
I was surprised by how important the press and other media were to maintaining in-
terest in transformation and how much they became allies in the effort. Senior de-
fense officials—civilian or in uniform—are always interested in what the press is
saying, and we all tried to use the press to make our arguments to each other and to
the various hierarchies we headed. You send memos and hold meetings. But if you
do that in parallel with press coverage and public commentary on the same sub-
stance, you get ideas into the audiences who will ultimately determine how far the
ideas will go. I found there were some informal “rules” of the game, however. I
worked for the most part ahead of policy, pointing out possibilities. That is appealing
to the press in the same way it appeals to defense contractors. Both want to “scoop”
their competition, and there is no better way than being able to predict the future.
So, in effect, I had a story to tell, and the press wanted a story to tell. It was a
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synergistic relationship that turned out to be surprisingly effective. That was because
of the subject matter itself. Transformation is about the future and everyone is inter-
ested in the future. So, if you’ve got something sensible to say about what could be
coming, and you can say it in interesting ways, almost everyone will listen.
CEBROWSKI’S LEGACY
Art Cebrowski’s interests ranged across mathematics, information technology,
history, sociology, and theology. They wove themselves throughout his thinking
about military affairs and conditioned his instinct for innovation. He was an
eclectic thinker; though he claimed to lack deep insights, he could make connec-
tions in ways that helped illuminate underlying processes and “the way things
worked.” He will, however, probably be most remembered for generating impor-
tant concepts, two of which are network-centric warfare and the idea that mili-
tary transformation is a process, not an end point.
Cebrowski argued that network-centric warfare is a theory of war—that it
identifies new sources of power, shows why those sources generate new military
structures and organization, and points to how the combination of new technol-
ogy, organization, and structure leads to new military and political strategies. It
speaks to the character of war, not to its nature, accepting that war by nature is a
form of intense human competition that involves violence, profound risk, and
mutual danger. Network-centric warfare recognizes that it is the nature of war to
be nasty, brutish, and, however short it may be, highly complex.
The new sources of military power stem largely from information technology—
from our growing capacity to gather, communicate, and process information
rapidly into knowledge. These capabilities, Cebrowski postulated, generate new
command and control possibilities, dramatically raising the efficiency and effec-
tiveness of “flatter” military organizations. They suggest the abandonment of
classic hierarchical patterns in favor of organizations that are much more decen-
tralized in terms of who reports to whom. They allow “horizontal” structures
(with respect to such functions as fire, maneuver, transportation, and logistics)
that cut across the vertically structured military services. He argued that infor-
mation can often substitute for mass in military operations, that dispersed units
can, as long as they have access to robust and secure information networks, gen-
erate the kind of combat power that achieves overwhelming effects once associ-
ated solely with mass. This, he believed, changes geostrategic assumptions,
including operational notions of time and distance. But the most profound mil-
itary implications, in Cebrowski’s view, were that attrition was no longer the ul-
timate military means of achieving political goals and that significant—indeed,
superpower-scale—military strength was available to nearly any nation or
group that wanted it.
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Like other and earlier theories of war, Cebrowski argued, network-centric
warfare has its “competitive space,” rule sets, and metrics. Where the competi-
tive space of industrial war involved the capacity to produce heavy weapons and
get them to where they could be most destructive, in network-centric warfare it
is the capability to obtain and integrate information into military operations.
The metrics used to gauge the relative power of militaries in the industrial age
were generally measures of input, notably military mass, expressed in numbers
of weapons, ton-miles per day, manpower, and orders of battle. Operational
planning focused on how to achieve an edge in such measures on a battlefield,
during a campaign, or in a war. In contrast, the metrics of network-centric war-
fare describe relative ability to create an information advantage and turn it into a
military advantage. They involve output measures—rates of change, operational
and tactical innovation, the speed with which one acts on information and cou-
ples events together, and political and moral outcomes. Where industrial war-
fare focused on the physical realm and the application of overwhelming force,
killing all opponents or as many as it took to make any who remained surrender,
the goal of network-centric warfare was to change the mind of the adversary
quickly. It aimed to demonstrate to the opponent that he could never maintain
the initiative, would always be beaten to the punch, outsmarted, outmaneuvered,
and out-killed—to impose on him a conviction that resistance is futile. The cen-
tral battlefield was not the physical but the cognitive domain. The aim of network-
centric operations was to couple military action more closely to the mental
processes and perceptions of war, to reduce superfluous destruction, shorten
conflict, and minimize harm to the innocent.
Cebrowski’s insistence on understanding U.S. military transformation as a con-
tinuing process flowed from assumptions girding his interpretation of network-
centric warfare, namely, that information technology was a new source of military
power and was widely available. He contrasted the availability of information tech-
nology with the industrial resources that until recently had powered the strongest
militaries and divided the world between great and lesser powers. To compete
militarily in the industrial age, a competitor had to have tremendous financial
and organizational power, for which reason military powers were almost exclu-
sively nation-states. In the information age, a source of military power was
emerging that did not demand financial or organizational assets anywhere near
so large. The new technology of power was ubiquitous, flowing out of commer-
cial enterprises, not government laboratories, and globally available. Moreover,
the rate at which information technology could produce new and improved mil-
itary capabilities had become very rapid.
That meant, he argued, that military competition was going to change funda-
mentally. It was going to be a true “World Series,” involving not only the great
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powers but a growing plethora of “others”—not just other nations but
nonnational, transnational, and subnational groups as well. Competitive posi-
tions would change much more quickly; those who started the race behind
would not have to repeat the developmental steps of the leaders. Competitive
success would depend increasingly on the ability to innovate and change. Trans-
formation would never end in a particular force structure or set of military ca-
pabilities. Unless the United States recognized this, Cebrowski warned, it would
lose its current military superiority long before it figured out what to do with its
advantages. His solution was to institutionalize transformation.
So, the United States has to figure out how to best institutionalize continuing and
probably accelerating transformation. The Defense Department ought to cultivate a
general bias that change is not dangerous, wrong, or unnecessary, per se. That doesn’t
mean you accept any changes as transformational or necessarily good. The standard
for judging transformation is threefold: does it increase military effectiveness, im-
prove military efficiency, and reinforce moral principle in the use of military force?
Military effectiveness, in this context, is a function of generating more capability to
achieve American political goals. It is unlikely that everyone will ever agree on the
specifics of what that means. So one of the keys to institutionalizing transformation
is to devise and refine decision processes that will continually assess the priority of
our political goals and whether the military capabilities we seek, maintain, and de-
velop are consistent with that priority. And when there is a discrepancy between our
goals and capabilities, as is increasingly going to be the case, we will have to have the
means of revising our capabilities much faster than has been the case. As our experi-
ence in Iraq in 2005 illustrates, it’s not too hard to discern when gaps between our
military’s capabilities and the goals to which we commit the military exist. The hard
part comes in being able to keep our notion of future military effectiveness attuned
to the changes in the world.
Military efficiency deals with the ease and costs of performing military functions and
tasks. Here, the goal is to innovate faster than potential opponents. This is because
opponents will adapt to and seek to counter what makes our military efficient. It’s
particularly the case now, because our current military power is so overwhelming.
Our military edge compels those who want to compete against us to try to exploit the
way we do not conduct our military functions rather than confront us head on, on our
terms, and trying—with low probability of success—to beat us in what we do best.
Military efficiency also involves achieving a decisive solution to an issue as fast and
completely as possible once you’ve decided to commit military force. Militaries that
do this are efficient. Those that do not are inefficient, because in prolonging military
operations they are likely to expand and elevate the violence and, in the process,
change the political stakes in the conflict. This is where efficiency, effectiveness, and
morality overlap. If the issues driving a resort to armed conflict are not resolved
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quickly, and because of this the political context of the conflict changes, then that is
likely to reduce the ability to use military force effectively and morally. This is one of
the reasons why an attrition strategy—destroying lives and property until the enemy
gives up—is likely to be immoral. It’s inherently sloppy and tends to kill the innocent
along with everyone else. That creates blood debts that change the political context of
the conflict and prolong the violence even longer.
In short, military effectiveness, efficiency, and morality together point to a force that
can adapt to changes in the world, to the resulting changes in the political goals the
United States adopts because of those changes, and to the opponents’ adjustments to
what the United States does. The net effect is a general standard for transformational
constant change that continually makes U.S. military operations more effective, effi-
cient, and moral.
Near the end of his life, Cebrowski increasingly turned to the question of how
to institutionalize constant transformation. He believed the solution was a matter
of identifying both the major barriers and the levers needed to overcome them. He
narrowed the former to four: “failure fear,” “size and uniformity,” “the military-
congressional-contractor triangle of stasis,” and “the seduction of stasis
authentication.”
“Failure fear” reflected the conservatism of military institutions. They are
cautious by nature because they recognize that the stakes of failure are very high.
But it is easy to go from justified caution to a less beneficial conservatism that
cautions against all change. It is the flip side of the view that change is inherently
good, and it is just as dangerous, particularly during a transition from one age to
another.
“Size and uniformity” often become a rationale against change, especially rel-
atively rapid change. The size of the U.S. military makes change costly, particu-
larly in view of the need for a high degree of uniformity in order to keep overall
capability and readiness high. Size and the commitment to maintain uniformity
also impart a momentum to change, in that once change takes hold there it is
logical to complete it as rapidly as feasible to avoid a divided force. Accordingly,
if the wrong change is initiated, the mistake can compound itself as the military
pushes along an ill-fated course driven by the need to reestablish uniformity, co-
herence, and readiness. For the sake of readiness, preventing costly mistakes, and
avoiding a dangerous momentum down the wrong path, the argument goes, it is
better to avoid change until the need is entirely clear, recognized, and agreed by
all parties involved.
The “military-congressional-contractor triangle of stasis” was Cebrowski’s
shorthand for the complex interactions that had grown since President Dwight
Eisenhower’s famous warning about the “military-industrial complex.” Defense
contractors, focused largely on military clients, tend to accept and echo their
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military clients’ views because it is good for business. But there are other busi-
ness reasons why contractors were generally not inclined toward change. To
those who produce tangible goods for the military, change usually means retool-
ing, new production learning curves, and at least temporary sags in profit. Ser-
vice providers, too, welcome the continuation of “business as usual,” for which
they have already hired and trained their employees. The congressional interest
in continuity is less stable, but the geographical distribution of both the military
and defense industry tends to bolster it.
Cebrowski saw “the seduction of stasis authentication” in the behavior of in-
dividuals who have the political authority to bring about transformation but often
find it easier not to exercise it. The deference the military pays to senior civilian
defense officials is seductive—particularly to the growing numbers of officials
who have never served in the military. It is sometimes more convenient, usually
less difficult, and almost always more enjoyable for them to act as important
spokespersons for military figures, with more experience in, understanding of,
and appreciation for the intricacies of national defense.
These, then, Cebrowski saw as the four greatest barriers to transformational
change inside the Pentagon. He was convinced they would not vanish, perhaps
not even in the context of a catastrophic attack on the United States. But he was
convinced the United States could surmount them, and he offered “levers” for
doing so.
One was the language and imagery of change. Changes in vocabularies, he
opined, could interject a healthy counterpoise to stasis. It is important, he
warned, not to make the shifts in vocabulary arbitrarily, because sloganeering
generates cynicism rather than progress. The key is to choose the vocabulary of
change carefully and to keep new terms consistent with the general thrusts of the
changes and concepts one seeks to bring about. The shifts should be from the
more general concepts toward the more specific, and as a rule of thumb, they
ought to occur roughly every two years.
Another was using the military training and education system to “teach
change.” The training and education system in the Department of Defense offers
something few, if any, other federal government departments can—extensive
formal training and educational access to the thinking and behavior of most of
its members. It is the single most important channel for embedding a process of
change in the institution.
A third was to expand the concept of “spiral development.” The term came
into vogue in the Rumsfeld Defense Department as a way of speeding new weap-
ons and systems through the research and development stage and into the hands
of operating forces. Cebrowski saw it as a way of transforming the U.S. military
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more broadly, because new technology in the hands of troops pays off in what
they learn in using it. The process incorporates the assumption that continued
and faster change has virtue. It can help build a mind-set that it is not merely ac-
ceptable to challenge continually the existing way of doing things, but natural
and needed.
A fourth was what Cebrowski called “planting dragon’s teeth.” His metaphor
picked up on not only the ancient Greek myth of Jason and the Golden Fleece
but the Chinese notion of a dragon as an agent of change from whose teeth,
planted in the earth, more dragons arise. “The point is,” he would say,
if you want to cultivate a conscious commitment to transformational change, you
have to establish agents and charge them with making transformational change their
primary mission. Changes in attitude, culture, and procedures that emerge from the
bottom up are the most enduring. But they don’t emerge spontaneously and they
don’t necessarily occur in response to admonitions from the top. It takes explana-
tion, consistency, and effort by change agents—dragons, if you will—throughout the
organization. And because dragons don’t live forever, because they often turn into
sheep and merge with the spirit of stasis, or just vanish, we need to continually plant
their teeth so that new change agents can take their place.
Finally, Cebrowski advocated more open access to information in and about
what the Defense Department was doing—“letting the sun shine in.” Change
agents can be important levers, particularly if they form networks and fill those
networks with information and transactions. But that is not easy. “In national
security matters it confronts concern with divulging secrets and threatens the
extravagant security systems in which we have invested great wealth and energy.
But much of this is outdated now that national security lies less in trying to re-
strict information and more in knowing what is occurring.”
Art Cebrowski remained a profound optimist. In one of our last discussions,
amid discouragement that the Pentagon seemed to be using transformation
rhetoric to cloak business as usual and that it was proving very hard to make sig-
nificant changes, he remained confident. “Look,” he said, “the race will go to the
swift, the smart, and the agile. Here, we Americans have an important edge, for
the capacity to leave the past behind flows from our culture and political system.
We venerate new frontiers and diversity, the expression of ideas, and the freedom
to differ. We, as a people, are the swift, the smart, and the agile. As such, we are far
more willing and able than any others to seize the opportunities of the new age.”
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IN MY VIEW
IRONING OUT THE DETAILS
Sir:
In the Autumn 2005 Naval War College Review (“Net-centric before Its Time,”
pages 109–35), Erik J. Dahl explored the similarities and differences between the
Jeune École school in the French navy of the nineteenth century and the advo-
cates of net-centric warfare in today’s U.S. Department of Defense. Dahl’s argu-
ment was that “the Jeune École failed . . . primarily because it attempted to do too
much, was unwilling to accept criticism or allow dialogue, and misjudged the
pace of change in warfare. Today’s advocates of military transformation and rev-
olution sometimes exhibit similar failings” (page 110).
Dahl’s detailed criticisms of what he calls the network-centric “school of
thought” include the following: (a) “a strong faith not just in the latest technical
fads but in technological progress writ large,” (b) “trust . . . in overly complex
and esoteric mathematical calculations and scientific theorizing,” (c) a lack of
flexibility in thinking and a concomitant unwillingness to admit mistakes, and
(d) arrogance (pages 126, 128, 129). What he is really talking about is not so
much a “school of thought” but a theology that rests on faith and a kind of spe-
cial scholasticism alien to the way that most people think.
In making these points, Dahl highlights the problems that face all advocates
of significant military reform, including the successful reforms. For example, for
almost six months at the beginning of 1919, the Navy’s General Board reviewed
the lessons learned from naval aviation’s experiences in World War I. The Secre-
tary of the Navy wanted the board members to produce a series of recommenda-
tions that would shape the future of airpower at sea. In testifying to the board,
pioneer naval aviator Commander John Towers observed, “I don’t think we can
continue beyond . . . 1925 . . . in building aircraft carriers, because I think it will
be quite possible that ships will all become more or less aircraft carriers and
be so designed” (quoted in Thomas C. Hone, Norman Friedman, and Mark
D. Mandeles, American & British Aircraft Carrier Development, 1919–1941
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[Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1999], p. 23). Commander Towers, a key
figure in the development of naval aviation, was wrong—both on that score and
on several others (see Clark Reynolds’s excellent and detailed biography, Admi-
ral John H. Towers: The Struggle for Naval Air Supremacy [Annapolis, Md.: Naval
Institute Press, 1991]). Yet his energy, professionalism, courage, and dedication
were essential to the success of the Navy’s aviation efforts.
Another way to describe dramatic changes in military affairs such as the in-
troduction of carrier aviation is to say that they are messy. The advocates of
change will have some evidence for their case, but their opponents will also mar-
shal evidence for a stiff defense of existing technology, doctrine, and concepts of
warfare. Partisans on both sides of the argument will often talk arrogantly and
even act selfishly. Careers and reputations will be hazarded and lost. The most
senior officials, such as Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, will be asked to take risks
and to make decisions based on little evidence or on disputed evidence. Mistakes
will be inevitable.
What’s different now from the situation that faced the Jeune École and its de-
tractors is that we have means of testing claims regarding new technology or new
methods of fighting. In his essay, Erik Dahl noted that the French navy held its
first modern naval maneuvers in 1886, right in the middle of the furor over the
claims of the Jeune École. By contrast, the U.S. Navy tested the possibilities, tac-
tics, and techniques of carrier aviation in major fleet exercises from 1923 right
through the spring of 1941. My point is that the French navy began a fleet ma-
neuver program because of the debate over the claims of the Jeune École but the
program wasn’t continued, if only because no one then grasped that a continu-
ous series of experiments and trials was essential if any prospective military rev-
olution was to become reality. The key to avoiding error in the midst of change is
to have a means of highlighting mistakes. The French navy didn’t understand
this well enough in the 1880s. We do now.
Dahl’s conclusion was that “many of the Jeune École’s innovations were well
ahead of their time” (page 123). He made the same criticism of the concept of
net-centric warfare—that it was and is ahead of its time both technologically
and strategically. His concern is that the effort to jump ahead—to take a major
risk—will fail and set back a movement that has some promising elements. He
fears that today’s “transformers” have, like their predecessors in the Jeune École,
misjudged “the temper” of the times and overreached (page 130).
But today’s advocates of change have tools that weren’t available to any navy
in the 1880s, including qualitative and quantitative simulations, distributed
electronic war games, and a sophisticated national training system that links
widely separated participants digitally. Put another way, we know a lot more to-
day about how to define and then to limit risk. That doesn’t mean there won’t be
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heated disagreements about net-centric warfare’s strengths and weaknesses, but
it does mean that those arguments won’t just be played out in the media, as they
were in France in the 1880s.
Indeed, the push for “transformation” has shifted from writers and thinkers
to tacticians, developers, and our combat forces. Notions debated on paper and
in slide presentations five years ago are being tested in combat and in simula-
tions and games. Those who doubt this is so should consult the websites of the
military services and the Joint Forces Command. Military revolutions are always
bedeviled by details. U.S. armed forces are ironing out the details and developing
new ideas as you read this, and that’s just the way it should be.
So my response to Erik Dahl is to say, “Thanks for the thoughtful warning. It
was appreciated, as are all such warnings. Pitch in! Help your colleagues trans-
form our military forces and the institutions and processes that sustain them.”
THOMAS C. HONE
Assistant Director for Risk Management
Office of Force Transformation, U.S. Department of Defense
Sir:
Erik Dahl’s article “Net-Centric before Its Time,” which examined whether the
controversies surrounding the French Jeune École movement of the late 1800s
might hold any lessons for a transforming American military today, is a useful
and timely one. However, in concluding that the Jeune École was “ahead of its
time strategically” and that its proponents were guilty of “misjudging the speed
at which naval warfare was changing,” the author may have erred, in not devel-
oping these thoughts sufficiently. To my mind, he misses the most fundamental
and important lesson that can be drawn from the whole Jeune École experience,
and that is that in times of great strategic uncertainty it does not pay to develop a
navy with too narrow a strategic focus or too specialized a mission set. The only
irrefutable historical consequence of this whole event was surely that the French,
through their intermittent pursuit of a specialized form of warfare against a sin-
gle opponent, failed to foresee that were the strategic situation to change, their
innovative fleet was likely to be rendered irrelevant and furthermore that there
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would be insufficient time for them to adjust. This is essentially what caused the
French Navy to flounder for forty years and to lose its position as a leading naval
power. As such, it has to be the key point that must be learned, particularly by the
preeminent navy of the modern age.
Secondly, Dahl talks of the “differences in the strategic circumstances facing
France during the 1880s,” a point that is well taken, but one that is again not fully
developed. The major military difference between the French in the 1880s and
the United States today was surely that France, as a strong naval power but not
comparable to Great Britain, had little choice but to react in some way to the
emerging threat posed by the Royal Navy. Not to do so would have been to abdi-
cate its responsibilities as a competing naval power—worse still, it was nation-
ally indefensible in situations such as this, where the power in question was
clearly the most pertinent strategic threat on the horizon. In many ways, this sit-
uation parallels Western perceptions of Soviet naval might in the Cold War, only
more acutely. The historian and analyst must therefore acknowledge that such
circumstances provide considerable incentive for an inferior power like France
in the 1870s to react in a specific fashion and against an obvious threat. In con-
trast, the United States, as today’s premier naval power, is under no such pres-
sure. Instead, it should be free to examine technological developments in a more
empirical manner, selecting only those that, in its judgment, might further its
abilities in an appropriate strategic direction. In short, today’s American prob-
lem of how best to react to an era of technological change is categorically differ-
ent from the one facing the French under the Jeune École.
Thirdly, and directly linked to this point, it must be understood that the
French had precious little choice but to innovate if they were to compete at all.
The British strategy, in times of war with France, was simply to adopt the age-old
idea of a close blockade of the French Atlantic coast, an approach that had the
added benefit of effectively dividing the French fleet in the process—the geo-
graphical handicap of the Iberian Peninsula and France’s continuing need to
base major units in Toulon did the rest. Nor could France rely on its industrial
capacity to pull it through. The differing rates of industrialization in Europe had
left the French with a far weaker shipbuilding capacity than the British, a situa-
tion that was exacerbated by the French practice of providing minimal oversight
in contracts let to individual shipyards. The results were, first, an inefficient and
uneconomical process that produced ships at a far slower rate than the British,
and second, a lack of standardization that made French yards hopelessly un-
suited to the building of large and complex platforms like battleships. Worse
still, these “one of a kind” ships were causing all sorts of maintenance and train-
ing problems for the navy that was to use them.
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With no prospects therefore of ever gaining parity in battleships, it is little
wonder that the building of the far less complicated torpedo craft seemed so at-
tractive to the French. Not only did such vessels “fit” the cottage-industry style
of their yards far more closely, but once the Jeune École had provided the neces-
sary tactical rationale, fielding large numbers of these novel naval weapons in a
radically new “networked” force disposition seemed at last to offer an affordable
prospect of defeating the close blockade once and for all. Better, even the inferior
French battle fleet would have the residual effect of “fixing” the British heavy
units in place, where they could be worked on by this defense mobile of torpedo
craft. These two factors were, in turn, expected to enable the third, offensive leg
of the Jeune École strategy, which was to use France’s undoubted strength in fast,
armored cruisers to slip through the blockade and threaten the consequently
poorly protected British trade routes. The point to all these explanations, how-
ever, is to show that the French were reacting to some very specific criteria and
from a position of military and economic inferiority—a handicap that does not
currently afflict the United States.
So, if the French response in this era was too specific in nature to be of use as a
model for the United States today, what of that of the British? After all, in many
ways their strategic situation more closely parallels that facing America in this
new century. Britain was the leader of a global trading empire and the premier
naval power of the time. Its military-industrial complex was the envy of the
world, and its ability to outproduce all comers in any prospective naval race
seemed assured. Is there, therefore, anything in the way that it responded to the
same naval “revolution” that might be of use to American planners today? The
rather glib, if factually correct, answer would seem to be “yes and no.” Yes, the
U.S. Navy should pay very close attention to the fact that the British essentially
“hedged their bets” against a variety of threats while experimenting with a whole
range of promising technologies. The result seemed to be that they were better
placed to use their industrial might appropriately when the strategic situation
settled—or at least they were certainly better off than navies like the French,
which had invested too heavily in the one scenario. At the same time, however,
Americans would do well not to look too closely at the reasoning of the British,
who it seems were guided less by a sense of purpose in this than by a rather arro-
gant indecision.
For example, I am quoted by Dahl as arguing that the British were probably
poorly prepared to deal with the sort of threat posed by a Jeune École France.
While true, this is essentially a broader issue, in that the Royal Navy, preoccupied
with its enthusiasm for naval technology and the prospects of a second Trafalgar,
seemed very slow to recognize the fact that the industrial age had changed the
entire nature of naval warfare forever. From this point onward, naval decisions
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were going to depend less upon decisive engagements at sea per se and more on
how such engagements might impact the broader and more mundane business
of safeguarding the nation’s economy and its crucial ability to generate the nec-
essary combat power, in its widest sense. In short, the business of exercising
“command of the seas” in the industrial age had widened considerably. For a
country that, more than any other, was critically dependent on its naval might
for the security of its overseas trade, this was a surprising oversight—all the
more so when you consider that this oversight persisted essentially unchanged
right up until the First World War, a full thirty years after the Jeune École threat
should have provided the necessary impetus for change. This is the reason for
my caution about drawing too many parallels with the quality of British naval
thinking at the time, although the main lesson is certainly clear. The United
States should anticipate that, in the same way that the industrial revolution al-
tered naval equations, there are likely to be similar differences in the way in
which an “information age” navy should exercise its influence.
The final caution I would add, and this echoes Dahl’s thinking, is that we
should never forget that the Jeune École was, first and foremost, a social reaction
to an oppressive environment within the French Navy of the time, like that
within any large bureaucracy of the day; it was, that is, simply a microcosm of
the bitter turmoil evident in French society as a whole. The service’s institu-
tional thinking was therefore prone to being “hijacked” for political purposes
and distorted for personal ends, with its establishment becoming hopelessly po-
larized in the process. While I am not suggesting that such bitter divides exist to-
day in America, it is nonetheless timely to warn against any overly zealous
pursuit of “transformation” for its own sake, or equally, against any outright re-
jection that offers little in return save the rejection itself. Such policies can only
have the effect of polarizing opinion within the Navy to the extent that neither
side would feel inclined to compromise. This would be damaging in the longer
term, since the forging of an appropriate naval strategy to meet uncertain times
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THE NATURE OF INSURGENCY WAR
Sir:
The Naval War College’s Professional Ethics Conference 2005 grappled in a
timely way with the inescapable issues of “insurgency” and “counterinsurgency.”
An unquestionable merit of this open meeting on the diverse, convoluted, cul-
turally rooted, subjectively contended, and above all, destructive insurgency in
the GWOT (Global War on Terror) is that it revealed the breadth and depth of
the issue to be overwhelmingly beyond any single individual’s study and experi-
ence and beyond a simple thesis or strategy for “the” solution.
To be sure, the event gathered an august spectrum of academic, legal, military,
nonmilitary/agency, historical, religious, media, and political expertise as well as
warriors (fresh from the front line of GWOT) and ex-warriors (from wars past).
The debates underscored the insurgency as the core of the current U.S. and
world geopolitical strait and, therefore, the utmost challenge—whatever the
genesis, mistakes made, and their consequences in and prospects for the (Iraqi)
war. Insurgents particularly of the current GWOT have many faces, beliefs,
ethnicities, countries of origin, loyalties, reasons for hatred and fanaticism, each
of which elicits many different assessments, sentiments, points, and counter-
points. The “ethics” context of the conference served to examine this complex
issue, including reflections of individual judgment or even conscience for
thoughtful conclusions.
Curiously, Webster’s defines insurgency as “revolt against a government that
is less than an organized revolution and is not recognized as belligerency” (em-
phasis supplied). In contrast, Bard E. O’Neill, cited in the conference program,
adds the use of “violence to destroy, reformulate, or sustain the legitimacy of one
or more aspects of politics.” O’Neill separates terrorism as “threat or use of phys-
ical coercion . . . against civilians, to create fear in order to achieve political objec-
tives.” But he goes on to connect the two: “Insurgent terrorism is purposeful . . .
violence . . . to achieve specific . . . goals.” If so, it would make sense to try to iden-
tify unequivocally those specific reasons within the amorphous substance of the
Iraqi insurgency. That is the case especially when the U.S.-led coalition troops
are being sent into the war with a prosaic assignment—“Hunt down the insur-
gents”—that may be concise but is proving hopelessly open-ended. Perhaps
more important than touting America’s rhetorical “mission” or “victory”—as
the administration is doing—might be to try learning what the insurgents’
“mission” or “victory criteria” are. That would help to develop insight into the
question of whether indeed the insurgents can be defeated.
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The motivator for insurgency per se may be more universal than one might
suspect from the peculiarities in Iraq. In the NWC forum, many historical paral-
lels were noted, such as in the war of American independence, French colonial
resistance in Algeria and Vietnam, the British struggle against the IRA, and
America’s Vietnam War. References were made also to the powerful underlying
character of a warring nation or cultural entity, to the codes of the warriors, such
as the (medieval) knights, (Japanese) samurai, and (U.S.) Marines. One univer-
sal causal element of revolt is the endemic resistance against “foreign” occupa-
tion or presence in a territory or populace invaded by the foreign government.
Normally this resistance factor can be ameliorated only by a “signed”—that is,
abiding—accord of cessation or of victory and surrender, possible only between
sovereign nation states, as in the world wars. Thus, in insurgency—by a faction
within a nation—this resistance tends to sustain itself in perpetuity. Discrimi-
nating chronicles of the Japanese surrender in World War II tell the real reason
(that is, behind the often-told rationale of yielding to the A-bomb and Soviets’ en-
try into the war) why Emperor Hirohito and his cabinet decided to surrender—
to avoid the inevitable coup d’état by an Imperial Army faction determined to
“fight till the last man.” The insurgency would have imploded the Japanese
nation.
The notion of a coup within a troubled sect might explain the Iraqis-killing-
Iraqis plight. An anti-foreign-occupation cause can be strong and righteously
unilateral enough to identify any foreign-enemy “sympathizer” as an enemy of
the cause. The Iraqi-specific, historically rooted, Shia-Sunni-Kurd dispute
(threatening a civil war in the post-Saddam instability) adds another dimension
in the problematic internecine squabble. Further, the infusion of the non-Iraqi
jihadists—since al-Qa‘ida is seizing the opportunity in the U.S. invasion and
deposal of a Moslem nation to claim legitimacy for infiltration into Iraq—has
undoubtedly introduced a convoluted, equivocal, and elusive insurgency ele-
ment under the umbrella of the pan-Islamic jihadist movement.
The U.S. effort to establish a new Iraqi sovereignty by cajoling—if not coercing—
the installation of an interim administration, writing of a new constitution, and
free election (pending at this writing) of the (first post-Saddam) government is
evolving but slowly because of the insurgency. Would the insurgency disappear
if the foreigners left? Can America’s war on the Iraqi insurgency be turned over
to the Iraqi “army” and “police” or the government? Would it then be the Iraqis’
war? But against whom? If against the insurgents, for what insurgency cause—if
no longer against foreign occupation?
Accounts of U.S. veterans of Iraqi battles indicate the problematic viscidity of
the insurgency war, even in each of the encounters. For example, which of the
Iraqis are insurgents, whether al-Qa‘ida or just another Iraqi with a grievance? Is
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their cause anti-foreign or indigenous dissatisfaction, and how strong is it? Mili-
tary people on the ground put their lives in the insurgents’ way—in real time and
in real life.
The intensity and determination of the insurgents are manifest in their “sui-
cide bomber” attack methods. The preemptive bravery and moral stigma of
self-sacrifice inflict shock and even fear upon the ordinary global populace.
Pragmatically, though, the “suicide” or certain-death aspect of the bombing
technique points to use of the human—still the most precise cybernetic mecha-
nism—as the targeting or guidance “system.” In the last days of World War II,
the Japanese military was in desperate need of skilled attack pilots to inflict any
possible damage on the overwhelmingly superior Allied invasion forces. As has
since been chronicled, the Imperial Navy, after agonizing reflection, formed the
“Special Attack” force—known in the West as the kamikazes. The literally final
attacks were not ordered but requested, with appeals to each pilot’s ingrained
spirit of bushido (the way of the warrior), which taught that there was “no
greater honor than to die (sacrifice oneself) for the ancestors’ land.” It might be
of special note that the Japanese never associated the kamikaze mission with the
word “suicide” (jisatsu), which connotes cowardly capitulation rather than
fighting to the end. A kamikaze pilot who was shot down in his final dive and
rescued, and another who was en route to attack when he received the surrender
notification, have uniformly said to this writer, “Everyone was going to fight and
die for the country. My time had come.”
As the Marine and Army officers returning from Iraq recounted in the NWC
discussions, in face-to-face, hand-to-hand encounters with an enemy as amor-
phous, frustratingly extrinsic, and preemptively explosive as the Iraqi insur-
gents, the individual fighter must make instantaneous assessments and tactical
and moral decisions for the next moment’s action, actions that must ensure their
own survival and save the lives of their teammates and achieve victory in the micro-
localized combat. To the warriors on the ground—and most likely, to the oppos-
ing individual insurgents likewise—the fighting becomes personal, detached
from the geopolitical strategies, weapons of mass destruction, oil, liberation,
freedom, democratization, and, likewise, jihad and al-Qa‘ida. In his book One
Bullet Away, Captain Nathaniel Fick, a Marine veteran of the Afghanistan and
Iraq wars, describes the combat on the ground as “humanity stripped of the ve-
neer of civilization,” and policy and strategy “as luxuries that men on the ground
cannot afford.” He contends that one’s commitment and loyalty are not so much
to “the idea of democratic Iraq or even the United States at large” but “to my
Marines to the left and the right.” Fick says the only thing that mattered was that
his Marines died or survived doing the “honorable thing.”
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Another preponderant concern at the conference was the “ethics” of “infor-
mation gathering” from captured insurgents—the question of “torture.” It be-
came clear in discussions that laws and regulations in the final analysis leave the
responsibility with the warriors on the scene. The chief of Navy and Marine
Corps chaplains, Rear Admiral Louis Iasiello, the conference’s final speaker, con-
cluded that “who we are drives what we must do,” that the “just war” is a product
of the upbringing of the individual American warrior.
In the meantime, what could the United States do with respect to the Iraqi in-
surgency situation? If the foreign occupation is the basic cause of insurgency, it
would make sense to remove the coalition presence from Iraq. But is it responsi-
ble and honorable to take over a nation (albeit one under a genocidal dictator-
ship), cause the rise of insurgency, and invite a global terrorism transplantation
into the country, and then to leave the nation torn by insurgency, an internecine
battle threatening its fledgling sovereignty? An honorable approach would be a
clear policy to assist the Iraqi nation to stand up free of struggle against foreign
coercion, including the easily misunderstood mandate for American-style de-
mocracy, and as a self-respecting and responsible sovereign state. At any rate, the
Iraqization of Iraq would be the answer to the issue of “ethics of insurgency and
counterinsurgency.”
THOMAS S. MOMIYAMA
U.S. Senior Executive Service (Ret.), associate fellow and Public Policy Committee
member of the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, 1973 Naval War
College Strategy and Policy, 1981 Senior Executive Fellow Harvard Kennedy School
of Government
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REVIEW ESSAYS
CONTEMPORARY OPERATIONAL-LEVEL WAR FIGHTING
James S. Robbins
Reynolds, Nicholas E. Basrah, Baghdad, and Beyond: The U.S.
Marine Corps in the Second Iraq War. Annapolis, Md.: Naval
Institute Press, 2005. 276pp. $32.95
Basrah, Baghdad, and Beyond is one of the first broad, theater-level accounts of
the Marine Corps’s most recent conventional conflict. It is not an official history
but, in the author’s words, “a framework for understanding Marine participation
in the Iraq war.” The book opens with Operation ENDURING FREEDOM and
swiftly moves to the preparation, planning, and execution of IRAQI FREEDOM
(OIF). It is an operational-level account, focused primarily on campaign planning
and execution from the point of view of I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF),
operating as part of the Coalition Forces Land Com-
ponent Command. The book is based generally on
such primary sources as interviews, official docu-
ments, contemporary reports, and firsthand observa-
tions. The author, retired Marine Corps Reserve
colonel Nicholas E. Reynolds, served as Marine Corps
Officer in Charge of Field History from 1999 to 2004
and supervised Marine history operations during
IRAQI FREEDOM. His work has benefited from the fact
that this campaign was one of the best documented in
history, particularly on the Marine side; the Corps had
embedded numerous historians and “lessons learned”
analysts at every level in the MEF. As hostilities wound
down, a “kind of historical wolf pack” was deployed to
conduct a week’s worth of interviews with Marines
James S. Robbins is a professor of international relations
at the National Defense University in Washington,
D.C., and a senior fellow in National Security Affairs at
the American Foreign Policy Council. Dr. Robbins re-
ceived his PhD in international relations from the
Fletcher School of Diplomacy. His research interests in-
clude terrorism and national security strategy, political
theory, and military history. He is a widely published
author in the national security field and a contributing
editor for National Review Online. His work has ap-
peared in the Wall Street Journal and the Washington
Times, as well as other publications. Dr. Robbins is a
frequent commentator on international television and
radio including the BBC, Voice of America, FNC,
MSNBC, CNBC, and CNN/FN. He is the author of
Last in Their Class: Custer, Pickett, and the Goats of
West Point (Encounter Books, 2006).
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from the MEF commander on down. Add to these materials journalists’ ac-
counts, “mil-blogs,” and participant memoirs, and one is left with an unequaled
documentary record from which to draw.
The book naturally focuses on the relationship between campaign planning
and execution, and one can see from the beginning in Afghanistan that the most
important elements in the process are relationships, communication, and trust.
Reynolds highlights the importance of human factors in command; even
though technology makes it possible for a commander to lead “virtually” from a
distant networked headquarters, warfare is still a human undertaking, and the
personal touch is important. Personalities play a central role. MEF commander
Lieutenant General James T. Conway is as ubiquitous throughout the book as he
was in the theater, leading his men from the front to the extent practicable. “Al-
most like a commander in the U.S. Civil War,” Reynolds writes, “he wanted to
see, and be seen by, his Marines before the battle.” Brigadier General James N.
Mattis, 1st Marine Division commander, followed this example as well, and “in
search of a purer form of war fighting, set off on the battlefield with a tiny reti-
nue and a cell phone.” By staying close to the front and interacting personally
with their field officers, the generals were better able to adapt to the fluidity of
the battle space. This ties into another theme developed throughout the book,
namely that “the plan itself was nothing but the planning was everything.” That
is, planning processes that encumber themselves with too much detail at the
front end waste time by emphasizing form over function. A good plan is one that
allows the war fighter to prepare to adapt as conditions on the ground inevitably
change. If good processes are in place, it does not matter whether the plan is
complete to the last bullet, bean, and Band-Aid.
The evolution of the planned air phase of the offensive is one example. The origi-
nal plan followed the Operation DESERT STORM model, with a month-long aerial
preparation to induce “shock and awe” among the Iraqis. The long duration of the
planned air campaign was of special concern to the MEF because it affected how the
Marine air wing could be utilized—if the air and ground campaigns were asyn-
chronous, as was originally planned, it would be more difficult to commit airframes
to ground-support missions. But as the start of the war neared, the air campaign
was shortened, first to around two weeks, then to five days, and ultimately to a
planned fifteen hours. Ironically, the attempted decapitation strike on the Iraqi
leadership on the night of 19–20 March forced the ground phase into action prema-
turely to secure the southern oil fields, and the air “preparation”followed a day later.
This had the benefit of achieving a measure of surprise on the Iraqi ground forces,
who had expected to face a period of aerial bombing before fighting on the ground,
and resulted in a completely synchronous battle space for the Marine air-ground el-
ements, which was what the Marine commanders had wanted from the beginning.
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The ground campaign plan itself underwent significant revisions as the battle
unfolded. It was originally planned for 125 days, which overestimated the resis-
tance potential of the regime. Saddam Hussein had no well-thought-out defen-
sive plan, no evident strategic concept. Thus as Iraqi forces collapsed before
them, the Marines had to adapt to the greatly accelerated timeline. Likewise,
coalition forces found that the planned-for opposition from elite Republican
Guard and Special Republican Guard units was not as deadly as that from Fedayeen
Saddam and other irregular forces, particularly in built-up areas. These fighters—
General Mattis called them “as worthless an example of men as we’ve ever
fought”—lacked the firepower to engage decisively, but as was shown in battles
such as An Nasiriyah, they were flexible, opportunistic, and oblivious of the laws
of war, and they could do heavy damage to isolated groups of Marines.
At An Nasiriyah—which the author describes as “an uninviting Third World
‘sprawl of slums and industrial compounds,’ with two- to-three-story concrete
buildings set on a grind of bad roads and alleyways, many strewn with garbage
and raw sewage”— the narrative dips into the tactical level to give a sense of the
battlefield environment, though the focus of the book is on the operational level.
There is a gripping account of Charlie Company, 1st Battalion, 2nd Marines be-
ing engaged by A-10s that had mistaken them for Iraqis. There are illustrative
tactical anecdotes scattered throughout, such as the account of First Lieutenant
Brian R. Chontosh, whose combined anti-armor team platoon was caught in an
ambush on the highway to Baghdad. Lieutenant Chontosh directed his driver
through a gap in the berm by the side of the road directly into the enemy posi-
tions, then dismounted and personally engaged the enemy with a succession of
weapons (M-16, 9mm pistol, AK-47, RPG), ending the ambush with a burst of
sudden violence and physical bravery. Chontosh was awarded the Navy Cross.
Baghdad represented another planning evolution. Most planners believed
that Saddam would make his stand in the capital and that Baghdad would be the
scene of punishing urban warfare. The Marines faced some tough fighting along
the approaches to the city from irregular troops and foreign fighters. Originally,
Baghdad was assigned wholly to Army V Corps, to avoid boundary conflicts be-
tween two corps-level elements. The MEF was assigned cordoning and support
responsibilities, though the land component commander, Lieutenant General
David D. McKiernan, had felt that should circumstances arise in which the MEF
would be more directly involved, the natural split would be the Tigris River. When
it became clear by 3 April that the regime was “going down fast, going down final,”
the Marines were assigned half the city and shifted plans several times in a few
days from cordoning to conducting raids, and then to moving decisively into the
city center, where they were greeted by enthusiastic crowds of Iraqis.
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“Phase IV” planning, which is discussed throughout the book, is particularly
noteworthy given that it has yet to terminate. Reynolds notes early in the narra-
tive, “there was very little guidance from higher headquarters on Phase IV, not
even a basic policy decree.” Marine planners tried to get ahead of the question
even without guidance, knowing that they would have to handle at least some Phase
IV duties. Questions sent to higher authorities on basic planning guidelines—
whether the Iraqi electrical grid, the economy, or the human infrastructure (e.g.,
the bureaucracy and police) would be intact—were met with “hazy assump-
tions” or no answers at all. As it turned out, the men on the ground adapted to
the situations as they encountered them, and they generally did well. Stopgap so-
lutions provided the basics for the Iraqis and kept order, at least for a few months
after the brief initial “looting” phase. The author notes well the significance of
the “surprise move” by the head of the Coalition Provisional Authority, Ambas-
sador L. Paul Bremer, who on 23 May 2003 disbanded the Iraqi army and, per-
haps more significantly, canceled their pensions. The “predictable result” of this
short-sighted move was to destabilize the country and give birth to the insur-
gency, but the long-term effects go beyond the scope of the work under review.
The author periodically discusses the use of contemporary networked plan-
ning tools and makes some good observations on the “near obsession” with
PowerPoint in the military. Some such briefings are the result of the distillation
of hours of staff work, carefully reduced to a few key concepts, artfully con-
structed and carefully worded to fit on a slide. However, after being sent up the
chain a few levels, other hands (not necessarily commanders) might begin edit-
ing, changing, rewording, or rearranging slides based on personal preferences or
random inputs, without the benefit of the depth of knowledge that was behind
the original briefing. “The result could be a course of action that looked good on
a PowerPoint slide but had not been thoroughly staffed,” Reynolds writes. “That
part of the plan would be ‘one PowerPoint brief ’ deep, and would either collapse
of its own weight or have to be rescued by planners scrambling to do the staff
work to back up the change.” The Marines generally resisted putting too much
detail into early planning, since the plans were certain to change later on. In ad-
dition, their experience in Afghanistan taught them that large planning staffs
and detailed plans hundreds of pages long were unnecessary, even counter-
productive. It was better to rely on “common sense, good liaison officers, and
‘hand con’” (i.e., relationships based on a handshake). Reynolds also gives a fa-
vorable account of the British planning system, which is highly informal while
still professional and abjures PowerPoint completely.
Sometimes higher commands received too much information, from official
channels and otherwise. It was “literally impossible to get away from TV images
of the war.” Media accounts of actions on the battlefield would occasionally have
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a negative impact on information management; press reports were generally
seen at higher headquarters more quickly than official reports, and in some cases
when the situation was hot, headquarters would be pressing down the chain to
get more information right away. This tended to make the information jam even
worse; as one staff officer observed memorably, “If you want information bad, you
will get bad information.” Reynolds also occasionally mentions the negative role of
pundits, “the experts on television with their nonstop stream of commentary and
free advice, usually from thousands of miles away.” This stands in contrast to the at-
titude toward the embedded reporters, who were held in high repute by the men on
the ground and were generally seen as providing accurate reportage.
Reynolds’s tone is sometimes colloquial, which keeps the book accessible, es-
pecially given the subject matter. The book is inevitably acronym heavy, so it
helps if the reader is comfortable in that environment. A useful glossary is pro-
vided. The author notes that the reader who had a hard time keeping track of the
specialized terminology would not be alone: “In this war, there was an often-
confusing mix of civilian and military acronyms whose meanings were not en-
tirely clear to everyone.” One shortcoming is the lack of adequate maps; the few
that are included are reference maps that do not show force dispositions, plans,
or movements. That being said, Basrah, Baghdad, and Beyond is an excellent
book for officers or other professionals seeking to improve their understanding
of contemporary operational-level war fighting and could profitably be studied
at intermediate-level professional military education schools for seminars on
operational art. There is clearly much more to be written about this campaign,
but this book provides a good framework to launch the process.
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NEATNESS DOESN’T COUNT
Donald Chisholm
Williams, Cindy, ed. Filling the Ranks: Transforming the U.S.
Military System. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2004. 376pp. $50
Cold steel isn’t worth a damn in an emergency. You need men to direct it.
FREDERICK BRITTEN, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 15 MAY 1934
The road to hell is paved with good intentions.
MARY KATHERINE CHISHOLM (VARIOUS DATES)
To date, transformation debates have ranged widely over force structures, com-
mand and control, networked warfare, rapid decisive operations, and their asso-
ciated processes and technologies, not to mention privatization. It remains
personnel, however, that give life and shape to organizations, and there is pre-
cious little informed discussion of the critical problems of military personnel in
the contemporary setting. As part of a fine MIT publication series on national
security issues, Filling the Ranks might have done much to overcome that lacuna,
but unfortunately, it falls short in several respects; to follow its well-intentioned
policy recommendations would produce serious harm to a system that, judged
by its accomplishments, is already extraordinarily effective.
Filling the Ranks comprises twelve essays by different authors (two-thirds are
economists, several having political science or government backgrounds, with
one each from mathematics and business administration, and only a couple
with professional military experience), framed by introductory and concluding
chapters by its editor. Its self-proclaimed mission is to present “assessments of
U.S. military pay and personnel policies in light of the strategic, demographic,
economic, and labor realities of the future. It identi-
fies specific problems that today’s military career pat-
terns, training, pay, and benefits pose for officers and
enlisted men and women in both active duty and re-
serve forces, discussing such issues as competition with
the private sector for talent, the need to restructure
compensation, and provision of family support. It of-
fers recommendations for more flexible, adaptive, and
effective policies and a blueprint for achieving them.”1
Dr. Chisholm is a professor in the Joint Military Opera-
tions Department of the U.S. Naval War College. He
earned his PhD in political science from the University
of California, Berkeley. His book Waiting for Dead
Men’s Shoes: Origins and Development of the U.S.
Navy’s Officer Personnel System, 1793–1941 (Palo
Alto, Calif.: Stanford Univ. Press, 2001) received the
2001 Rear Admiral Samuel Eliot Morison Award for
Distinguished Contribution to Naval Literature.
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This reviewer offers a dissenting perspective. In so doing, I restrict my attention
to two principal problems of the work, constraints of space precluding both
wider-ranging evaluation and differentiated attention to its individual essays.
WHERE IS “SERVICE”?
This book’s component essays focus almost exclusively on manipulating “tangi-
ble inducements” to produce desired results. Frederick Winslow Taylor fa-
mously believed that people were at once inherently lazy and sorely greedy for
material goods.2 To overcome the former in the manufactory setting, to ensure
that workers would not “soldier,”Taylor disdained hourly or salaried pay and de-
vised a system of compensation directly tying individual pay to individual
productivity—the so-called piece-rate system, which was, in turn, contrived by
means of an empirical analysis of work processes. Scientific management would
thus improve productivity and eliminate the principal impetus for management-
labor discord by irrefutably establishing those production levels that were actu-
ally possible—management could not then ask for more, and workers could not
then perform less. Indeed, Taylor and his acolytes did bring a certain order to the
workplace and improved the efficiency of large industrial enterprises.3
Within less than two decades of Taylorism’s acme, however, pioneering em-
pirical studies by other students of organization and management, notably F. J.
Roethlisberger, demonstrated that organization of work processes and produc-
tion levels, far from being determined by scientific analysis and implemented by
management, were largely set and enforced through a complex informal social
organization of the workers.4
Shortly thereafter, a vastly experienced corporate executive, in residence for a
time at Harvard, observed that all organizations employ complex economies of
incentives to attract and retain workers and to secure from them the necessary
services.5 Chester I. Barnard concluded that although an objective economy of
incentives (pay and other material emoluments) was essential, no organization
ever possessed sufficient resources to secure required contributions solely by ob-
jective means. Consequently, all organizations also employed subjective econo-
mies of incentives appealing to other than purely material motivations (working
conditions, symbolic rewards, socialization to organizational values, and the
like), both as a matter of constrained resources and as practical recognition of
powerful human motivations that could be effectively manipulated by organiza-
tions for their own purposes.
It is mildly astonishing, therefore, that any serious discussion of military per-
sonnel “transformation” could be undertaken absent systematic consideration
of the subjective economy of incentives. Nonetheless, Taylor’s dogma, however
discredited, apparently constituted the alpha and omega of individual human
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motivation for the authors of this collection of essays. They seek to manipulate
those aspects susceptible of manipulation and measurement, irrespective of their
practical relevance to the problems at hand.6 Even this assumption is suspect—
efforts to structure naval officers’ pay to encourage willingness to go to sea began
in the early nineteenth century, meeting with only partial success. Tying promo-
tion to sea duty performed proved far more effective as an incentive. Moreover,
if the precise amounts of pay, allowances, incentives, and benefits actually re-
ceived by service members remain somewhat opaque and difficult to sum, it is
likely because such opacity serves a function in the larger polity.7
The military’s commissioned officer corps developed as a distinct profession
very early in its history, with internally derived performance standards and en-
forcement.8 For officers, and now increasingly senior enlisted personnel as well,
the subjective economy of incentives has elaborated to an effective complex of
mechanisms: the intrinsic value of service to and sacrifice for country; opportu-
nity for promotion through the grades; assignment to duty in which service
members can actively practice their profession, carry responsibility, and exercise
discretion, to include, ultimately, command; overseas travel and residence; ac-
cess to training and educational opportunities; decorations for valor and extraor-
dinary accomplishment; and opportunity to join a tradition of excellence and
achievement. Everyone has to pay the rent, but professional officers have always
been more highly motivated by the subjective economy of incentives than their
civilian counterparts, now made easier by very decent pay, the best retirement
program bar none, and other benefits. For good reason, service in the military
has been a calling sometimes likened to life in a monastery.
FALSE ECONOMY
There is another, troubling myopia common to these essays. In devising their
personnel systems, all organizations must attend to both economy—that is,
cost—and equity for individual members. First and foremost, however, we need
our organizations to be effective and reliable.9 We create and maintain public or-
ganizations to provide vital goods and services—external security primary
among them—that the market is unwilling or unable to provide reliably in de-
sired ways at appropriate levels, often because they cannot be generated at a
profit; that is, they are inherently inefficient. It is a perilous misdirection to be
efficiently ineffective, but especially so for public organizations, which need to
be assessed for accomplishment far more than cost. In fact, in the face of the un-
certainty and danger characteristic of turbulent environments, hard experience
shows us that effectiveness and reliability are rarely achieved absent organiza-
tional redundancy, even though this runs precisely opposite to the efficiency as-
sumptions and theorems of theoretical economics.10
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In the military context, effectiveness translates to war-fighting ability. One
searches in vain, however, for close attention to war fighting and military effec-
tiveness by the authors of Filling the Ranks. Rather, consistent with broader ef-
forts to bring the ethos of private business to the military over the past decade or
so, these essays focus on economic efficiency, with attention to equity as it ap-
pears to play in incentives for performance. Thus, one learns that because com-
puter specialists are worth more in the private market than they are currently
paid in the military, to improve their retention rates they should be paid more in
equivalent grades than the infantryman whose combat skills find little demand
in the private sector. Aside from its implicit dismissal of the vital importance of
the lowly grunt, especially in counterinsurgency and similar operations, and
bearing in mind the importance of technical knowledge in the modern U.S. mil-
itary, this recommendation ignores the fact that the military has long provided
social mobility by means of access to stable income, education, and training,
with the expectation that military personnel will move to the private sector—a
historically extraordinary and effective subsidy of industry. Comparisons of the
military services with private labor markets need to be undertaken advisedly and
only with careful qualification. Defense, is, after all, a public good and is likely to
remain so. As General Dwight D. Eisenhower once said to his subordinates:
“Now boys, let’s not make our mistakes in a hurry.”
Few would question that the military personnel system is now under great
stress. Let me suggest, however, that this strain has been produced not by diffi-
culties of the objective economy of incentives to which these essays address
themselves but by the post–Vietnam War shift to an all-volunteer force, the post–
Cold War drawdown in military strength, a world suffused with failing states
and the troubles they breed, unrealistic assumptions about the use of conven-
tional military force to produce desired results in this environment, intentional
Department of Defense policies that for reasons of economy have stripped vir-
tually all slack from the military services, an ongoing real shooting war, and the
resulting sustained high operational tempo (and concomitant personnel
tempo) that shows little sign of abating any time soon.11 Relieving this stress
hinges on addressing the underlying problems described immediately above, the
scope of which vastly exceeds those aspects of the personnel system considered
in Filling the Ranks.
In the end, these essays are not really about personnel reform and combat ef-
fectiveness. Rather, they are about two other, lesser objectives: making the sys-
tem more penetrable and rendering military personnel themselves more
malleable by their civilian masters; and reducing costs. That a personnel system is
cumbersome or difficult to manage presents no justification for reorganization
if it is already effective. Neatness doesn’t count; outcome counts. Institutions
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cumulate their structures and processes over decades and centuries of trial-
and-error response to practical problems and, although sometimes appearing
byzantine and arcane, usually have sound reasons for their particular configura-
tion. The track record for sweeping reorganizations remains dismal.12 These es-
says display poor historical grasp, suffering from casual, sometimes plain
inaccurate, empirical assertions, combined with an alarming lack of understand-
ing of the military profession and the factors that motivate its members. Finally,
these essays define the problem in terms of a preferred, a priori solution: instead
of working regressively from a carefully structured problem, they begin with a
set of untested assumptions and work forward, leading, fundamentally, to trying
to solve the wrong problem.13 This reviewer does not share the optimism of the
authors of Filling the Ranks; at the macro level, their policy recommendations do
not address the most serious military personnel problems but rather, if followed,
will produce myriad unintended consequences, some of which will be pro-
foundly negative.14
The military personnel system can benefit from careful empirical analysis to
produce an accurate image of its problems’ structures, accompanied by a system-
atic process of generating appropriate alternatives to the status quo, to be treated
as empirically testable hypotheses intended to produce incremental adaptations.
Also, notwithstanding contemporary urges to centralize, consolidate, and stan-
dardize (often under the mystical guise of enhanced “jointness”), any analysis
must take account of the fundamentally different histories, missions, and oper-
ating environments of the several services. Filling the Ranks does not provide
such an analysis.
NOTE S
1. Available at mitpress.mit.edu/catalog/author/
default.asp?aid=192.
2. See Frederick W. Taylor, The Principles of Sci-
entific Management (New York: Harper,
1911; repr. Norton, 1967). See also Judith
Merkle, Management and Ideology: The Leg-
acy of the International Scientific Management
Movement (Berkeley: Univ. of California
Press, 1980). Taylor’s aim was to decompose
given work processes into their smallest com-
ponents, define the levels and optimum
method for each, train workers to those com-
ponents, establish normative production lev-
els, and, finally, pay any given worker only
for that level of skill required and for his ac-
tual production. This diminished labor’s
power by making any one worker readily re-
placeable by any other suitably trained
worker.
3. Scientific management was implemented
over a vast olio of enterprises, including an
ill-fated experiment in Navy-owned ship-
yards that was quickly abandoned.
4. Along with Elton Mayo, George Homans,
and others, F. J. Roethlisberger conducted the
famous “Hawthorne Studies” over several
years, beginning in the mid-1920s, reported
in Management and Morale (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1941).
5. Chester I. Barnard gave a series of manage-
ment lectures at Harvard in 1937, published
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as Functions of the Executive (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1938), still in
print in many languages. This reviewer con-
siders it among the several best books on
management ever written. Among his many
accomplishments in both private and public
sectors, Barnard established and ran the
United Services Organization (USO) during
World War II.
6. Elizabeth A. Stanley-Mitchell’s “The Military
Profession and Intangible Rewards for Ser-
vice,” pp. 93–118, is the sole exception to this
generalization.
7. Congressional efforts to nail down exactly the
pay received by naval officers dates to at least
the mid-nineteenth century. The short-lived
reforms included discontinuance of fuel al-
lowances and rations, with increased pay to
compensate for same. Opacity also helps to
mask the inevitable inequalities and inequi-
ties in any system of compensation, thereby
reducing heartburn. See Donald Chisholm,
Waiting for Dead Men’s Shoes: Origins and
Development of the U.S. Navy’s Officer Person-
nel System, 1793–1941 (Palo Alto, Calif.: Stan-
ford Univ. Press, 2001), chaps. 7–11, 23.
8. See Christopher McKee, A Gentlemanly and
Honorable Profession: The Creation of the U.S.
Naval Officer Corps, 1794–1815 (Annapolis,
Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1991); Peter
Karsten, The Naval Aristocracy: The Golden
Age of Annapolis and the Emergence of
Navalism (New York: Free Press, 1972); and
Chisholm, Waiting for Dead Men’s Shoes.
9. See Chisholm, Waiting for Dead Men’s Shoes,
chap. 1.
10. See Martin Landau, “Redundancy, Reliability,
and the Problem of Duplication and Overlap,”
Public Administration Review 29 (1972), pp.
346–58.
11. The military faces well documented recruit-
ment and retention problems, which the re-
viewer believes resulted primarily from a
post–Cold War military that was structured
and sized to fight conventional conflicts of
the preferred American type but that now is
and will be called upon for the foreseeable fu-
ture to fight low-intensity conflicts that are
enormously consumptive of personnel over
long periods of time.
12. Abysmally unsuccessful Western efforts to
“develop” third world countries by means of
large-scale projects that ignore local history
and institutions are instructive on this point.
See, for example, J. Stephen Lansing, “Bali-
nese ‘Water Temples’ and the Management
of Irrigation,” American Anthropologist 89
(1987), pp. 326–41.
13. Economists have largely remained indifferent
to the practical problems of searching for and
generating alternatives because it assumes
that the market will present alternatives to
the decision maker. Notable exceptions in-
clude Wesley C. Mitchell and Herbert A.
Simon.
14. See Robert K. Merton, “The Unanticipated
Consequences of Social Action,” American
Sociological Review 1(1936), pp. 894–904. Un-
intended and unanticipated consequences are
not the same as the economist’s “negative ex-
ternalities,” about which, by definition, the
individual decision maker, the firm, does not
care. Responsible public policy makers, in
contrast, must be concerned with unantici-
pated consequences.
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BOOK REVIEWS
NOT THE DAYS OF CLAUSEWITZ
Smith, General Sir Rupert. The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World. London: Penguin,
2005. 428pp. £25
Military theorists around the globe have
noted changes in the landscape of war-
fare—nonstate actors, asymmetric
threats, technology proliferation,
etc.—and suggested that the military
forces currently fielded by Western na-
tions are not equipped to respond to
them. The latest product of this analysis
is The Utility of Force: The Art of War in
the Modern World, by General Sir
Rupert Smith.
Smith certainly has the appropriate cre-
dentials to write about the topic. He
commanded the British 1st Armoured
Division in the first Gulf war and was
commander of UN forces in Bosnia at
the time of the Dayton Peace Accords
in 1995. After three years as General
Officer Commanding Northern Ireland,
he became Deputy Supreme Allied
Commander Europe (DSACEUR), serv-
ing as second in command to a U.S.
general, Wesley Clark, during the
NATO air campaign in Kosovo.
The variety of the author’s experiences
throughout his distinguished career is
critical, because these experiences con-
stitute the framework for his thinking
about war. First, he emphasizes the
importance of separately considering
the effects of force at the three levels of
war: tactical, operational (or theater, as
Smith prefers), and strategic. Having
held commands at each level, he has
gained his appreciation of this first-
hand. Second, much of Smith’s com-
mand experience has been as part of
coalitions, which he recognizes will
continue to play a significant role in fu-
ture warfare. Finally, he taxonomizes
modern warfare—which he dates from
the wars of Napoleon—into three dis-
tinct forms of war, corresponding
roughly to three historical periods: inter-
state industrial war, the Cold War
(which he regards as primarily an
anomaly of the era of mutually assured
destruction), and “war amongst the
people.” Just as Smith has commanded
troops at each of the levels of war, he
has served in some capacity in all three
forms of war.
The most novel contribution Smith
makes is his discussion of the implica-
tions of “war amongst the people.” This
is grounded in the idea that troops to-
day are committed for much different
reasons than in the days of Clausewitz,
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and against much different enemies—
enemies who do not wear a uniform
but move freely “amongst the people.”
Smith uses this idea to examine past
conflicts, touching on the guerrilla
fighters operating on the Iberian Penin-
sula in the Napoleonic wars before
moving on to analyze the British suc-
cesses in Malaya, the French and Amer-
ican failures in Vietnam, and the two
Gulf wars. Thereafter, he develops a se-
ries of questions for commanders to ask
prior to the employment of force and
devotes the penultimate chapter to ap-
plying these questions, albeit post hoc,
to his experience in Bosnia.
The Utility of Force is not a scholarly
work, nor does it claim to be; it has few
footnotes and no bibliography, but nei-
ther does it need them. The book is not
military history but rather a skillfully
presented interpretation of certain
trends in the history of warfare. Mean-
while, it raises a number of important
questions that all future strategic lead-
ers should be considering.
ROBERT BOLIA
Air Force Research Laboratory
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base
Fontenot, Gregory, E. J. Degen, and David Tohn.
On Point: The United States Army in Operation
Iraqi Freedom. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute
Press, 2005. 539pp. $34.95
On Point, as stated in its opening pages,
is clearly intended for a professional
military audience. General Eric K.
Shinseki, former chief of staff of the
Army, commissioned this work in 2003
as an after-action review. The overarch-
ing purposes were to educate soldiers
and defense professionals with respect
to the conduct of combat in Operation
IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) and to suggest
implications for continued U.S. Army
transformation.
In telling the story of the Army in OIF,
the authors appeal not only to the target
audience but to the general public at
large through objective and informative
analysis. On Point provides a clear ap-
preciation for the complexities involved
in planning, preparation, and execution
of military operations across the range of
military operations. Further, On Point
provides the lay reader insight into the
after-action-review process, which re-
mains critical to advancing institutional
learning and improving the future appli-
cation of the armed forces as an instru-
ment of national power.
On Point tells the story from a decid-
edly Army perspective. The discussion
encompasses topics essentially in three
parts, from the strategic-operational
level down to the tactical level of war.
The first discusses the Army prepara-
tion for OIF. The second focuses on the
ground war through the conclusion of
major offensive combat operations. It is
discussed in four phases: Phase I—
preparation, Phase II—shaping the
battlespace, Phase III—decisive offen-
sive operations, and Phase IV—post-
hostilities. Finally there is an analysis of
the campaign’s implications regarding
future conflict, Army organization, and
transformation to a future force. Army
successes and failures are clearly delin-
eated, along with the authors’ recommen-
dations for the future.
Like many military books written by
military officers and professionals, On
Point often suffers from an overempha-
sis on acronyms and abbreviations,
making the writing sometimes dry and
overly detailed. Nonetheless, the
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authors have effectively blended official
battle narratives, after-action reviews,
and eyewitness accounts of the war to
emphasize one or more of the central
themes to be investigated by the OIF
Study Group.
Shortly after its completion in 2004, On
Point was available only online through
links to the Center for Army Lessons
Learned (CALL), and to a select group
of officers fortunate enough to receive a
limited edition produced by the Com-
bat Studies Institute Press in 2004. This
first edition from the Naval Institute
Press makes the work available to the
public in a single bound edition. Unlike
the online version, the pictures, illustra-
tions, graphics, and maps are difficult
to read and interpret accurately due to
poor printing and reproduction. Until
this problem is corrected in a subse-
quent edition, the reader should refer
to the color online version for any nec-
essary clarification. Additional tools
available to the reader include a com-
plete glossary of military terms and acro-
nyms, as well as a detailed U.S. order of
battle for Operation IRAQI FREEDOM.
Nonmilitary readers will no doubt need
to consult both items early and often
during their reading and study.
TERRY L. SELLERS
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army
Ellis, Jason D., and Geoffrey D. Kiefer. Combating
Proliferation: Strategic Intelligence & Security Pol-
icy. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 2004.
287pp. $48
Jason Ellis, a former senior research pro-
fessor at the National Defense Univer-
sity, and Geoffrey Kiefer, a researcher at
NDU’s Center for Counterproliferation
Research, seek to illuminate the intersec-
tion between intelligence and America’s
“quest to prevent and manage WMD
proliferation.”
The authors focus on six topics, dis-
cussing the issues involved in each, and
illustrate each with a pair of case stud-
ies. Chapter 2, “Standards of Evidence,”
focuses on intelligence concerning the
Pakistani nuclear program and Chinese
missile assistance, while the remaining
five chapters address, in succession, es-
timative uncertainties and policy trade-
offs, intelligence surprise, intelligence
sharing, military support, and war-
fighting in a WMD context. The North
Korean nuclear program and Soviet/
Russian biological warfare activities
serve as the case studies for the estima-
tive uncertainties chapter. They are fol-
lowed by studies on India’s 1998
nuclear tests, North Korea’s 1998
launch of a three-stage Taepo Dong-1,
and U.S. intelligence sharing with Rus-
sia (concerning its nuclear and missile
assistance to Iran) and the United Na-
tions Special Commission (UNSCOM),
as well as the boarding of the Yin He
along with the attack on the al-Shifa fa-
cility in Sudan. The final two case stud-
ies examine the Operation DESERT
STORM air campaign and counterforce
in DESERT FOX.
As indicated by the sixty-three-page
notes section, the authors made an ex-
tensive effort to mine the open-source
literature for relevant material. As a re-
sult, their case studies provide valuable
accounts of some of the key examples of
the intersection of intelligence and pro-
liferation in recent years.
One shortcoming stems from Ellis’s and
Kiefer’s desire to focus on current de-
velopments concerning the intersection
of intelligence and proliferation. In
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doing so, the authors have bypassed any
discussion of older events that might
have provided opportunities for some
long-term perspective.
They report the recommendations of
Admiral David Jeremiah’s investigation
of the intelligence community’s failure
to provide advance warning of India’s
1998 tests. Yet those recommenda-
tions—including altering collection pri-
orities, better human intelligence, and
improved coordination—are eerily sim-
ilar to those of the community’s post-
mortem of its failure to warn of India’s
1974 test. The similarities raise a num-
ber of questions—possibly, that the in-
telligence community has simply
proven it is unable or unwilling to cor-
rect its shortcomings.
Another problem for the reader (al-
though not the authors’ fault) is that
the book only briefly refers to Opera-
tion IRAQI FREEDOM. There is only a
brief mention of Colin Powell’s presen-
tation of intelligence to the UN, and
none at all of the postwar findings on
U.S. intelligence performance. Had the
book been completed a year or two
later, these would have been prime top-
ics. However, Combating Proliferation is
not a book overtaken by events but





Herspring, Dale R. The Pentagon and the Presi-
dency: Civil-Military Relations from FDR to
George W. Bush. Lawrence: Univ. Press of Kansas,
2005. 512pp. $45
Civil-military relations are the subject
of considerable scrutiny and debate
throughout the Clinton presidency.
Unfortunately, the academicians, jour-
nalists, and occasional uniformed pro-
fessionals who joined in that debate
have been inexplicably mute since the
Bush-Cheney-Rumsfeld regime came to
power. So this inquiry by Kansas State
University political science professor
Dale Herspring offers a welcome shot of
intellectual adrenalin to an enduringly
important, if temporarily moribund,
topic. Herspring confronts two issues
that are central to the canonical dis-
course of civil-military relations: civil-
ian control of the military by elected
and appointed political officials, and
the political neutrality or nonneutrality
of those in uniform. Herspring is well
qualified to address the subject, having
spent twenty years as a foreign service
officer in relatively senior State Depart-
ment and Defense Department assign-
ments, as well as some thirty-two years
of combined active and reserve duty in
the Navy.
Focusing his attention primarily on the
senior ranks of the military—the con-
trolled—rather than on the civilian
controllers, Herspring considers the in-
tersection of presidential leadership and
military culture an arena of inevitable
conflict. Where the two are compatible,
he argues, conflict is minimized; where
they are not compatible, the frequency
and intensity of conflict are magnified.
He holds that since the Truman admin-
istration the military has become pro-
gressively more political, displaying
common interest-group behavior by
using Congress and the media to serve
its own institutional self-interest at the
expense of dutiful obedience to execu-
tive civilian authority.
1 7 2 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
T:\Academic\NWC Review\NWC Review Spring 2006\Ventura\NWC Review Spring 2006.vp
Tuesday, April 11, 2006 8:23:05 AM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
178
Naval War College Review, Vol. 59 [2006], No. 2, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol59/iss2/1
Herspring devotes a chapter to each of
the twelve presidencies from Franklin
D. Roosevelt to George W. Bush. Each
chapter, identical in structure, begins
with a brief examination of the leader-
ship style of the president concerned,
along with two or three case studies de-
picting the military’s reaction to it on
particular critical issues, and concludes
with a discussion of two questions: To
what degree did the president’s leader-
ship style mirror or violate military cul-
ture, and how did that style affect
civil-military relations? Did military
culture change or employ new methods
to oppose change?
Conflict between senior civilian officials
and the senior military, though inevita-
ble, Herspring believes, can be miti-
gated by presidential behavior. Over
time, such conflict has been most pro-
nounced in administrations where pres-
idential leadership style and military
culture have been most at odds.
Herspring adjudges the level of conflict
as high in the Johnson, Nixon, and
Clinton administrations; moderate un-
der Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy,
Carter, and George W. Bush; but mini-
mal under Roosevelt, Ford, Reagan, and
George H. W. Bush.
This is a book that should command at-
tention from students of civil-military
relations. Although it is an interesting
read—thoroughly but not exhaustively
researched, tightly and coherently
structured—its ultimate value is as de-
scriptive historical synthesis. It offers
no conceptual breakthroughs and does
not examine in any detail such impor-
tant issues as the highly political behav-
ior of senior officers like Colin Powell
and Alexander Haig or the growing prac-
tice of retired senior officers, like William
Crowe, to endorse presidential candidates
(arguably for political patronage) and,
like Wesley Clark and Barry McCaffrey,
to provide regular news commentary
on controversial public policy issues;
the firings and resignations of selected
senior officers (John Singlaub, Michael
Dugan, Frederick Woerner, Ron
Fogleman, even Eric Shinseki), and the
associated failure of senior officers to
accept responsibility for gross military
lapses like Abu Ghraib and the bomb-
ing of the Beirut Marine barracks,
Khobar Towers, or the USS Cole; and,
most notably, Iran-Contra and its after-
math, particularly the roles played by
Robert McFarlane, John Poindexter,
Oliver North, and Colin Powell. More
discussion on these issues would have
strengthened the author’s thesis and the
reader’s understanding of military
politicization and professionalism.
Although such omissions do not
weaken the book noticeably, the au-
thor’s avoidance of normative judg-
ment is a shortcoming worth noting. Is
conflict between civilian officials and
the military healthy or unhealthy? Is
there a proper distinction to be drawn
between responsible military dissent
and disobedience? Which of the mili-
tary’s obligations takes precedence, du-
tiful obedience to civilian authority or
checking and balancing civilian impetu-
osity, ineptitude, or misconduct?
Such questions remind us that civil-
military relations are an endless contest
of principle and personality in democra-
cies fledgling and mature. One suspects
that this contribution from Dale
Herspring will have the salutary effect of
reminding us of that fact and rekindling
much-needed debate on the subject.
GREGORY D. FOSTER
Industrial College of the Armed Forces
National Defense University
B O O K R E V I E W S 1 7 3
T:\Academic\NWC Review\NWC Review Spring 2006\Ventura\NWC Review Spring 2006.vp
Tuesday, April 11, 2006 8:23:05 AM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
179
Naval War College: Full Spring 2006 Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2006
McCoy, Jennifer L., and David J. Myers, eds. The
Unraveling of Representative Democracy in Vene-
zuela. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 2004.
342pp. $49.95
By far one of the more interesting and
challenging issues facing U.S. national
decision makers today is what to do
about Venezuelan president Hugo
Chavez and his Bolivarian revolution.
Since Chavez came to power Venezuela
has shifted from a staunch friend to a
strident antagonist and become much
more closely aligned with Cuba, and it
now appears increasingly willing to find
new markets for its oil. Given that Ven-
ezuelan crude supplies approximately
13 percent of U.S. energy needs, these
are developments U.S decision makers
cannot take lightly.
The Unraveling of Representative De-
mocracy in Venezuela attempts to ex-
plain how the political landscape of
Venezuela evolved to the point where a
Chavez victory was possible. In this ef-
fort, the editors succeed admirably. Not
only does this work boast solid scholar-
ship and impressive research, but it
stands as a superb example of what an
edited volume should be but all too
rarely is.
The book begins with an exploration of
the history of the Punto Fijo democ-
racy, which was essentially an agree-
ment between Venezuelan political
elites, establishing a representative de-
mocracy. In chapter 1, David Myers
examines how this agreement was
reached and how, over time, the terms
of the agreement became codified into
the Venezuelan political landscape.
The result was one of the most stable
and long-lived democracies in South
America.
Chapters 2 through 6 deal with various
elements of Venezuelan society and
how it reacted to or was incorporated
within the Punto Fijo regime, including
how eventually the regime could no
longer be maintained in the face of in-
creasing political stress. A variety of actors,
from the urban poor to the professional
military to Venezuelan intellectuals, are
examined. Each chapter is well written
and thought provoking and comple-
ments the other portions of the book.
Among its more intriguing conclusions
is that an increasingly professionalized
officer corps became a key component
in the success of Venezuelan democ-
racy. With professionalization came ac-
ceptance of civil control of the military
and a greatly diminished role in internal
security issues. When this changed in
1989, at the request of civilian authority,
the officer corps became increasingly po-
liticized. Today, a significant percentage,
if not a majority, of formerly civic func-
tions are carried out by military officers
whose primary attribute is a fierce per-
sonal loyalty to Hugo Chavez.
Chapters 9 through 11 deal with policy
decisions made during the Punto Fijo
years and how, gradually, the existing
political parties grew unable to cope
with or meet the demands of an increas-
ingly disillusioned public. Through this
examination the reader grows to under-
stand that it was this political failure
that enabled Chavez to rise to power.
Furthermore, by 1998 the vast majority
of Venezuelan voters welcomed Chavez,
believing change preferable to main-
taining the status quo.
The description of the evolution of a
representative Venezuelan democracy
to a democracy of direct participation is
compelling and fascinating. It is so well
handled that one wishes the authors
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had spent as much time dissecting the
Chavez regime as those that preceded it.
One of the few drawbacks is that there
is little attention to an examination of
Hugo Chavez and his inner circle of
advisors.
This book is a must-read for anyone
who wishes to get beyond Chavez’s
rhetoric and red beret. It would enrich
any South American regional studies
course and has applicability for other
disciplines as well. Readers who take the
time to consider The Unraveling of Rep-
resentative Democracy in Venezuela will
emerge richer for the effort. Among
those who should read it are business-
men interested in Venezuelan markets
and any military officer assigned to the
U.S. Southern Command.
Given the success McCoy and Myers
have had in creating this book, it is only




Bush, Elizabeth Kauffman. America’s First Frog-
man: The Draper Kauffman Story. Annapolis,
Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2004. 221pp. $28.94
War brings out the best as well as the
worst in human nature. Freedom for
Americans has always depended on the
bravery and innovation of servicemen
willing to endure danger and privation.
Elizabeth Kauffman Bush has written a
marvelous account of one such hero,
her brother, Draper Kauffman—the na-
tion’s first frogman and the founder of
the Navy SEALs.
Determined to follow in the footsteps
of his father (Vice Admiral James
Laurence), Kauffman persevered at the
Naval Academy despite his poor eye-
sight, which nearly prevented him from
attending and initially denied him a
commission in the Navy when he grad-
uated in 1933.
Disappointed but undaunted, he ac-
cepted a position at a shipping company,
U.S. Lines, in New York, where he be-
came assistant operations manager. His
two-month tenure at the company’s
German office in 1939 convinced him
that the United States had to join with
France and Great Britain to stop Hitler.
When he returned home, Kauffman
joined the free-lecture circuit urging
early American intervention in the war,
in defiance of the prevailing isolationist
sentiment in the United States.
Eager to do more to defend the cause of
freedom, Kauffman joined the Ameri-
can Volunteer Ambulance Corps, which
placed itself under the direct command
of the French army. He served with
valor as an ambulance driver during the
Battle of France in May–June 1940 be-
fore the Germans captured him. He
languished several weeks in a Nazi
prisoner-of-war camp, dropping forty
pounds before the American embassy
secured his release.
After a six-week voyage from Portugal,
Kauffman arrived in Great Britain at
the peak of Hitler’s bombing campaign.
He joined the Royal Navy and became
expert at the harrowing task of diffus-
ing delayed-action German bombs and
mines during the Blitz. He narrowly es-
caped with his own life when a mine he
was working on blew up.
Kauffman returned home to recover
from his wounds, and in November 1941
he finally received his commission in the
U.S. Naval Reserve. His experience in
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Great Britain won him the job of
launching the Navy’s Bomb Disposal
School, receiving his first Navy Cross
for dismantling a five-hundred-pound
bomb dropped in Hawaii by the Japa-
nese attack on Pearl Harbor. Chosen in
1943 to establish an underwater demo-
lition school in Fort Pierce, Florida,
Kauffman rigorously trained teams
later known as frogmen (later to be
known as the Navy SEALs) to defuse
bombs and destroy submerged obsta-
cles deployed by the Nazis to impede
the invasion of France. Kauffman re-
ceived his second Navy Cross for valor
in leading underwater demolition teams
at Tinian in the Pacific, as well as ad-
vance demolition teams at the invasions
of Iwo Jima and Okinawa.
When the war ended, Draper Kauffman
continued his distinguished naval ca-
reer, commanding the destroyer USS
Gearing and the heavy cruiser Helena.
Promoted early to rear admiral,
Kauffman eventually became superin-
tendent of the U.S. Naval Academy in
Annapolis, Maryland. His naval career
concluded with two postings: as Com-
mander, U.S. Naval Forces, Philippines,
and then as commandant of the Ninth
Naval District and the Great Lakes
Training Center, north of Chicago.
Kauffman retired from the Navy in
1973, revered by those with whom he
had served. The author of this work is
Kauffman’s sister, Elizabeth Kauffman
Bush. Her historical analysis is precise,
concise, and judicious. She has not only
mastered such technically intricate top-
ics as bomb demolition but conveys
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OF SPECIAL INTEREST
. . . AT THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Annual International Law Conference, 28–30 June 2006. “Global Legal Challenges:
Command of the Commons, Strategic Communications, and Natural Disas-
ters,” a colloquium of international law scholars, practitioners, and students to
examine legal standards applicable to pressing global challenges—the global
commons, strategic communications, and natural disasters—will be hosted by
the International Law Department of the Center for Naval Warfare Studies. All
those attending the conference will be integral participants in this colloquium,
and the Naval War College will publish the conference proceedings as a volume
in its renowned International Law Study series. For agenda and registration in-
formation, visit www.nwc.navy.mil/ild.
Spring Intersessional. The Naval War College’s Spring 2006 Intersessional Con-
ference was held 6–7 March, on the theme “Employing Strategic Communica-
tions in the Modern Operational Environment.” Panels addressed “The Nature of
Strategic Communications,” “The Message and the Audience of Strategic Com-
munications,” and “The Bearers of Strategic Communications.” Panelists included
teaching and research faculty, supplemented by representatives from the Navy,
Department of State, industry, and major universities. Readings are available on
the College’s website, at www.nwc.navy.mil/pao/L1/Upcoming%20Events.htm
(click on “intersessional conference”).
The Edward S. Miller Research Fellowship in Naval History. The Naval War Col-
lege Foundation intends to award one grant of $1,000 to the researcher who has
the greatest need and can make the optimum use of research materials for naval
history located in the Naval War College’s Archives, Naval Historical Collection,
Naval War College Museum, and Henry E. Eccles Library. (A guide to the College’s
manuscript, archival, and oral history collections may be found on the Naval War
College’s website: www.nwc.navy.mil/museum, under “naval history resources,”
click on “Naval Historical Collection Publications.” Further information and
copies of registers for specific collections are available online or on request from
the Head, Naval Historical Collection, e-mail evelyn.cherpak@nwc.navy.mil.)
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The recipient will be a research fellow in the Naval War College’s Maritime
History Department, which will provide administrative support during the re-
search visit. Submit a detailed research proposal that includes a statement of
need and plan for optimal use of Naval War College materials, curriculum vi-
tae, at least two letters of recommendation, and relevant background informa-
tion to Miller Naval History Fellowship Committee, Naval War College
Foundation, 686 Cushing Road, Newport, R.I., 02841-1207, by 1 August
2006. For further information, contact the chair of the selection committee
at john.hattendorf@nwc.navy.mil. Employees of the Naval War College or any
agency of the U.S. Department of Defense are not eligible for consideration;
EEO/AA regulations apply.
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RECENT BOOKS
Osborne, Eric. W. Cruisers and Battle
Cruisers: An Illustrated History of Their
Impact. Santa Barbara, Calif.: ABC-CLIO,
2004. 283pp. $85
“Men and women who operate cruisers
[today] do so in an environment where
the future of their ships is question-
able.” It is an ironic state of affairs for a
warship type that has the “most lengthy
stories” of any, save only the battleship.
Like its companion volumes in the pub-
lisher’s Weapons and Warfare series, it
defines and describes the type and
traces its evolution (in this case from its
“prehistory” in the Age of Sail), in the
not only military but historical and so-
cial context (an area where this volume
is especially strong), up to 2004. All this
accounts for a little more than half the
book, by bulk; the rest is a tabulation of
cruiser classes, with specifications, sum-
maries of historical highlights, and in
most cases black-and-white photo-
graphs. In this section the rapid trans-
formation of the “cruiser” type in the
late nineteenth century is especially
striking—from the Vauban, much like
the U.S. screw steamers of the Civil
War, to the Dupuy de Lome, which
looks like nothing so much as a
crocodile in a children’s book. Glossary,
selected bibliography, and index.
Polmar, Norman, comp. The Naval In-
stitute Guide to the Ships and Aircraft of
the U.S. Fleet. 18th ed. Annapolis, Md.:
Naval Institute Press, 2005. 672pp.
$89.95
This series forms, with the Jane’s family
and Combat Fleets of the World, the
standard reference in the field—anyone
familiar enough with the subject to
need such a book is already aware of its
use and value. The eighteenth edition
adds chapters on littoral combat ships
and unmanned aerial vehicles, and up-
dates on carrier air wing composition,
prepositioning ships, submarine rescue
systems, unmanned undersea vehicles,
the MH-60R/S helicopter, and the
Coast Guard’s DEEPWATER program.
The volume contains 918 photos and
114 other illustrations, general and
ship-name/class indexes, and appendixes
(four of them tabular, plus essays on the
Arsenal Ship and transformation).
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Rasor, Eugene. English/British Naval
History to 1815: A Guide to the Litera-
ture. Bibliographies and Indexes in Mil-
itary Studies, no. 15. Westport, Conn.:
Praeger, 2004. 913pp. $119.95
Sixteen years ago, Eugene Rasor pub-
lished an invaluable guide to naval his-
tory in his British Naval History since
1815 (Praeger, 1990). He has now sup-
plemented that work with a new guide,
English/British Naval History to 1815.
The new work differs from the earlier
work, not only in being a “prequel” of
nearly twice the size but in having for
every entry an annotation that assesses
its reference value. Together, Rasor’s
volumes provide an unmatched refer-
ence guide to British naval history for
interested readers, students, and scholars
of naval history, of all levels and inter-
ests. Rasor’s new volume is particularly
welcome because of the 2005 bicentenary
of the battle of Trafalgar. While that
commemorative event has produced a
large number of new works that will
need to be considered in future biblio-
graphical studies, Rasor is aware of
many research works in progress and
has incorporated as many as he could
into this bibliography. The 4,124 entries
in his alphabetical listing of the most
important scholarly and printed mate-
rials on the full range of topics in the
naval history of England and Great
Britain from the earliest times to 1815
is conveniently linked to and prefaced
by a 373-page historiographical narra-
tive. His authoritative introduction is
helpfully divided into numerous chap-
ters and subsections devoted to spe-
cific periods and major thematic topics.
This will not only serve as a guide to
what has been written but provide a stim-
ulus to what yet needs to be done on this
subject.
Sorley, Lewis, ed. Vietnam Chronicles:
The Abrams Tapes, 1968–1972. Lubbock:
Texas Tech Univ. Press, 2004. 917pp. $50
In 1972, when General Creighton
Abrams returned to Washington from
Vietnam to assume the duties of Army
chief of staff, he brought along some
two thousand hours of tape recordings
of briefings and discussions made dur-
ing his four-year tenure as Commander
U.S. Military Assistance Command
Vietnam (MACV). The tapes were clas-
sified and sealed after his death in 1974.
Sorley, while writing Abrams’s biogra-
phy, became aware of the tapes, and
they were made available to him for use
in his 1999 A Better War. Screening the
tapes, Sorley produced some 3,200
handwritten pages of notes, much more
than he could use. This work, then, is
an annotated collection of excerpts
from those notes. Many themes con-
cerning strategy, tactics, intelligence,
etc., emerge in this work and provide
the MACV view of the war from the
perspectives of Abrams, his senior com-
manders and staff officers, and Ambas-
sador Ellsworth Bunker. They will be of
use to scholars and researchers of the
1968–72 period. For a broader perspec-
tive of the war see William Gibbons’s
The U.S. Government and the Vietnam
War (edited by Edward Keefer), which
describes and analyzes U.S. policy, or
the State Department’s official record of
U.S. foreign policy and diplomacy dur-
ing the Vietnam War.
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